NUS talk-interpreting Chinese element.pptx

Hepeng Jia
School of Communication, Soochow Univ
Exploring China perspectives in science, health
and environmental communications:
What we can do and how

Strong academic for climate comm
Soochow University Science and SciComm Team
The team was co-founded in 2019 by two professors, Hepeng Jia and
Guoyan Wang. After four years of development, the team members have grown
from 4 to 12 (2020: +2, 2021: +4, 2023: +4). The team’s research interests
cover science communication, health communication, risk communication,
science and technology policy, climate communication and other related fields.
The team has received a total of 5 national social science projects (2
national social science key projects), two National Natural Science Foundation
projects, 8 Ministry of Education, Jiangsu Province and other provincial and
ministerial level research projects, 9 central government projects Projects
commissioned by ministries and commissions; published a total of 60+ articles
in core journals (SCI/SSCI>=50), 1 English monograph, and multiple textbooks.
F a c u l t y m e m b e r s

What has China done
https://doi.org/10.1177/09636625221090729
Public Understandingof S
cience
2022, Vol. 31(3) 331–339
© The Author(s) 2022
Article reuse guidelines:
sagepub.com/journals-permissions
DOI: 10.1177/09636625221090729
journals.sagepub.com/home/pus
P U S
More engagement but less
participation: China’salternative
approach to public communication
of science and technology
Hepeng J
ia
S
oochow University, China
Abstract
This essay critically traces the development of public engagement with science in China in the past
decade and relevant scholarly studies. While confirming the country’s tremendous progress in the field
achieved either by official efforts or by social media empowerment, it argues that science communication
advanceshave not realized the public engagement with science ideal of enablingthe public to participate in
constructive dialogue for policymaking. However, citing recent studies on the specifics of China’s science
communication, ranging from scientists’ reliance on their organization, to the consequences of attitudinal
polarization, this article appeals to an alternative research agenda to broaden our understanding of the
dynamic science communication process in the world’s most populous nation.
Keywords
attitudinal polarization, collectivism, nationalism, organization reliance, public engagement with science,
public participation, social mediaempowerment
Ten years after my colleague and I drafted the essay discussing China’ s hard road to public
engagement with science (PES; Jia and Liu, 2014) for a special issue of Public Understanding
of Science (PUS; Stilgoe et al., 2014), the task to assess the PES in the country has become even
trickier. China has achieved tremendous progress in making more people understand science.
However, (after However) the dialogic mode of science communication, particularly regarding
policy issues, is declining.
While this essay demonstrates the up-and-downs of PES in China, I will refrain from making a
normative judgment. Instead, this essay attempts to probe what this distinctive situation might
mean for public understanding of science and what alternative research agendas we might need.
Corresponding author:
HepengJ
ia, S
chool of Communication, S
oochow University, Dushuhu Campus, S
uzhou, 215123, China.
Email: hpjia@suda.edu.cn
1090729P
US0010.1177/09636625221090729 Public Understanding of Science J
ia
resear ch-article 2022
Invited essay

What has China done
 Scientifically literate public surpassed the
benchmark 10% of the population in 2019.
 By 2019, science museums certified by the
association have reached 293 from nine in
10 years ago
 2.7 billion attendances of science
communication activities, both on-site and
online, were recorded in 2020, an annual
increase of 138%.
 The new mid- and long-term scientific
literacy working plan (2021–2035).

What has China done
But:
• The open debates on GM organisms (GMOs; Yuan,
2010), potentially polluting chemicals (Jia, 2014), trash
incineration (Huang, 2015), and hydropower projects
(Jia, 2021) organized by civil society organizations in the
2000s and early-2010s nearly disappeared in around
the mid-2010s.
• Scientific Squirrel and PaperClip closed.
• Dialogic pattern of public engagement with science has
not been formed in China, despite the convenience
caused by social media.
• Citizen science versus citizen science communicators.

Public engagement versus participation
• Hundreds of science museums, more interactive and attractive
communication projects, more funding and encouraging
policies, and flourishing social media accounts and celebrities
popularizing science online. But on the other side, open
debates, consensus conferences, the public hearing for science,
and other initiatives that support the lay public to question
science policies, have disappeared from view.
• Can the situation be called PES?
• But: The classic meaning of PES is focused on the political
dimension (Lewenstein, 2016).
• In China, the public is increasingly “engaged” by diversified
science stuff in increasingly interactive ways.
• You cannot engage the public against COVID-19 in a dialogic
way.

Trends and patterns of the world’s SC scholarship –
Is China similar?
1. The role of scientific literacy is increasingly questioned
and put into contexts.
2. From popularization to polarization.
3. Motivated reasoning and broadened cognitive models,
e.g. Cultural cognition for science (communication).
4. Misinformation intensively examined.
5. Rethinking Public Engagement in Science.
6. Rewriting other classic theories in the new SC
environment.

The role of science litreacy reconsidered
1. Improving the scientific literacy of the public has long been regarded as the
primary goal of science popularization or science communication.
2. The traditional view is that the higher the scientific quality, the easier it is to
support scientific undertakings.
3. Scientific literacy is also considered to make it easier to mobilize citizens to
participate in and accept scientific innovations.
4. Countries have formed relatively unified scales, most of which are derived
from the indicator system developed by American scholar Jon Miller.
5. Improving the scientific quality of citizens is regarded as the core pursuit and
main assessment indicator of my country's science popularization work.

1. Scientific knowledge (which forms the core component of scientific literacy) can
predict overall positive attitudes toward science, but the degree of support for
specific scientific issues depends on environmental factors (Sturgis & Allum, 2004).
2. Overall scientific knowledge does not predict attitudes toward GMOs, while
knowledge of genetics only weakly predicts attitudes toward GMOs (Allum et al.,
2008). However, familiarity with scientific procedures (another component of the
scientific literacy scale) can positively predict attitudes towards GM (Ceccoli &
Hixon, 2012).
3. Scientific knowledge is useful in predicting attitudes toward less controversial
technologies, such as nanotechnology (Brossard et al., 2009).
4. However, once prior knowledge is acquired, even attitudes toward nanotechnology
are affected by prior attitudes (Druckman & Bolsen, 2011).

1. In the United States, where the issue of climate change is highly
controversial, scientific literacy cannot predict support for policies and, on
the contrary, predicts polarized attitudes (Drummond & Fischhoff, 2017).
2. Scientific literacy predicts resistance to conspiracy theories, but the effect
is relatively small. The impact of scientific literacy on health behavior
depends on context (Cavojova et al., 2020; He et al., 2021).
3. The more opposed people are to GM, the more they think they have
higher knowledge of GM (Fernbach et al., 2019; Min et al., 2021).
4. The (European and American) left and right tend to have higher
(objective) knowledge in the areas they support and more incorrect
knowledge in the areas they oppose (Nisbet et al., 2015).

Is Everything about Conspiracy Theories?
The Impact of Public Perception of Conspiracy Theories on
Chinese Public’s Intention for Covid-19 Vaccination
杨正, 罗茜,*贾鹤鹏
苏州大学传媒学院

Survey：
A nationwide questionnaire
survey on 1,890 people who
have not received the COVID-
19 vaccine. Using hierarchical
linear regression

系数a
模型
未标准化系数标准化系数
t 显著性
B 标准错误 Beta
2 (常量) 2.629 .278 9.470 .000
年龄 .028 .030 .023 .934 .350
性别 .136 .058 .052 2.359 .018
学历 .064 .030 .052 2.120 .034
月收入 .053 .035 .038 1.500 .134
风险感知 -.069 .025 -.062 -2.759 .006
有效性感知 .099 .077 .051 1.283 .200
安全性感知 .331 .083 .158 4.003 .000
易得性感知 .171 .025 .159 6.829 .000
3 (常量) 3.195 .282 11.311 .000
年龄 .026 .029 .022 .893 .372
性别 .083 .057 .032 1.453 .146
学历 .050 .030 .040 1.679 .093
月收入 .060 .035 .043 1.722 .085
风险感知 -.010 .026 -.009 -.391 .696
有效性感知 .053 .076 .027 .703 .482
安全性感知 .318 .081 .152 3.909 .000
易得性感知 .188 .025 .175 7.620 .000
疫苗阴谋论 -.251 .039 -.221 -6.402 .000
新冠阴谋论 .053 .048 .038 1.109 .268
系数a
模型
未标准化系数标准化系数
t 显著性
B 标准错误 Beta
3 (常量) 2.601 .273 9.528 .000
年龄 .023 .029 .019 .782 .435
性别 .111 .057 .043 1.956 .051
学历 .038 .030 .031 1.283 .200
月收入 .050 .035 .036 1.433 .152
风险感知 -.055 .025 -.050 -2.234 .026
有效性感知 .051 .076 .026 .669 .504
安全性感知 .306 .081 .146 3.772 .000
易得性感知 .143 .025 .134 5.798 .000
疫苗知识 .139 .020 .173 7.016 .000
科学知识 .024 .011 .054 2.224 .026
4 (常量) 3.068 .281 10.900 .000
年龄 .022 .029 .019 .776 .438
性别 .077 .056 .030 1.370 .171
学历 .034 .030 .027 1.143 .253
月收入 .055 .034 .040 1.609 .108
风险感知 -.012 .026 -.011 -.480 .631
有效性感知 .022 .075 .011 .294 .769
安全性感知 .305 .080 .145 3.788 .000
易得性感知 .162 .025 .152 6.594 .000
疫苗知识 .119 .020 .148 5.957 .000
科学知识 .013 .011 .029 1.179 .239
疫苗阴谋论 -.178 .040 -.157 -4.422 .000
新冠阴谋论 .016 .048 .011 .324 .746

1. The Chinese public's awareness and acceptance of conspiracy theories does affect their willingness to receive the COVID-19 vaccine.
2. There is no significant relationship between the Chinese public's willingness to be vaccinated and their awareness of Covid-19
related conspiracy theories; the public's awareness of Covid-19 vaccines-related conspiracy.
3. There is a significant correlation between attitudes and willingness to receive the COVID-19 vaccine.
4. The public's scientific literacy serves as an intermediary factor mediating the correlation between the Chinese public's willingness to
be vaccinated against COVID-19 and their awareness of conspiracy theories.
5. Similar to the classification of conspiracy theories, the public's general scientific literacy does not play a significant moderating role in
vaccination intention; however, the public's vaccine-related literacy plays a significant moderating role.
Main findings

强国通行证：
探究中国公众对疫苗接种证明的态度及其社会文化基础
2021 data

强国通行证—疫苗接种证明的态度
• Nationalism, which reflects support for the government,
has the highest predictive power.
• However, in the absence of a large-scale epidemic in China,
the perceived national benefits are not significant.
• Subjective norms reflecting perceived vaccination attitudes
of those around them also strongly predicted attitudes
toward passes.
• The weak negative effect of scientific literacy deserves
attention.
Passport to a mighty nation

 Weak relationship between scientific literacy and a weaker belief in
almost all COVID-19 conspiracy theories.
 Nationalism was associated with a stronger belief in theories
favorable to China and a weaker belief in “China as culprit”
theories.
 Media trust and attitudes toward science were also associated with
conspiracy beliefs. However, the association depended on the
nature of the media outlets and conspiracy theories.
 The multifaceted nature of conspiracy beliefs in China and the
robust political dimensions of the relationship between such
beliefs and science or media factors.
Underlying factors in the Chinese public’s belief in
COVID-19 conspiracy theories
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 Belief that the coronavirus has a foreign natural origin is associated with
increased rather than decreased willingness to engage in protective
behaviors.
 Belief that the origin of the pandemic was a Chinese laboratory may be
significantly associated with a reduced willingness to protect one's
health.
 People's levels of nationalism, as measured by national pride and
satisfaction with China's pandemic control efforts, were closely related to
their intentions to adopt protective behaviors, which moderated the
health consequences of believing false conspiracy theories.
 Scientific literacy is also associated with an increased likelihood of taking
preventive measures. But the effect is far less remarkable than
nationalistic and conspiracy theory beliefs. The diverse health
consequences of conspiracy beliefs are revealed, demonstrating the
importance of examining collectivist sociopolitical structures in health
communication.
Health consequences of conspiracy theories

Majority of the public approve of mandatory
vaccination in China.
Factors Influencing Chinese Public Attitudes to
Compulsory COVID-19 Vaccination:
 Demographic variables were not associated with
attitude.
 Nothing to do with vaccine knowledge.
 In addition to the perceived threat of worrying about
being isolated and the perceived benefit of keeping
oneself free from infection, other classic health belief
model variables (susceptibility, vulnerability, severity,
etc.) susceptibility, community vulnerability, serious
threat to family, community and country) were not
significant.
 Scientific literacy negatively affects attitudes toward
compulsory vaccination.
Main findings
 Subjective norm of vaccination (perceived
population of others who vaccinated themselves)
significantly and positively affected attitudes
 The perception of national economic benefits
significantly and positively affects attitudes.
Concerns about foreign economies overtaking China
significantly negatively impacted attitudes.
 Nationalism significantly positively affects attitudes.
 Altruism significantly positively affects attitude.
 Belief in virus conspiracy theories significantly
affects attitudes in positive direction.
 Conspiracy thinking significantly and positively
affect attitudes toward mandatory vaccination.
Attitudes to compulsory COVID-19 vaccination (2022 data)

Puzzle for Chinese youth
• Willingness to visit science museums is strongly and
positively correlated with scientific attitude, but has no
correlation with scientific literacy and scientific trust.
• Unexpectedly, a positive correlation between the
willingness to visit science museums and supernatural
behaviors, such as taking fortune-telling.
• Do metaphysical behaviors play a more important
role than scientific quality? It is awe rather than
knowledge or trust in science that leads people to go
to science museums.

National survey of more than 2800 civil servants
in partnership with Chinese Association of
Agricultural Science Societies.
Examine both attitude to GMOs, belief in
conspiracy theories, scientific literacy,
administrative literacy, and so on.
Administrative literacy is a major moderator to
adjust the relationship between attitude to
GMOs and belief in conspiracy theories.
Echoing the worldwide effort to reconsider the
role of scientific literacy and looking for other
measure, e.g. a professional literacy here.
Beyond COVID-19: Civil servants’ attitude to GMOs in China

 Belief that the coronavirus has a foreign natural origin is associated with
increased rather than decreased willingness to engage in protective
behaviors.
 Belief that the origin of the pandemic was a Chinese laboratory may be
significantly associated with a reduced willingness to protect one's health.
 People's levels of nationalism, as measured by national pride and
satisfaction with China's pandemic control efforts, were closely related to
their intentions to adopt protective behaviors, which moderated the
health consequences of believing false conspiracy theories.
 Scientific literacy is also associated with an increased likelihood of taking
preventive measures. But the effect is far less remarkable than
nationalistic and conspiracy theory beliefs. The diverse health
consequences of conspiracy beliefs are revealed, demonstrating the
importance of examining collectivist sociopolitical structures in health
communication.
Zero-COVID and science literacy (Under review)

Partisanship and attitude polarization
Attitudinal polarization is often associated with the politicization
of science (Bolsen and Druckman, 2015).
Left-leaning ideology on China’s social media Weibo is generally
associated with anti-GMO attitude (Zhang and Sun, 2018).
Polarization and its effects prompt reconsideration of some long-
held simplistic views, such as the direct link between knowledge
and attitude.

How ideologies shape people’s science & health belief
 For economic right’s moderating role, among more radical economic rightists, which account for a significant
portion of China’s liberals , and among milder political leftists, perceived severity was more strongly associated
with the attitude toward zero-COVID policy. The patterns demonstrate that holders of these ideological values
may be more likely to rely on individual risk perceptions to make judgments.
 For the political left’s moderating role, more extreme political leftists were more likely to link trust in science to
support the zero-COVID policy. It possibly shows that political stance distorted people’s perception of science.
 For nationalism’s moderating role, extreme nationalists seemed to support a zero-COVID policy without feeling
too severe.
 The moderating roles of ideological and political values show political distortions of people's threat
perception and scientific trust in their attitude to zero-COVID policy.
Zero-COVID or coexistence

Nationalism is an important positive
predictor of climate actions: People who rate
higher on nationalism are more willing to act.
Chinese public has only limited knowledge
about climate policy. Knowledge about
climate policy can positively predict public
attitude.
Both economic leftism and rightism can
positively predict climate actions, which
indicates economy is the major consideration
of Chinese public regarding climate actions.
Scientific literacy is a positive but weak
predictor of climate perception but NOT of
climate action.
Beyond COVID-19: Ideological division shapes climate attitude too

So, as in the United States and Europe, ideological attitudes are linked to people’s
attitudes to GMOs, climate change, COVID-conspiracy theories and COVID-19 policies.
Ideology also distorted people’s cognitive judgement on Zero-COVID policies.
Science literacy cannot determine attitude or only slightly influence attitude.
Can we say China is the same as US and EU in terms of attitude polarization?
But,
In COVID-19 preventive behaviors, it is NOT ideological direction but the polarization
degree that determines Chinese public’s intentions for preventive behaviors. The more
polarized in ideological spectrum, the more likely are people to take preventive actions.
Is China unique?

• Perceived national rather than personal or
community risks/benefits dominate personal
attitude.
• However, for climate-friendly behaviors, national
risks/benefits fail to work. A powerful nation can
address climate change itself, and no need to
involve citizens.
• Efficacy is important, but the current messages
lack it.
• For climate-friendly behaviors, perceived personal
benefit and obedience to policy dominates.
• Science doesn’t matter, as long as China becomes
a powerful low-carbon nation.
• Unlike in other countries, online climate messages
focus on nation rather individuals.
Explanation: Statism-oriented climate attitude and behaviors

More China uniqueness happens here – Strong organization
in SC
 The top-down publicity system (Jia & Liu, 2009).
 Science popularization behavior is highly correlated
with the communication frequency of publicity
personnel. This illustrates the high organization and
mobilization of science communication in China
(Jia, Shi & Wang, 2018).
 It is highly dependent on organizations for
communication, and individual attitudes are not
significant (Jia, 2020; 2022).
 Science popularization training actually leads to a
weakening of willingness (Jia, Yang & Luo, 2022).

Chinese scientists’ communication paradox
• Chinese scientists’ media contacts were highly associated with the frequency with
which they talked with their PIOs (public information officers; Jia et al., 2018).
• But the same dataset showed Chinese scientists’ perception of institutional
censorship was statistically positively associated with their media contacts (both
2016 and 2018 data). Should not awareness of censorship discourage Chinese
scientists?
• What’s wrong?
• Our follow-up interviews with scientists and PIOs at a large research university in
central China indicated that many scientists were wary of media outlets’ request for
payment in order to propagandize their research achievements. The sense of
censorship comforted rather than upset them.
• Science communication scholars need to explore the underlying mechanism of this
specific context to better understand Chinese scientists’ communication behaviors.
Variable Name β
Status
Organizational Position 0.052
Scientific Productivity -0.011
Discipline*
0.097
Perceived Public Interests in Their
Research
0.058
Past media experience
New media use 0.029
Media engagement -0.063
Understanding of media mechanism**
0.131
Perceived media role
Evaluation of media contact -0.012
Evaluation of media coverage on own
research field*** 0.181
Expectation on media report
Recognition
Leader recognition*
0.098
Peer recognition 0.010
Institutional support -0.046
Institutional censorship*
0.090
Public recognition**
0.159
Control variables
Gender 0.064
Age*
0.053
Institution attribute 0.037
Media interaction*
0.088
*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001

COVID-19 and Chinese scientists’ communication paradox
The more surveyed scientists thought they had received sufficient science communication training, the less
likely they would communicate COVID-19 to the public, utterly contrary to the widely held view on the
positive role of self-efficacy (The measurement of self-efficacy commonly covers whether the surveyed
scientists believe they have received science communication training; Dudo, 2013).
Guessed Chinese scientists’ organization reliance also caused this. It is also possible that science communication
training provided by the Chinese research institutions might stress the need to keep silent on certain issues.
But, at the early stage of COVID-19, featuring massive lockdowns, the organized science communication in ordinary
research institutions seemed nonexistent, which discouraged these “privileged scientists” from communicating
COVID-related science to the public.

Chinese scientists’ communication paradox:
Are Chinese scientists different?

Pandemic and scientists’ crisis communication
态度
Attitude
感知行为控制
Perceived Behavior Control
主观规范
Subjective
Norms
道德规范
Moral Norms
描述性规范
Descriptive
Norms
意愿
Intention
感知机构支持
Perceived Institutional
Support
感知行为收益
Perceived Behavior
Benefits
H1
H7
H2
H3
H4
H5
H9
H6
H8
H1：态度→意愿
H2：主观规范→意愿
H3：感知行为控制→意愿
H4：描述性规范→意愿
H5：道德规范→意愿
H6：感知机构支持→意愿
H7：感知行为收益→意愿
H8：感知机构机构支持→行为收益
H9：感知机构支持→态度
H10：感知机构支持→收益

I will write science popularization articles related to COVID-19
I will participate in discussions related to COVID-19 (including
online).
I will provide information related to COVID-19 on Weibo, Zhihu,
Toutiao, Wukong Q & A, Tiktok and other social media platforms.
I will correct others' misconceptions about the COVID-19.
I will provide scientific knowledge about the COVID-19 in my
WeChat group.
I will accept media interviews about the COVID-19 or
communicate with reporters.
I will correct the misconceptions about the COVID-19 in wechat
groups.
Science Communication
or knowledge expression？
• The willingness of Chinese scientists to participate in science communication
may not be as low as we think, but the indicators to measure this willingness
need to be adjusted accordingly under the usage habits of social media. It is
not only engaging in traditional science popularization activities or media
behavior that is "qualified" science communication for the public.
• In addition, scientists‘ move towards “knowledge expression” is the result of
rich media patterns in the digital age. Scientists' active participation in science
popularization is inseparable from emerging popular science media.
• The strong organization of Chinese scientific research institutions should
provide more support and services in the process of scientists moving
from ”public communication" to "knowledge expression".
Pandemic and scientists’ crisis communication

Offers a new perspective to examine the
medialization of science: When science was
“medialized” due to bureaucratic order, we can
hardly expect any consequential impact of the
so-called medialization on science as observed
in the West.
This may explain Chinese scientists’ passive and
impassive attitude to science communication
through mass media mentioned above (Jia et
al., 2018).
But it also echoes earlier study findings
examining the dominant organizational feature
of China’s SC. Can organizational strategy
ensure everything?
Beyond COVID-19: Medialization real in China?

Researchers (Chapman et al., 2007;
Dumas-Mallet et al., 2020; Fanelli, 2013;
Kiernan, 2003; Phillips et al., 1991) have
generally found that media coverage can
increase the citation frequency of a
reported paper.
No China data.
Utilizing data from the “Scientific Journals
meet Mass Media” project (2007-2011)
sponsored by the China Association for
Science and Technology (CAST), the only
regular media-journal exchange platform
in the country.
A large sample of over 7,000 papers in six
journals over five years.
Beyond COVID-19: Medialization real in China?

The citations of papers recommended by science journals to the mass media were indeed
statistically significantly higher than those of articles in the control group (unrecommended
papers in the same issue of the same journal
Whether news
released to the
media
End of the second
year after media
coverage
End of the sixth year
M T Sig M T Sig
Yes 1.75
6.101 .000**
11.2
6.219 .000**
No （control） 1.10 7.4

However, among the recommended papers, those reported by the media haven’t resulted in
statistically significantly higher citation than the papers that the media didn’t report.
Whether news
released to the
media
End of the second
year after media
coverage
End of the sixth
year
M T Sig M T Sig
Yes 1.81
0.474 .636
11.57
0.516 .606
No （control） 1.70 10.94

The time to consider China’s uniqueness
Is China different (this time
it came to Science-media
interaction system)?

1) The overall citation volume of Chinese domestic science and technology
journals during the period of this study (2007-2011) was relatively low. Papers
recommended by editors themselves may have reached the citation ceiling,
2) The press releases of the papers recommended by the media face-to-face
project are too professional and difficult for the media.
3) When Chinese journals participated in media face-to-face projects and face
the mass media, their work is very unsystematic, making it difficult to achieve
consistent results.
So, should we say China is different, or simply say China hadn’t reached a
quality standard (which means it can be the same later)?
3) Yet, another China difference emerged in our data: The effect of professional
media reporting on increasing citations is interior to that of mass media. It
shouldn’t be. Professional media should be read by more scientists than mass
media can. But why?
Before determining China’s difference, let’s analyze the journal/media
citation data

The time to consider China’s uniqueness, but
1) Overall, WeChat public accounts’ coverage of papers can indeed lead to
higher paper downloads and citations.
2) Compare findings in previous slide: The effect of professional media
reporting on increasing citations is interior to that of mass media.
So, should we say China is different, or simply existing journal-media research
hasn’t investigated the complicated pattern across different media, lay media,
professional, and social media accounts of journals?
When we move
to social media
world……

Social, political, communication, and knowledge control factors
(Hilgartner, 2017) that have jointly suspended or delayed the
Chinese government’s decisions to commercialize GM crops, build
more dams and develop inland nuclear power plants.
• Should debates be the only option?
• How to decipher China’s uniqueness academically?
• Where is the research opportunities linked to the uniqueness?

Science in movements: Media & comm
Hydropower GMO Nuclear
争议基本形态 Collective efforts of
ENGOs to resist
hydropower projects
Long-lasting and massive
public rejection
Low-profiled internal elite
strife. No organized anti-
nuclear campaigns
科技争议的社会共源 Growing public concerns about uncontrolled technologies; Competing knowledge
claims; the rise of environmentalism and civil society; the rise of mass media,
Internet, and social media; Scientists’ slow response to the public concerns.
Decreased public trust in the government and official science.
公众对正统科学的信任 Low Low Generally high except the
short period after
Fukushima accident
媒体因素 Media actively reported
hydropower controversies
to highlight their
environmental agenda.
Few censorship
Media actively reported
GMO controversy to win
public attention.
Censorship only after
public rejection
widespread
Media positively reported
domestic nuclear power,
largely rejecting to offer
platforms for
controversies.
No censorship
Most debates ceased
before the rise of social
media.
Social media diversified
public rejection of GMOs
and intensified
controversies.
Social media debates on
nuclear power were
untraceable.

Science in movements: Social movements
社会运动视
角
政治机会结构 Moderate
opportunities and
favorable structure
for activism
.
Many opportunities
and moderately
favorable structure
for activism
Few opportunities
and unfavorable
structure for
activism
框架争夺 Lack of public
accountability in
environment.
Lack of public
accountability in food
safety.
Avoid a strong
anti-nuclear frame;
Public
accountability
frame not
dominant.
争议的社会动员 Periodically effective
mobilization among
elites
Successful mass
mobilization
Unsuccessful
mobilization
Fragmented
authoritarianism (FA)
framework （碎片化的威权
主义）
Wide FA framework,
with visible
bureaucratic
fragmentation
between hydropower
and environmental
agencies
Bureaucratic
fragmentation less
apparent but actors’
massive participation
brings wide
fragmentation.
No bureaucratic
fragmentation, only
minor FA within
industry and
slightly between
host local
government and
nuke industry.

Science in movements: STS perspectives
STS
知识控制体系（Knowledge (kn)-
control regimes of
establishments）
Moderate to weak Moderate to weak Strong
国家社会技术记忆（National
sociotechnical imaginaries）
Sociotechnical
imaginaries of
hydropower of
developmentalism
challenged by
environmentalism
Sociotechnical
imaginaries of food as
the bases for national
existence
Sociotechnical
imaginaries of atomic
power as national
independence, social
prosperity and S&T
progress.
Actively strengthen.
公民认识论与另类知识（Civic
epistemology & alternative
knowledge）
Environmental justice,
ecology integrity and
social justice for dam
relocation
Generally adopted among
ENGOs and experts, allied
with SEPA
Food more for substance
than for S&T progress,
innovation. Conspiracy
theories adopted/
Widely adopted by the
general publics
Alternative knowledge
motivated elite activists to
dispute.
Only limited to small elite
activists.

Science in movements: Multidisciplinary studies
needed
Results of controversy & protesting campaigns
•
Outcomes of
science as a tool
of social
movements
Successful for
all targeted
dams.
Completely
successful for
the time being.
ONLY with limited
effect (delayed new
projects for three
years).

Theoretical innovation and implications to science and health communication
Theoretical implications: Take a glocalisti approach

Strategic planning of Soochow University
1. Mid and long-term plans; expand & coordinate partners.
2. Research goes ahead first.
3. Persuade more partners to get involved.
4. Research, projects, and partnership integrated together.
5. Design climate exhibitions with institutional partners.
6. Workshops, training and content provisions.
7. Collaborating on Media Sustainability Index.
8. Develop citizen science projects on climate perceivability.
9. Rigorous annual assessments.
10. Publicity activities with WRI.

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