2. Some of the Mentalizing Mafia
UCL/AFC/Tavistock Dr Liz Allison
Prof George Gergely
Professor Alessandra Lemma
Dr Pasco Fearon
Professor Mary Target
Professor Eia Asen
Prof Anthony Bateman
Dr Trudie Rossouw
University of Leuven
& UCL/AFC
Dr Patrick Luyten Dr Dickon Bevington
3. Some more maffiosi (The USA branch)
Menninger Clinic/Baylor Medical College (The USA branch)
Dr Jon Allen Dr Carla Sharp
Dr Lane Strathearn Dr Efrain Bleiberg
Dr Brooks King-Casas
Professor Flynn O’Malley
Dr Read Montague
Yale Child Study Centre
Prof Linda Mayes Professor Nancy Suchman
4. And European recruits to the ‘Family”
Dawn Bales Professor Finn Skårderud
Dr Mirjam Kalland
Professor Sigmund Karterud
•Cindy Decoste •Svenja Taubner
•Catherine Freeman •Bart Vandeneede
•Ulla Kahn •Annelies Verheught-Pleiter
•Morten Kjolbe •Rudi Vermote
•Benedicte Lowyck •Joleien Zevalkink
•Tobi Nolte •Bjorn Philips
•Marjukka Pajulo •Dr Peter Fuggle
And Rose Palmer for help with the preparation of this presentation.
5.
6. Let the boy
You will never dream Ivan,
amount to anything He is a born
if you hold a ball dilettante!
like that!
I want to write my
PhD on the “Use You look smug
of low signal-to- now but you
noise ratio stimuli will lose your
for highlighting the hair just like
functional Dad
differences
between the two
cerebral
hemispheres”.
8. A working definition of mentalization
Mentalizing is a form of imaginative
mental activity, namely, perceiving and
interpreting human behaviour in terms
of intentional mental states (e.g. needs,
desires, feelings, beliefs, goals,
purposes, and reasons).
9. Brains and social behavior vary across different mammalian species
Insectivors:
Regulated maternal
behaviors
Chimpanzees:
Societies of a few dozen
Modern Humans:
Societies of millions of
interacting people
Humans exceedingly skilled
at large scale social
interaction
Competition for social skills
led to the evolutions of
cognitive mechanism for
collaborating with others
Fuelled evolution of human
brain.
Therefore correlation in
mammals between size of
social group and volume of
neocortex
10. The social brain: A variety of studies -
stories, sentences, cartoon, animations
medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC), temporo-parietal junction (TPJ),
posterior superior temporal sulcus (pSTS), amygdala, anterior
cingulate cortex (ACC), anterior insula (AI), inferior frontal gyrus (IFG)
and interparietal sulcus (IPS)
11. The uniqueness of homo sapiens
No animal, not even the most intelligent of non-human
primates, can discern the difference between the act
of a conspecific due to serendipity and one rooted in
intention, wish, belief or desire.
The capacity to mentalize has also been argued to
account for the other major difference between
humans and other apes:
self awareness and self-consciousness as a path to
emulation bringing with it social emotions such as
embarrassment, shame and guilt
the species specific striving to be more than a ‘beast’, to live
beyond one’s body, to aspire to a spirit that transcends
physical reality and step beyond one’s own existence
social origin of the self (simulation).
12. Mentalizing:
Further definitions and scope
To see ourselves from the outside and
others from the inside
Understanding misunderstanding
Having mind in mind
Mindfulness of minds
Introspection for subjective self-
construction – know yourself as others
know you but also know your subjective
self
13. Articles using ‘mentalization’ in
title or abstracts
Number of articles on Web of Science Database
Source: http://apps.webofknowledge.com, Data collected 10.1.2012
14. Clear evidence of mentalizing?
JUST RELEASED!
NEW!
IMPROVED!
Longer than all
previous
Washes brains versions!
whiter!
2012
American Psychiatric Publishing, Inc
19. Mentalizing at the World Cup: How does Robert
Green feel after letting in the USA goal?
Upset Angry
Disappointed Frustrated
20.
21. Shared neural circuits for mentalizing about the
self and others (Lombardo et al., 2009; J. Cog. Neurosc.)
Self mental state
Other mental state
Overlapping for
Self and Other
22. Relational Aspects of Mentalization
Overlap between neural locations of mentalizing
self and other may be linked to intersubjective
origin of sense of self
We find our mind initially in the minds of our parents
and later other attachment figures thinking about us
The parent’s capacity to mirror effectively her child’s
internal state is at the heart of affect regulation
Infant is dependent on contingent response of
caregiver which in turn depends on her capacity to be
reflective about her child as a psychological being
Failure to find the constitutional self in the other has
potential to profoundly distort the self representation
(exaggerated mirroring of child’s anxiety aggravates
anxiety rather than soothe)
The same applies to child with inadequate sense of
independent self within therapeutic relationship
23. Affect & Self Regulation Through
Psychological Representation
of self-state:
Mirroring
Self: co n
ting
Internalization e nt d
2nd Order of object’s image ex p ispl
ay
Representations und ressio
erst
ood n of Expression
affe
ct
symbolic organisation
of internal state
Physical Self: Reflection
Primary
Representations signal
Constitutional self al
Resonance
no n-verb
in state of arousal pressio
n
ex
Infant CAREGIVER
Fonagy, Gergely, Jurist & Target (2002)
With apologies to Gergely & Watson (1996)
24. Theory: Birth of the Agentive Self
Attachment figure “discovers” infant’s mind (subjectivity)
Internalization
Representation of
infant’s mental
state Core of
psychological
self
Inference
Attachment figure Infant
Infant internalizes caregiver’s representation to form psychological self
Safe, playful interaction with the caregiver leads to the integration of primitive
modes of experiencing internal reality mentalization
25. ‘The baby looks at his mother’s face and
finds himself there’
D. Winnicott
‘She/he thinks that I think, therefore I am’
26. Bidirectional Influences of the
Development of Mentalization
Poor affect regulation obviously makes sensitive
caregiving more challenging
The impact of some environmental influences are evidently
exaggerated by certain genetic attributes (e.g. the short allele of
the 5-HTT gene Barry, Kochanska, & Philibert, 2008).
Limitation of voluntarily directing attention and accurate
and solid interpersonal understanding necessary for
mature affect regulating attachment relationships.
Inability to mentalize disrupts attachment relationships
Disrupted attachments undermine further development of
mentalizing
The very process that could help the child to overcome
the problems arising out of interpersonal challenges is
undermined by the difficulties in the child’ attachment
system
28. The development of mentalization
Weeks after birth the baby smiles at humans
(social beings) in preference to objects
Can tell its own body (shell) from that of another
person’s
2 months after birth infants prefer the subtle
patterns of contingency in face-to-face
interactions, including turn taking and correlated
affect (Gergely and Watson, 1999; Murray and
Trevarthen, 1985).
By 9 months, infants are able to follow another
person's gaze to a location outside of their visual
field
A key first step in establishing joint attention (Moore,
2008).
29. From 12 months babies deliberately engage and
redirect attention of caregiver (pointing and vocalizing)
Joint ( “triadic”) attention provides a
platform by which two or more people
coordinate and communicate their
intentions, desires, emotions, beliefs, and/or
knowledge about a third entity (e.g. an
object or a common goal) (Tomasello et al.,
2005).
By 2.5 years children implement complex
social tactics – teasing, lying, saving face
(Reddy, 2008: How infants know minds)
30. False belief task: unexpected transfer
(Wimmer & Perner, 1983)
Test question
Where will he look
first heshe Mum
After that, leaves
Thenfor putsbook?
Then hisleaves to
Maxi to tidy up
his
comes somein book
Mumdothe garden
Now,takes it work
to in Maxi returns
and puts the
play book in the
thethe room book
out in bookshelf
of the kitchen.
looking forcupboard,
the his
cupboard
31. Effect of Age in 178 separate studies
2nd ½ of 4th year
4y 2nd 4y of 4th year
½
Very robust developmental trends most manipulations ineffective
Meta-analysis of False Belief Studies (Wellman et al., 2009)
32. The embodied mind and research on
the human infant
Massive denial of infant mentation outside of
psychoanalysis until about 75 years ago
Half a century ago infants were commonly subjected to
surgery without anesthetic (curare was used to stop
squirming inconvenient for the surgeon) Can infants
have minds when they are no yet able to speak?
Astounding discoveries concerning early social
awareness in infants
Mentalization is embodied before it is cognitive
Freud may have been correct about the mental life
being somatically grounded (the body is at the root of
meaning.
33.
34. Sensitivity to others’ state of mind
False belief for baby
True belief for Smurf
True belief for baby
False belief for Smurf
Á M Kovács et al. Science
2011;330:1830-1834
35. Sensitivity to others’ state of mind
Ball Not There Ball Not There
True belief for baby
False belief for baby False belief for Smurf
The infant but not the Infant knows ball is not there
Smurf believes that But Smurf believes it should
the ball should be there be there
Neither infant nor Neither infant nor
the smurf believe the Smurf believe that
that ball is there the ball should be there
The two key conditions in Smurf Study: Infant of 7 months
considers what agent (Smurf) believes about the status of ball
Á M Kovács et al. Science 2010, 330:1830-1834
Published by AAAS
36. Principle of Fairness
According to the Principle of Fairness,
agents should deal fairly with others
distribution of resources
compensation for work
Sloane, Baillargeon, and Premack (2010)
9 months olds
Animate or inanimate giraffes
Reasonable expectation applies only to
animate objects
(e.g., Boyd & Richardson, 2003; Fehr et al., 2008; Haidt & Joseph, 2007;
Jackendoff, 2009; Olson & Spelke, 2008; Premack , 2007; Sigmund et al., 2002)
40. Results–9 mnths olds: looking time
Animate Giraffes Inanimate Giraffes
Condition Condition
Unequally distributed toys
Equally distributed toys
Mean Looking Time (sec)
*
41. The infantile origins of
psychopathology
Infants have genetically inbuilt ‘healthy’ social
expectations
Social experience to be developmentally ‘good
enough’ has to comply with these expectations
Fit in with biologically prepared mechanisms which
evolved to transmit human culture
Be consistent with neural development (i.e. capacity
to integrate new information)
Violations of expectations toxic because not only they
‘teach’ inappropriate content but undermine
mechanisms for the social acquisition of knowledge
and the emergence of an agentive sense of self
42. The role of
contingent
caregiver
responding in
the development
of cognitions
43. Natural Pedagogy theory
(Csibra & Gergely, 2006; 2009, in press)
A human-specific, cue-driven social cognitive
adaptation of mutual design dedicated to ensure
efficient transfer of relevant cultural knowledge
Humans are predisposed to ’teach’ and ’learn’
new and relevant cultural information from each
other
Human communication is specifically adapted to
allow the transmission of
a) cognitively opaque cultural knowledge
b) kind-generalizable generic knowledge
c) shared cultural knowledge
44. The Pedagogical Stance is triggered by
Ostensive-Communicative cues
Examples of ostensive communication
cues
eye-contact
turn-taking contingent reactivity
special tone (motherese)
Ostensive cues function:
to signal that the other has a Communicative
Intention addressed to the infant/child
to Manifest New and Relevant information
about a referent
45. Experimental illustration of ostensive cues
Gergely, Egyed et al. (in press)
Subjects : 4 groups of 18-month-olds
Stimuli: Two unfamiliar objects
46. 1: Baseline – control group
No object-directed attitude demonstration
Simple Object
Request by
Experimenter A
Subjects: n= 20 Age: 18-month-olds
53. Epistemic trust and secure
attachment
Secure attachment is isomorphic with inducing
in the infant/child a sense of epistemic trust
that the information relayed by the teacher may
be trusted (i.e. learnt from)
Evidence
Cognitive advantage of secure attachment
Contingent responsiveness to the infant’s own (at first,
automatic) expressive displays in secure attachment
During “mirroring” interactions, the other will “mark”
her referential emotion displays in a ‘manifestative’
manner to instruct the infant
54. How Attachment Links to Affect Regulation
DISTRESS/FEAR
BONDING
Down Regulation of Emotions
Exposure to Threat Activation of attachment
EPISTEMIC
TRUST
Proximity seeking
The forming of an attachment bond
55. Implications: The nature of psychotherapy
The mind is found within the other not within itself
Evolution has ‘prepared’ our brains for
psychological therapy
We are eager to learn about the opaque mental
world from those around us
They are prepared to learn most readily about minds
in conditions of epistemic trust
Epistemic mistrust follows maltreatment or abuse
and therapists ignores this knowledge at their peril
Therapy is not just about the what but the how of
learning
Opening the person’s mind via establishing
contingencies so (s)he once again can trust the social
world by changing expectations
Not what is taught in therapy that teaches but
57. Secure attachment is facilitative of
mentalizing
Children pass theory of mind tasks earlier
if
Had secure attachment relations with parents
in infancy
If parent’s own state of mind in relation to
attachment was secure
Family members relate to each other in payful,
mentalizing way
Mechanism may well be mediated by
oxytocin
59. Shared
characteristics of
evidence based
therapies for BPD
likely to enhance
the organization
of mental states?
60. Clinical summary of MBT
Focus is on a break in mentalizing – psychic
equivalence, pretend, teleological
Rewind to moment before the break in subjective
continuity
Explore current emotional context in session by
identifying the momentary affective state between
patient and therapist
Identify therapist’s contribution to the break in
mentalizing (humility)
Seek to mentalize the therapeutic relationship
61. So what should the therapist aim do?
In MBT, the mind of the patient becomes the focus
of treatment.
Help the patient learn about the complexities of his
thoughts and feelings about himself and others, how
that relates to his responses, and how ‘errors’ in
understanding himself and others lead to actions
It is not for the therapist to ‘tell’ the patient about
how he feels, what he thinks, how he should
behave, what the underlying reasons are,
conscious or unconscious, for his difficulties.
any therapy approach to BPD which moves towards
‘knowing’ how a patient ‘is’, how he should behave and
think, and ‘why he is like he is’, could be harmful.
We recommend an inquisitive or ‘not-knowing’
stance. Conveys a sense that mental states are
opaque
62. Evidence based or promising treatments
SFT
CAT
MBT
TFP
DBT
STEPPS
DBT MBT
63. MBT is in its infancy as an EST
Prof. Anthony Bateman, MD Prof. Peter Fonagy, PhD FBA
64. Psychotherapy for BPD
A range of structured treatment programmes for
BPD shown to be effective in studies
DBT
TFP Do they work for
SFT
CBT the reasons the
SPT developers suggest?
DDP
CAT
GPM
MBT
65. Gaps in Therapy Outcomes Research
Nosolid evidence for who will benefit
from what type of psychotherapy
‘Inexacttherapies’ partial
effectiveness
‘Attachment to methods’
‘guildification’ of interventions
66.
67. Mentalizing Elements of BPD
Therapies (1)
Extensive effort to maintain engagement in treatment
(validation in conjunction with emphasis on need to
address therapy interfering behaviours)
acceptance and recognition
Include a model of pathology that is explained to the
patient increased cognitive coherence (early phase)
Active therapist stance: Explicit intent to validate and
demonstrate empathy, generate strong attachment
relationship foundation of alliance (epistemic trust)
Focus on emotion processing and connection between
action and feeling (suicide feeling == abandonment
feelings) restore cognitive representation of
emotion
68. Mentalizing Elements of BPD
Therapies (2)
Inquiry into patients’ mental states (behavioral
analysis, clarification, confrontation) strengthen
representations of mental states
Structure of treatment provides increased activity,
proactivity and self-agency (eschew expert stance,
“sit side-by-side”) enhance intentionality (mental
state drives action)
Structure is manualized with adherence monitored
support therapist in non-mentalizing context
Commitment to the approach ditto
Supervision to identify deviation from structure and
69. Mentalizing Elements of Therapies (3):
Components of the process of effective
interaction
Establishing attachment through contingent
responding epistemic trust (working alliance)
opens ‘information superhighway to cultural
knowledge”
Create compassion towards subjective
experience enable ‘liberal’ attitude towards self-
states mindfulness of minds
Enhance mentalized affectivity feeling of feeling
felt inititiate virtuous cycle of finding self in other
enable finding the other in the self
71. Expanding the model to Social Systems
Human beings were not designed to be
brought up in a nuclear family
The human brain was designed to adapt to
social environments beyond childhood
Current social conditions place intolerable
burdens on the nuclear family
Economic pressures to be part of the workforce
Inadequate social support for parenting
Social isolation of the nuclear family
a “Perfect Storm” from perspective of
human evolution
73. Typical Size of Human Family
Group Across Evolution
50
45
Size of family group
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
10,000BC 1,500BC 1850AD 1900AD 1980AD
Humans spent 99% of history living in groups of 35-40 people
74. Humans as part of a wider ecosystem
Connected Connected Connected Connected Connected
Mind Mind & Body Families Communities Environment
75. Some features of a successfully
mentalizing social system
Is relaxed and flexible, not “stuck” in one point of
view
Can be playful, with humour that engages rather
than hurting or distancing
Can solve problems by give-and-take between own
and others’ perspectives
Advocates describing ones own experience, rather
than defining other people’s experience or intentions
Conveys individual “ownership” of behaviour
rather than a sense that it “happens” to them
Is curious about other people’s perspectives, and
expect to have their own views extended by others’
76. Some components of a successfully
mentalizing social system
1. Relational strengths
- curiosity
- safe uncertainty
- contemplation and reflection
- perspective taking
- forgiveness
- impact awareness
- non-paranoid attitude
2. General values and attitudes
- tentativeness
- humility (moderation)
- playfulness and humour
- flexibility
- ‘give and take’
- responsibility and accountability
77.
78. Mentalizing and Non-Mentalizing Social
Systems
Mentalization develops in and is sustained
by the social system we live in
Social systems that are compassionate
(care about us) have physical (oxytocin) and
psychological (feel held in mind) impact
which enhance accurate self-awareness and
awareness of the mental state of others
Social systems that disrespect human
subjectivity (how a person is likely to feel)
recreate the evolutionary environment that
encodes for self-sufficiency (dismissing of
subjectivity) create environment for bullying
79. Non-Mentalizing Disorganized Social
Systems
Social systems that create fear and
hyperactivate attachment can destroy
thinking capacity and force the system back
to pre-mentalistic modes of social thinking
Such social systems can be self-reinforcing
and therefore highly stable in their instability
They undermine the very social mechanism
that could alter their character: human
collaboration (negotiation and creativity)
80. Vicious cycles of inhibition of mentalizing
within a disorganized social system
Powerful emotion
Frightening, undermining,
frustrating, distressing or
coercive interactions Poor mentalising
Loss of certainty Inability to understand
or even pay attention
that thoughts are to feelings of others
not real
Try to control or Others seem
change others incomprehensible
81. Vicious Cycles of Non- Mentalizing Within a
Dysfunctional Social System
Powerful emotion Powerful emotion
Frightening, undermining, Poor mentalising Frightening, undermining, Poor mentalising
frustrating, distressing or frustrating, distressing or
coercive interactions coercive interactions
Person 1 Inability to understand Person 2 Inability to understand
or even pay attention or even pay attention
to feelings of others to feelings of others
Try to control or Try to control or
change others or change others or
oneself oneself
Others seem Others seem
incomprehensible incomprehensible
82. Non-Mentalizing Disorganized Social
Systems: Psychic Equivalence Systems
Mind-world isomorphism; mental reality =
outer reality; internal has power of external
Attitudes to ideas and feelings
Thoughts are real and therefore they have to be
controlled
There are singular solutions to social reality,
there are no alternative ways of seeing things,
there is intolerance to perspectives
Models of minds are simple (black and white),
schematic and rigidly held acts of prejudice
Negative ideas (threats) become terrifying
83. Non-Mentalizing Disorganized Social
Systems: Pretend systems
Ideas form no bridge between inner and outer
reality; mental world decoupled from external reality
Attitudes to ideas and feelings
People think and feel but this can have no consequence
leading to an empty and meaninglessness social
existence
There is selfishness and extreme egocentrism emerging
out of the unreality of anything other than one’s own
thoughts and feelings
Lack of reality of internal experience permits
interpersonal aggression and deliberate harm because
other minds are not felt to exist and the mind is no
longer felt as contingent on continued existence of the
physical self
Frequently there is endless ‘communication’ and
searching but it is destined to yield no change
84. Non-Mentalizing Disorganized Social
Systems: Teleological Systems
Expectations concerning the agency of the other
are present but these are formulated uniquely in
terms restricted to the physical world
Only what is material can be meaningful
Attitudes to ideas and feelings
A focus on understanding actions in terms of their
physical as opposed to mental outcomes
Only a modification in the realm of the physical is
regarded as a true index of the intentions of the other.
Only action that has physical impact is felt as potentially
capable of altering mental state in both self and other
o Physical acts of harm aggression is seen as legitimate
o Demand for physical acts of demonstration of intent by others
payment, acts of subservience, retributive justice
85. So how to create a mentalizing community?
Activate attachment by creating contingent
responding an attitude of caring and genuine
interest
Enhance the curiosity which members of the
community have about each others’ thoughts and
feelings mentalizing
Be careful to identify when mentalization has turned
into pseudomentalization (pretending to know)
Focuses on misunderstanding (mentalization is
the understanding of misunderstanding)
Curiosity coupled with respectful not knowing
Maintain respectful distance from ideas
86. Neural dimensions
of mentalization
in BDP:
Controlled vs
automatic
mentalization
87. The social brain: A variety of studies -
stories, sentences, cartoon, animations
medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC), temporo-parietal junction (TPJ),
posterior superior temporal sulcus (pSTS), amygdala, anterior
cingulate cortex (ACC), anterior insula (AI), inferior frontal gyrus (IFG)
and interparietal sulcus (IPS)
88. Multifaceted Nature of Mentalization
Fonagy, P., & Luyten, P. (2009). Development and Psychopathology, 21, 1355-1381.
Implicit- Explicit-
amygdala, basal ganglia, lateral and medial prefrontal cortex
Automatic- ventromedial prefrontal (LPFC & MPFC), lateral and medial Controlled
Non -conscious- cortex (VMPFC), parietal cortex (LPAC & MPAC), Conscious
lateral temporal cortex (LTC) medial temporal lobe (MTL),rostral
Immediate. and the dorsal anterior anterior cingulate cortex (rACC) Reflective
cingulate cortex (dACC)
Mental Mental
interior medial frontoparietal recruits lateral fronto-temporal exterior
network activated network
cue cue
focused focused
Cognitive Affective
agent:attitude Associated with several areas Associated with inferior prefrontal
self:affect state
propositions of prefrontal cortex gyrus propositions
Imitative Belief-desire
the medial prefrontal cortex,
frontoparietal frontoparietal mirror-neuron
ACC, and the precuneus
MPFC/ACC
system
mirror neurone inhibitory
system system
89. Mentalizing Profile of Prototypical BPD patient
Fonagy, P., & Luyten, P. (2009). Development and Psychopathology, 21, 1355-1381.
BPD
Implicit- Explicit-
Automatic- Controlled
Non -conscious- Conscious
Immediate. Reflective
Mental BPD External
interior visible
cue cues
focused focused
BPD Affective
Cognitive
agent:attitude self:affect state
propositions propositions
BPD
Imitative Belief-desire
frontoparietal MPFC/ACC
mirror neurone inhibitory
system system
90. Crucial role of Attachment History in
facilitating/inhibiting Mentalization in the face
of stress
Arousal/stress inhibits controlled (‘reflective’)
mentalization
This leads to automatic mentalizing
dominated by reflexive (unrerflective)
assumptions regarding self and others under
stress, which may not be obvious in low stress
conditions
Reemergence of non-mentalizing modes
Luyten, P., Mayes, L. C., Fonagy, P., & Van Houdenhove, B. (2010). The interpersonal regulation of stress: A
developmental framework. Manuscript submitted for publication.
Fonagy, P., & Luyten, P. (2009). A developmental, mentalization-based approach to the understanding and
treatment of borderline personality disorder. Development and Psychopathology, 21(4), 1355-1381.
Fonagy, P., Luyten, P., Bateman, A., Gergely, G., Strathearn, L., Target, M., et al. (2010). Attachment and
personality pathology. In J. F. Clarkin, P. Fonagy & G. O. Gabbard (Eds.), Psychodynamic psychotherapy for
personality disorders. A clinical handbook (pp. 37-87). Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Publishing.
91. Dimensions of mentalization: implicit/automatic
vs explicit/controlled in Othello
That handkerchief which Iariseth this? and gave thee
Why, how now, ho! from whence so loved
Thou gavest to Cassio.
Are we turn'd Turks, and to ourselves do that
By heaven, Ihath forbid the Ottomites? in's hand.
Which heaven saw my handkerchief
Cont For Christian shame, put by this barbarous brawl:
rolled
Controlled Automatic
Autom
atic
Love
Spurned/
92. Dimensions of mentalization: implicit/automatic
vs explicit/controlled in Othello
That handkerchief which I so loved and gave thee
ThouLateral to Cassio.
gavest
temporal PFCAmygdala
Lateral Medial Ventromedial PFC
PFC
By heaven, I saw my handkerchief in's hand.
cortex
Cont
rolled
Controlled Automatic
Autom
atic
Arousal
93. Dimensions of mentalization: implicit/automatic
vs explicit/controlled
Psychological understanding drops and is
rapidly replaced by confusion about mental
states under high arousal
That handkerchief which I so loved and gave thee
Thou gavest to Cassio.
By heaven, I saw my handkerchief in's hand.
Cont
rolled
Controlled Automatic
Autom
atic
Arousal
94. Dimensions of mentalization: implicit/automatic
vs explicit/controlled
Psychotherapist’s demand to explore issues
that trigger intense emotional reactions
involving conscious reflection and explicit
mentalization are inconsistent with the
patient’s ability to perform these tasks when
arousal is high
Cont
rolled
Autom
atic
Arousal
95. Dimensions of mentalization: internally vs externally
focused (mental interiors vs visible clues)
Internal External
I wonder if he feels He looks tired;
his mother loved perhaps he slept
him? badly
96. With selective loss of sense of mental interiors, external features
are given inappropriate weight and misinterpreted as indicating
dispositional states
Intern
al
Exter
nal
You’re covering your eyes; you can hardly bear to look at me
97. Dimensions of mentalization: Cognitive vs
affective mentalization
Cognition Emotion
Agent attitude Self affect state
propositions propositions
“I think he thought that
England would beat “I feel sad about it too”
Germany”
Associated with inferior
Associated with several prefrontal gyrus
areas of prefrontal cortex
98. Dimensions of mentalization: Cognitive vs
affective mentalization
With diminution of cognitive mentalization the logic of
emotional mentalization (self- affect state proposition)
comes to be inappropriately extended to cognitions.
Cogn
ition
Emot
ion
“I feel sad, you must have hurt me”
99. A biobehavioral switch model of the relationship
between stress and controlled versus automatic
mentalization (Based on Luyten et al., 2009)
Attachment - Arousal/Stress
100. Maltreatment
Maltreatment intensifies attachment
relationships: when there is distress / fear, the
attachment system is triggered and the
attachment figure is sought out
The attachment system of a maltreated child is
hyperactivated: there is a rapid escalation of
intimacy and the child seeks comfort from an
unsafe attachment figure. The child is therefore
at risk of receiving more maltreatment – which
gives rise to a cycle
During this episode mentalization is inhibited
101. Inhibition of social understanding associated with
maltreatment can lead to exposure to further abuse
DISTRESS/FEAR
Adverse emotional
experience rooted in Intensification of attachment
traumatic relationships needs
Inhibition of mentalisation
Inaccurate judgements of affect,
Delayed development of mentalization understanding
Failure to understand how emotions relate to situations and behavior
102. Inhibition of social understanding associated with
maltreatment can lead to exposure to further abuse
DISTRESS/FEAR
Exposure to Intensification of attachment
maltreatment
Inhibition of mentalisation
Inaccurate judgements of facial affects,
Delayed theory-of-mind understanding
Failure to understand the situational determinants of emotions
103. Theory: Mayes’ (2001) Adaptation of Arnsten’s
Dual Arousal Systems Model
Prefrontal capacities
Posterior cortex and
subcortical capacities
Changing Point 1a
Performance
switchpoint
threshold
Point 1
Low High
Arousal
104. Mentalizing Profile Associated with Arousal
Fonagy, P., & Luyten, P. (2009). Development and Psychopathology, 21, 1355-1381.
AROUSAL
Implicit- Explicit-
amygdala, basal ganglia, lateral and medial prefrontal cortex
Automatic- ventromedial prefrontal (LPFC & MPFC), lateral and medial Controlled
Non -conscious- cortex (VMPFC), parietal cortex (LPAC & MPAC), Conscious
lateral temporal cortex (LTC) medial temporal lobe (MTL),rostral
Immediate. and the dorsal anterior anterior cingulate cortex (rACC) Reflective
cingulate cortex (dACC)
Mental AROUSAL Mental
interior medial frontoparietal recruits lateral fronto-temporal exterior
network activated network
cue cue
focused focused
AROUSAL Affective
Cognitive
agent:attitude Associated with several areas Associated with inferior prefrontal
self:affect state
propositions of prefrontal cortex gyrus propositions
AROUSAL
Imitative Belief-desire
the medial prefrontal cortex,
frontoparietal frontoparietal mirror-neuron
ACC, and the precuneus
MPFC/ACC
system
mirror neurone inhibitory
system system
105. Treatment vectors in re-establishing mentalizing
in borderline personality disorder
Impression driven
Controlled
Implicit- Explicit-
Automatic Controlled
Mental Appearance
Inference Mental
interior exterior
focused focused
Certainty of emotion
Doubt of cognition Affective
Cognitive
agent:attitude self:affect state
propositions propositions
Emotional contagion
Autonomy
Imitative Belief-desire
frontoparietal MPFC/ACC
mirror neurone inhibitory
system system
107. Mentalizing as a multidimensional
neuroscience construct
Two distinct neural networks are shared by self-
knowing and knowing others (Lieberman, 2007;
Uddin et al., 2007)
frontoparietal mirror-neuron system (Keysers & Gazzola,
2006; Rizzolatti, Ferrari, Rozzi, & Fogassi, 2006).
the medial prefrontal cortex, ACC, and the precuneus
(Frith, 2007; Frith & Frith, 2006; Uddin et al., 2007)
The inhibition of imitative behavior involves cortical
areas that are also related to mentalizing, self-
referential processing and determining self agency
Failure of medial prefrontal and temporo-parietal
mentalizing function in BPD difficulties in
decoupling their representations of another person’s
experience from their self-representations.
108. Evidence for shared representations
Cognitive psychology
observation has a strong influence on movement
execution (e.g. Brass et al., 2000, 2001, Kilner et al., 2003,
Stuermer et al., 2000)
Social psychology
chameleon effect (Chartrand & Bargh, 1999)
Cognitive neuroscience
activation of motor related areas by action observation
(e.g. Grezes & Decety, 1999, Iacoboni et al., 1999, 2001,
Calvo-Merino et al., 2005, 2006)
Neurophysiology
mirror neurons (e.g. Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004)
DISCOS, LONDON 09
114. The neural signature of imitation-inhibition
incongruent vs. congruent
anterior fronto-median cortex (aFMC)
temporo-parietal junction area (TPJ)
Brass, Derrfuss & von Cramon, 2005
115. Functional role of aFMC and TPJ
Gilbert et al. (2006) Decety & Grezes (2006)
imitation-inhibition (Brass et al., 2009)
red= mentalizing (only BA 10) red=mentalizing yellow=agency
116. Functional-overlap hypothesis
The inhibition of imitative behaviour involves
cortical areas that are also related to mentalizing,
self-referential processing and determining self
agency.
We assume that this overlap reflects common
underlying processes such as self/other distinction
and decoupling of self and other.
Capacity to inhibit imitative behavior may be key
to enabling us to generate a sense of ‘me-ness’
through achieving a ‘not-other’-ness
DISCOS, LONDON 09
117. Implication for the phenomenology
of borderline personality disorder
Failure of medial prefrontal and temporo-parietal mentalizing
function in BPD difficulties in decoupling their
representations of another person’s experience from their
self-representations
Patients with BPD feel vulnerable to loosing a sense of self
in interpersonal interchange because they cannot
adequately inhibit the alternative state of mind which is
imposed on them through social contagion.
Perhaps the apparent determination to ‘manipulate and
control’ the mind of others characteristic of BPD patients
should be best seen as a defensive reaction, defending the
integrity of the self within attachment contexts.
without such control, they might feel excessively vulnerable to
loosing their sense of separateness and individuality.
118. The Cassel Step-down Treatment
Study (Chiesa & Fonagy, in press)
297 patients in personality disorder services
(112 complete data, 31 males 81 females, 40% with
some tertiary education)
Recruited through
Cassel Residential inpatient programme (n=120)
Cassel Community stepdown/outpatient programme
(n=113)
MAU: Devon Personality Disorder services (n=64)
Treatment input and staff resources
Treatment hours 16.2-18.2 versus 3.2 hours
Staff wte’s: residential 8.5 versus community 2.6
120. Movie for the Assessment of Social
Cognition (MASC) (Dziobek et al 2006)
Requires subjects to watch a 15 min movie
about 4 characters at a dinner party
The 4 characters (Sandra, Betty, Michael &
Cliff) each have different motives for
attending the party
Video is paused 46 times for questions about
characters’ feelings, thoughts and intentions
Friendship & dating issues are the
predominant themes
121. Movie for the Assessment of Social
Cognition (MASC) (Dziobek et al 2006)
Picture 1: Cliff is the first to arrive at Sandra’s house for the dinner party.
He and Sandra seem to enjoy themselves when Cliff is telling about his
vacation in Sweden
122. Movie for the Assessment of Social
Cognition (MASC) (Dziobek et al 2006)
Picture 2: When Michael arrives, he dominates the conversation,
directing his speech to Sandra alone
123. Movie for the Assessment of Social
Cognition (MASC) (Dziobek et al 2006)
Picture 3: Slightly annoyed by Michael’s bragging story, Sandra shortly looks in
Cliff’s direction and then asks Michael: ‘‘Tell me, have you ever been to Sweden?’’
Question: Why is Sandra asking this?
124. Movie for the Assessment of Social
Cognition (MASC) (Dziobek et al 2006)
Example correct answers:
To change to the topic that Cliff talked about before so
that he gets involved again
To redirect the conversation to Cliff
To integrate Cliff
Example incorrect answers:
To hear if Michael also has something interesting to say
about Sweden
To see which of the two guys has a cooler story to tell
She is very suspicious of Michael and thinks he is making
it up because he is the kind of person who tries to deal
with his inadequacy by making up stories so she wants to
see if Michael can corroborate Cliff’s story
125. Correlation Between Movie for the Assessment
of Social Cognition (MASC) and Borderline
Personality Features Scale for Children
(Sharp et al., 2011)
0.8 p<0.00005
N=107
0.6
0.4 n.s.
0.2
p<0.02
0
-0.2
-0.4
-0.6 Total Theory of Mind Excessive Theory of Mind No Theory of Mind
Source: Sharp et al, 2011, J. Amer. Acad. Child & Adolesc. Psychiatry, 50: 563-573
126. Correlations between mentalizing and emotion
regulation and borderline features (Sharp et al.,
2011)
(**)
Source: Sharp et al, 2011, J. Amer. Acad. Child & Adolesc. Psychiatry, 50: 563-573
127. Hypermentalizing leads to emotion disregulation
which leads to borderline personality features
(Sharp et al., 2011, J.Am. Acad. Child. Adol. Psychiat., 60, 563-573.)
0.42*** (0.19*)
0.27* 0.75**
Hypermentalizing Emotion (0.69**) BPD
Regulation
(MASC) (DERS) (BPFSC)
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001
Variable B SE B ß R2 P
Step 1
Hypermentalizing 1.56 .370 .383** .15 .0001
Step 2
Hypermentalizing .793 .270 .194* .58 < .0001
DERS .375 .036 .686**
128. Hypermentalizing is reduced with BPD
symptoms during inpatient treatment
(Sharp et al., submitted)
Tendency to hypermentalize is
malleable through milieu-
based inpatient treatment:
interpersonal-psychodynamic,
although cognitive-behavioral,
family systems, and
psychoeducational
approaches are incorporated
into the treatment approach.
129. MBT IS CHEAP AND COMFORTABLE
AND HELPFUL IN A RANGE OF WAYS!!!
There is fairly general qgreement where mentalization is located in the brain.
The capacity to mentalize has also been argued to account for the other major difference between humans and other apes: (1) self awareness and self-consciousness as a path to simulation bringing with it social emotions such as embarrassment, shame and guilt; (2) the species specific striving to be more than a ‘beast’, to live beyond one’s body, to aspire to a spirit that transcends physical reality and step beyond one’s own existence; (3) the social origin of the self in the recognition of oneself in the mental state of the other as the root to a sense of selfhood (see Allen, Fonagy, & Bateman, 2008 for a more comprehensive review of the concept)
This Venn diagram maps the conceptual overlaps between mentalization and four related concepts including mindfulness, psychological mindedness, empathy, and affect consciousness, which are represented by the four circles. The lines which bifurcate the diagram according to its three dimensions (i.e., self-/other-oriented, implicit/explicit, and cognitive/affective) are dashed to illustrate the permeable and nonabsolute nature of these divisions. In the self/ other dimension, mindfulness focuses more on mental states within oneself, while empathy is primarily understood in terms of one’s imagination of mental states within others. Both affect consciousness and psychological mindedness concern both sides of the self and other distinction. While mindfulness and psychological mindedness emphasize both cognitive and affective aspects of mental states and function explicitly, affect consciousness and empathy relate more primarily to affective mental contents and function both explicity and implicity. Mentalization lies at the intersection of these concepts but the boundaries between them are not distinctly drawn.
Mentalization allows us to have common experiences – we need to coordinate our emotional experiences to function in large social groups. Imagine what would happen if we all felt differently about Lampard’s disallowed goal! Fortunately not the case.
Have to be able to step into the shoes of another person -
CAN DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGUY RESEARCH HELP US GET CLOSER TO THE POTENTIAL SOCIAL EXPEREINCES THAT COULD SET OF THE EPIGENETIC CASCADE THAT Dr Moshe Szyf was describing to us yesterday? INTERSUBJECTIVE ORIGINS OF THE SELF
JUST HOW IMPORTANT CONTINGENT RESPONDING TO AFFECT IS WE KNOW FROM STILL FACE PARADIGM (GERGELY)
What is the control syste
There has been formidable resistance to envision the rich affective and mindful life that we now know infants do have from birth, probably for a considerable time prior to birth to the small person who cry when hungry or smile after a good feed. Psychoanalysts who dared attribute complex mental states to infants were ridiculed and pilloried (e.g. Glover, 1945). Half a century ago infants were commonly subjected to surgery without anesthetic (curare was used to stop squirming inconvenient for the surgeon) Can infants have minds when they are no yet able to speak? Modern cognitive and affective neurosciences confirms Freud’s assumption that mental life was somatically grounded, the body being at the root meaning making. Neuroscience findings consistently suggest that higher order representational systems (abstract and metaphoric thought, social cognition) are reliant on bodily markers and simulation of how we perceive and experience our body in action (e.g. Barsalou, 2008; Gallese, 2007).
Logical structure of events in Experiment 1. ( A ) In all four conditions, the agent enters the scene, placing a ball on a table ( 13 ) (Movie S1). The ball then rolls behind an occluder. ( B ) In the agent’s presence, the ball stays behind the occluder (a and c), or leaves the scene (b and d). As a result, the agent (A) “believes” either that the ball is behind the occluder or that there is no ball behind the occluder. Then, the agent leaves the scene. ( C ) In the agent’s absence, the ball leaves the scene (c), returns behind the occluder (d), or does not move (a and b). Thus, the participant (P) either believes the ball to be behind the occluder (a and d), or to have left (b and c). ( D ) The agent reenters the scene, and the occluder is lowered. In half of the trials of all conditions, participants see the ball behind the occluder. We measure ball detection latencies as a function of (i) the participant’s belief (P+, ball behind occluder, versus P–, no ball behind occluder) and (ii) the agent’s “belief” (A+, ball behind occluder, versus A–, no ball behind occluder), resulting in two true belief conditions and two false belief conditions. The figure does not reflect the actual timing of the events. To control for the timing differences, we used pairs of conditions matched for their timing properties ( 13 ).
Results of Experiments 4 to 7. Looking times in 7-month-old infants. Bars represent average looking times, and error bars show SEM (see Fig. 1 for condition labels). (A) Results of Experiment 4 (true belief). Looking times for the condition when infants (and the agent) believed the ball to be behind the occluder (P+A+) and for the condition when neither the infants nor the agent believed the ball to be behind the occluder (P–A–). (B) Results of Experiment 5 (false belief; agent present in the last scene). Looking times for the condition when only the agent (falsely) believed the ball to be behind the occluder (P–A+) (Movie S1), and for the condition when neither they nor the agent believed the ball to be behind the occluder (P–A–) . (C) Results of Experiment 6 (no outcome control). Looking times for two conditions that were identical to the ones used in Experiment 4, except that the occluder was not lowered at the end of the movies. Thus, infants did not see whether the ball was present behind the occluder. As a result, there were no confirmed nor violated beliefs. (D) Results of Experiment 7 (false belief; agent absent in the last scene). Looking times for the two conditions where the agent was replaced with a pile of boxes in the very last scene (corresponding to Fig. 1D). We compared the condition where only the agent (falsely) believed the ball to be behind the occluder (P–A+) with the condition where neither the infants nor the agent believed the ball to be behind the occluder (P–A–). n analogy to Experiment 2, Experiment 7 asked whether infants would maintain others’ beliefs even in the agent’s absence. Specifically, infants were presented with the baseline condition (where both the infant and the agent believed that the ball was not there) and a condition where only the agent believed the ball to be behind the occluder. Before the occluder was lowered, however, a pile of boxes, rather than the agent, entered the scene. As in Experiment 5, infants looked longer than in the baseline condition when the agent (who was not present when the occluder was lowered) believed that the ball was behind the occluder [ F (1,13) = 6.75, P = 0.02] ( Fig. 3D ). Hence, like adults in Experiment 2, infants seem to compute others’ beliefs online and to maintain them even in the absence of the agent. Possibly, the boxes could have prompted participants to think of the agent and his beliefs, although there was no relation between the boxes and the agent. However, even if the boxes reminded participants the agent, our results can be explained only if participants computed the agent’s beliefs and sustained them even though the agent was not present. Together, our results suggest that the mere presence of social agents is sufficient to automatically trigger online belief computations not only in adults, but also in 7-month-old infants. Once the beliefs have been computed, adults and infants maintain them even in the absence of the agent, presumably for later use in social interactions. Hence, from 7 months on, an age by which infants attribute goals and intentionality ( 14 ), humans automatically compute other’s beliefs and seem to hold them in mind as alternative representations of the environment. As a result, at least in implicit tasks like ours, others’ (false) beliefs can influence infants’ and adults’ behavior similarly to their own (true) beliefs. The finding that others’ beliefs can be similarly accessible as our own beliefs might seem problematic for an individual, because it may make one’s behavior susceptible to others’ beliefs that do not reliably reflect the current state of affairs. However, the rapid availability of others’ beliefs might allow for efficient interactions in complex social groups. These powerful mechanisms for computing others’ beliefs might, therefore, be part of a core human-specific “social sense,” and one of the cognitive preconditions for the evolution of the uniquely elaborate social structure in humans.
Hyperactivation of attachment system may be core aspect of BPD 2c
Just how important contingencies are for all of us
Oxytocin is the VIAGRA of mentalization
Around in great quantity (breast feeding) when the infant needs it most – when it totally depends on being understood Oxytocin turns us towards the face to try to find the mind therein
Psychic equivalence : Mind-world isomorphism; mental reality = outer reality; internal has power of external Fran Intolerance of alternative perspectives ”YOU LOOKED AT YOUR WATCH” Pretend mode : Ideas form no bridge between inner and outer reality; mental world decoupled from external reality FRAN “ dissociation” of thought, hyper-mentalizing or pseudo-mentalizing ENDLESS HOURS OF ‘THERAPY’ Teleological stance : A focus on understanding actions in terms of their physical as opposed to mental constraints Cannot accept anything other than a modification in the realm of the physical as a true index of the intentions of the other. Long version2 has some new slides in it
Long version2 has some new slides in it
NOT ALL PROTOCOLS HAVE THE SAME EVIDENCE BASE WE ARE UNDER NO ILLUSIONS ABOUT MBT AS AN EST
ONE MAY BE FORGIVEN FOR CONTEMPLATING IF ANY Treatment WITH A 3 LETTER ACRONYM HAS A CHANCE OF IMPROVING THE WELLBEING OF INDIVIDUALS WITH BPD All provide structure – Perhaps it is the structure that is crucial because allows people to think. If we just provide a structure that tells therapists what to do will we remove the effective component.
The brain is not organized into neural networks localized based on professional associations.
2c
Extensive effort to maintain engagement in treatment (validation in conjunction with emphasis on need to address therapy interfering behaviours) Includes a model of pathology that is explained to the patient ( Active therapist stance: Explicit intent to validate and demonstrate empathy, generate strong attachment relationship Focus on emotion processing and connection between action and feeling (suicide feeling == abandonment feelings) Inquiry into patients’ mental states (behavioral analysis, clarification, confrontation) Structure of treatment provides increased activity, proactivity and self-agency (eschew expert stance, “sit side-by-side”) Structure is manualized with adherence monitored Commitment to the approach Supervision to identify deviation from structure and support for adherence
Extensive effort to maintain engagement in treatment (validation in conjunction with emphasis on need to address therapy interfering behaviours) Includes a model of pathology that is explained to the patient ( Active therapist stance: Explicit intent to validate and demonstrate empathy, generate strong attachment relationship Focus on emotion processing and connection between action and feeling (suicide feeling == abandonment feelings) Inquiry into patients’ mental states (behavioral analysis, clarification, confrontation) Structure of treatment provides increased activity, proactivity and self-agency (eschew expert stance, “sit side-by-side”) Structure is manualized with adherence monitored Commitment to the approach Supervision to identify deviation from structure and support for adherence
Extensive effort to maintain engagement in treatment (validation in conjunction with emphasis on need to address therapy interfering behaviours) Includes a model of pathology that is explained to the patient ( Active therapist stance: Explicit intent to validate and demonstrate empathy, generate strong attachment relationship Focus on emotion processing and connection between action and feeling (suicide feeling == abandonment feelings) Inquiry into patients’ mental states (behavioral analysis, clarification, confrontation) Structure of treatment provides increased activity, proactivity and self-agency (eschew expert stance, “sit side-by-side”) Structure is manualized with adherence monitored Commitment to the approach Supervision to identify deviation from structure and support for adherence
Long version2 has some new slides in it
Long version2 has some new slides in it
Long version2 has some new slides in it
Long version2 has some new slides in it
Long version2 has some new slides in it
Thoughts are real and therefore they have to be controlled – Orwellian thought police There are singular solutions to social reality, there are no alternative ways of seeing things, there is intolerance to perspectives (concrete and egocentric – if I thought it it is real, no self questioning) Models of minds are simple (black and white), schematic and rigidly held (demonization and dehumanization) – distorted mentalizing ( Negative ideas (threats) become terrifying Long version2 has some new slides in it
People think and feel but this can have no consequence leading to an empty and meaninglessness social existence There is selfishness and extreme egocentrism emerging out of the unreality of anything other than one ’ s own thoughts and feelings Lack of reality of internal experience permits interpersonal aggression and deliberate harm because other minds are not felt to exist and the mind is no longer felt as contingent on continued existence of the physical self Frequently there is endless ‘ communication ’ and searching but it is destined to yield no change Long version2 has some new slides in it
A focus on understanding actions in terms of their physical as opposed to mental outcomes Only a modification in the realm of the physical is regarded as a true index of the intentions of the other. Only action that has physical impact is felt as potentially capable of altering mental state in both self and other Physical acts of harm Demand for acts of demonstration of intent by others Long version2 has some new slides in it
Long version2 has some new slides in it
C
Early in the play Othello is presented as a reasonable man who tries to calm his hot-headed fellows, asking them to think about the reasons for their impulsive behaviour when they get into a brawl. However, later on as Iago’s insinuations plant the seed of doubt about his wife Desdemona’s fidelity in his mind, his arousal level increases to the point where he leaps to conclusions about her thoughts and feelings without controlled explicit mentalizing)
Early in the play Othello criticises others for their inability to control their impulse
This Venn diagram maps the conceptual overlaps between mentalization and four related concepts including mindfulness, psychological mindedness, empathy, and affect consciousness, which are represented by the four circles. The lines which bifurcate the diagram according to its three dimensions (i.e., self-/other-oriented, implicit/explicit, and cognitive/affective) are dashed to illustrate the permeable and nonabsolute nature of these divisions. In the self/ other dimension, mindfulness focuses more on mental states within oneself, while empathy is primarily understood in terms of one’s imagination of mental states within others. Both affect consciousness and psychological mindedness concern both sides of the self and other distinction. While mindfulness and psychological mindedness emphasize both cognitive and affective aspects of mental states and function explicitly, affect consciousness and empathy relate more primarily to affective mental contents and function both explicity and implicity. Mentalization lies at the intersection of these concepts but the boundaries between them are not distinctly drawn.
SO What is the idea behind MBT?
Powerful activation of the attachment system is incompatible with meaningful (as opposed to ruminative) contemplation of mental states As attachment intensifies and arousal increases, mentalization switches from a primarily controlled, reflective, internally focused cognitively complex prefrontally guided process to an automatic, externally focused emotionally intense posterior cortically and sub-cortically driven one Emotional arousal in BPD lose explicit mentalizing and become particularly attuned to the states of mind of individuals around them Able to perform experimental mentalizing tasks relatively well under low arousal (Arntz, Bernstein, Oorschot, Robson, & Schobre, 2006) Cannot explain the states of mind they experience under high arousal Show confusion about mental states as they are dominated by reflexive assumptions about the internal states of others psychotherapists of many orientations often aim to address and provide broader understandings for issues that trigger intense emotional reactions (challenging interpersonal situations, issues of shame, guilt, feelings of inadequacy etc). The demand for conscious reflection and explicit mentalization is inconsistent with the patient’s capacity to perform these tasks under high levels of arousal. This makes it particularly hard to change deeply ingrained implicit dispositional interpersonal ideas which rely on automatic and preconceived judgments of self and others.
Why is engaging the carergiver so important for the infant? Infant acquires affect regulation through close interaction with caregiver – comes to understand own emotional state Discovers himself through mirroring interactions
The TPJ is involved in perspective taking (Ruby & Decety, 2001, 2003, Aichhorn et al., 2006), in sense of agency (Farrer et al., 2002, 2003, Decety & Grezes, 2006) and mentalizing (Frith & Frith, 1999) The aFMC is involved in mentalizing (Frith & Frith, 1999, Firth & Frith, 2003, Amodio & Frith, 2006, Gilbert et al., 2006) and self-referential processing (Northoff and Bermpohl, 2004)
In fact, recent work by Brass’s group, using a within-subject experimental design with reflective mentalizing and imitation-inhibition tasks, suggests that there is a functional relationship between the inhibition of imitative behavior and the capacity for belief-desire reasoning (Brass et al., 2007). Thus it appears that the inhibition of imitative behavior involves cortical areas that are also related to mentalizing, self-referential processing and determining self agency. We assume that this overlap reflects common underlying processes such as self/other distinction and decoupling of self and other.
In fact, recent work by Brass’s group, using a within-subject experimental design with reflective mentalizing and imitation-inhibition tasks, suggests that there is a functional relationship between the inhibition of imitative behavior and the capacity for belief-desire reasoning (Brass et al., 2007). Thus it appears that the inhibition of imitative behavior involves cortical areas that are also related to mentalizing, self-referential processing and determining self agency. We assume that this overlap reflects common underlying processes such as self/other distinction and decoupling of self and other. the capacity to inhibit imitative behavior may be key to enabling us to generate a sense of ‘me’-ness through achieving a ‘not-other’-ness. In other words, each time we interpret the actions of another, there may be a sequence in which an initial imitative matching response with the other within a motor neuron self-other system interacts with the reflective mentalizing self-other system. Thus by necessity this involves an inhibition of the mirror system and reduces the extent of ‘primary identification’ with the other. Long version2 has some new slides in it
Thus,, we might extrapolate the hypothesis that the failure of medial prefrontal and temporo-parietal mentalizing function might leave the individual with difficulties in decoupling their representations of another person’s experience from their self-representations. Hence, if this is correct, patients with BPD feel vulnerable to loosing a sense of self in interpersonal interchange because they cannot adequately inhibit the alternative state of mind which is imposed on them through social contagion. Perhaps, then, the evident determination to ‘manipulate and control’ the mind of others that is so characteristic of BPD patients should be best seen as a defensive reaction, defending the integrity of the self within attachment contexts. Otherwise, without such control, they might feel excessively vulnerable to loosing their sense of separateness and individuality. Long version2 has some new slides in it
Consistent findings show that the stronger the alliance the greater the therapeutic change (eg Horvath & Bedi 2002; Orlinsky et al 2004) Therapeutic alliance is therefore often posited as a mediator and mechanism of therapeutic change Studies evaluating alliance during treatment often show that alliance predicts improvement in symptoms at end of treatment However, this in itself does not show that alliance plays a causal or mediational role
Subjects are asked to watch a 15-minute film about four characters getting together for a dinner party. Themes of each segment cover friendship and dating issues. Each character experiences different situations through the course of the film that elicit emotions and mental states such as anger, affection, gratefulness, jealousy, fear, ambition, embarrassment, or disgust. The relationships between the characters vary in the amount of intimacy (friends – strangers) and thus represent different social reference systems on which mental state inferences have to be made. During administration of the task, the film is stopped at 45 points during the plot and questions referring to the characters' mental states (feelings, thoughts, and intentions) are asked (e.g., “What is Betty feeling?”, “What is Cliff thinking?”). Participants are provided with four responses options: (i) a hypermentalizing response, (ii) an undermentalizing response, a (iii) no mentalizing response and a (iv) accurate mentalizing response. To derive a summary score of each of the subscales, points are simply added, so that, for instance, a subject who chose mostly hypermentalizing response options would have a high hypermentalizing score. Similarly, participants' correct responses are scored as one point and added. To calculate an overall mentalizing score, mentalizing errors are subtracted from accurate mentalizing, such that for the overall score, a higher score indicates accurate mentalizing. The MASC is a reliable instrument that has proven sensitive in detecting subtle mindreading difficulties in adults of normal IQ41, young adults63, as well as patients with bipolar disorder42, and autism64
Borderline Personality Features Scale for Children (BPFSC). The Difficulties in Emotion Regulation Strategies Scale (DERS). The DERS59 provides a comprehensive assessment of difficulties in ER, including awareness and understanding of emotions, acceptance of emotions, the ability to engage in goal-directed behavior and refrain from impulsive behavior when experiencing negative emotions, as well as the flexible use of situationally appropriate strategies to modulate emotional responses. It consists of 36 items that are scored on a 5 point Likert scale, ranging from 1 ( ‘almost never (0-10%)’ ) to 5 ( ‘almost always (91-100%)’ ). A higher total score indicates greater emotion dysregulation. The highest possible total score is 180. The measure has demonstrated adequate construct and predictive validity and good test-retest reliability in undergraduate students59, and was recently validated in a community sample of adolescents71. The DERS has been used previously in inpatient adolescent samples72, 73. In the present sample, internal consistency of this measure was good with a Cronbach’s alpha of .86.