A review of the paper "Vanish: Increasing Data Privacy with Self-destructing Data" Presentation Layout: - Vanish Data Object (VDO) - Encapsulation/Decapsulation - Architecture - Major issues - Final Thoughts

1. Increasing Data Privacy with
Self-Destructing Data
Roxana Geambasu, Amit Levy, Tadayoshi Kohno,
Arvind Krishnamurthy, Henry M. Levy
Andreas Georgiou

2. Outline
 Introduction
 Vanish Software
 Vanish Architecture
 Distributed Hash Tables (DHTs)
 Problems identified
 Final Thoughts

3. Introduction
 What is Vanish ?
 What are the Goals ?
 Threat Model

4. Vanish Software
 Firefox plug-in (FireVanish) & File Vanishing
 No Crypto Keys required
 No user action required

5. Vanish Software
 Encapsulate
 Vanish Data Object (VDO) = {C,L}
 Decapsulate

6. Vanish Software
 Encapsulate
Timeout (hours/days)
 Vanish Data Object (VDO) = {C,L}
 Decapsulate

7. Vanish Software
 Encapsulate
 Vanish Data Object (VDO) = {C,L}
 Decapsulate

8. Vanish Software
encrypted data
 Encapsulate
 Vanish Data Object (VDO) = {C,L}
 Decapsulate
locator key

9. Vanish Software
encrypted data
 Encapsulate
 Vanish Data Object (VDO) = {C,L}
 Decapsulate
locator key

10. Vanish Software
encrypted data
 Encapsulate
 Vanish Data Object (VDO) = {C,L}
 Decapsulate
locator key

11. Vanish Architecture
VDO via Email
DHT
VDO Creation {C, L, N, Threshold}
VDO {C, L, N, Threshold}
L : Locator Key
L : Locator Key
C= EK (Data)
K : Random Enc Key
Reconstruction
Encryption Key
Data = DK (C)

12. Distributed Hash Table (DHT)
 Decentralised P2P Network
 [Key, Value] Pairs
 Scale, Geo-Location & Reliability
 Multiple DHTs (OpenDHT & Vuze)

13. Identified Problems I
 No security before timeout
 Anyone can access to the VDO
 Legal issues (UK & US)

14. Identified Problems I
 No security before timeout
 All users have access to the VDO
 Legal issues

15. Identified Problems II
 Not Practical
 No commercial value.
 No user studies (interface/usability/confidence)
 No security (Sybil Attack)

16. Identified Problems II
 Not Practical
 No commercial value.
"Defeating Vanish with Low-Cost Sybil Attacks Against Large DHTs" (2009) Scott Wolchok, Owen S. Hofmann, Nadia Heninger, Edward W. Felten, J. Alex Halderman, Christopher J. Rossbach,
Brent Waters, Emmett Witchel
 No user studies (interface/usability/confidence)
 No security (Sybil Attack)

17. Final Thoughts
 Use of DHT in Information Security
 Followed the Scientific Method (Experiments)
 Most goals were accomplished
 Suggested solutions to weaknesses

18. Final Thoughts
 Use of DHT in Information Security
 Followed the Scientific Method (Experiments)
 Most goals were accomplished
 Suggested solutions to weaknesses

19. Thank You for Listening
Andreas Georgiou 2014
andreas.georgiou.13@ucl.ac.uk