INDONESIA - Existent Terrorism and the opportunities for the growth of radical Islam and ISIS

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ISS Risk Special Report:
Existent Terrorism in Indonesia and the Opportunities for the
Growth of Radical Islam and ISIS
September, 2016

Intelligent Security Solutions Limited Frontier & Emerging Markets Analysis
©ISS Risk 2016 Page | 1
Table of Contents
Abstract ...................................................................................................................................................2
Introduction..............................................................................................................................................2
Contextualisation.....................................................................................................................................4
1. Political backdrop to today‟s terrorist landscape.............................................................................4
2. The consequences brought by globalisation of jihad to local groups .............................................5
a) Jemaah Islamiyah (JI).................................................................................................................6
b) Free Aceh Movement (GAM)......................................................................................................8
c) Laskar Jihad (LJ).........................................................................................................................9
The 5th wave: A new international influence ..........................................................................................9
1. From al-Qaeda to Islamic State ......................................................................................................9
2. Camp Bucca..................................................................................................................................11
3. Al-Qaeda in Indonesia...................................................................................................................12
4. Abu Bakar Ba‟asyir........................................................................................................................15
5. Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid, JAT .....................................................................................................16
Government counter-actions and responses........................................................................................23
SYRIA: Catalysts to the journey and the results of the connectivity.....................................................27
Channels to Syria..............................................................................................................................29
Chronology of ISIS related events ........................................................................................................32
The medium to long term risks..........................................................................................................44

Abstract
In contrast to several countries with large Muslim populations within Asia and further afar,
the Republic of Indonesia has remained a country relatively free of a religiously motivated
radical militant population. The environmental conditions that prevented such a significant
shift towards radicalism – as have also been seen in other Islamic nations – included, but
were not limited to, an authoritarian government and strong Asian ethos and influence upon
the practice of religion within the country. Both these pillars are helping in curtailing the
growth of radical or extreme Islamic ideological fundamentalism to date.
The challenge facing Indonesia, as it is for many countries across the globe, is squarely one
of the growth of jihadism. Jihadism has experienced an evolution over the past four decades,
not unlike many facets of globalisation under the auspices of modernity. Specific waves of
radicalisation have occurred during this forty year period, these elements what they mean for
the evolution of radical Islam in Indonesia, are identified in this report. The terrorist
campaigns waged by what were historically „Islamist separatist groups‟ and the now growing
and disruptive presence of „Pan-Islamism‟ extremism generally, has altered the fabric of
radical islamification over this period. The key strand of DNA connecting the evolution of
global jihadism is undoubtedly the evolving connectivity of the ideology.
Introduction
Most certainly the strength of governmental authoritarianism has waned over recent decades
within Indonesia as it modernises and liberalises; these „forces‟ in turn contribute, to a
degree, to the tempering of interpretations of Islam within Indonesia. Yet many of the
changes have also helped to ensure that extremists remain on the margins of both its
religious and social society, they have also „allowed‟ for this sub-culture to germinate at its
fringes, to inhabit an existence in the shadow of mainstream society and from there
potentially thrive. This ostracised, largely excluded element – albeit at its own behest – has
existed for a long time in Indonesia. It has been carried along by the undercurrent of
radicalism found growing not just within Indonesia but currently across much of Southeast
Asia. This phenomenon is what poses the newest and most challenging security threat to the
Indonesian people, their government, their sovereign integrity and the country‟s international
investment profile.
The nascent existence of this undercurrent of radicalism has spawned groups such as
Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), which grew from a national level threat to a serious transnational
regional threat by capitalising significantly on their relationship with al-Qaeda (AQ) into the

mid-2000‟s. Despite the contraction of JI, the country‟s then most potent terrorist group, and
the parallel simultaneous contraction of AQ in Southeast Asia in the late 2000s, the
resiliency and continuous reinvention of Islamic fundamentalism poses a vexing question for
the government in the past two decades. It is a question that has yet to be properly
answered outside of attempted de-radicalisation programs. As well intended as the treating
of its symptoms has been to date by the Indonesian government and several NGOs, the root
causes and inspirations remain and are resurfacing in a turbulent period of Islam‟s modern
history.
The government has attempted to resolve this problem at the grassroots level – the granting
and the implementation of Sharia Law within the Ache region for example – but religious
radicalism remains a persistent and growing issue faced by the country. It is the exponential
risk of latent growth borne of this impasse that ISIS seeks to exploit, feed and capitalise
upon. As has been witnessed elsewhere in the region, once ISIS establish their local
footprint, this is then converted into a springboard or platform to grow their attempts to
establish their global Caliphate aspirations.
ISIS, as they have made repeatedly clear, has the end goal of establishing and maintaining
a global caliphate. In 2014, the terrorist organisation circulated a map illustrating the areas
which they planned to have acquired within the next five years, a veritable Five Year Plan.
This map includes the entire Middle East, North Africa, large areas of Asia including India
and extending to Kazakhstan, and even large parts of Europe such as Spain, Greece, and
Austria. It is important to recognise however that ISIS‟ current operations are not solely tied
to these purported plans. In the name of the Caliphate, the group is also actively recruiting
sympathisers and aligning local extremist groups across the Southeast Asia region.
Having already established formal links to Bangladesh, Malaysia, the Philippines and
Indonesia, it is clear that ISIS is fully seizing operational opportunities across the region. To
this end, ISS Risk is currently in the process of producing reports on terrorism for each of the
individual countries throughout Asia. This report is a segment of this project, focusing
specifically on Indonesia. In order to illustrate the role of ISIS and, more generally, terrorism
in Indonesia, we have provided an outline and assessment of terrorism in its recent history.
This chronological account brings us to the current state of terrorism in Indonesia today.
Our analysis draws clear parallels between the previous role of al-Qaeda and the current
role of ISIS opportunistically feeding off the global undercurrent of radicalisation within Islam
and instigating equally global initiatives which delve into and drive domestic affairs of this
country.

As you will see in the sections that follow, there are dominant groups, such as Jemaah
Islamiyah (JI), some are willing to associate and carry out attacks in the name of ISIS, but in
actuality are following an entrenched vision of their own extremism. ISIS is the current
means to an end. Furthermore we put forward the analysis that when considering the
historical nature of JI and its own regional ambitions, it is unlikely that the two will ever align,
but merely complement each other‟s aspirations. Most of these indigenous groups will
exploit ISIS‟ presence in the country by resurging and growing and operating in its shadows.
Consequently to this „indigenously rooted standpoint‟ of JI, ISIS‟ greatest potential for new
recruits in Indonesia is to be found in the younger generations, emergent groups and those
incarcerated in the country‟s prisons.
As admitted by the authorities, the overcrowded Indonesian prison system has virtually
created a breeding ground for jihadists. It is these prisoners‟ that can be most easily lured by
fellow inmates, including clerics that regularly preach calls to jihad during their incarceration.
ISIS is fully taking advantage of these conditions to grow its network in the country.
However, at the same time indigenous groups are also capitalising on this „captive audience‟
and the resurgence of radical Islamic doctrines and ideology that had slowed since AQs and
JIs quietening in the late 2000s to early 2010s.
The mix of international and domestic extremist groups in Indonesia presents an interesting
dynamic for assessment and analysis. Historical competing interests remain subject to a
myriad network of interests which are expediently aligning and re-aligning currently.
Marriages of conveniences‟ are ever more frequently materialising. So, effectively, between
the influence of al-Qaeda, indigenous groups, and ISIS, we are seeing jihadism in Indonesia
come full circle. How this is playing out domestically and regionally is the focus of this report.
Contextualisation
1. Political backdrop to today’s terrorist landscape
The politics of Indonesia have long affected the landscape of terrorism in the country.
Although radical Islam has been present in the country since before its independence from
colonial rule, it is the experiences of the past 20 years that have seen it become deeply
rooted. Under President Sukarno, Indonesia‟s government transformed to an authoritarian
system. The second president, Suharto, continued the system, strengthening the power of
the military, ousting opponents and bureaucratising social and political organisations. The
strong hand of these rulings left little room for Islamic extremists to foster influence and
make significant gains in the country. Consequently, and in stark contrast to the experiences
of several other „Muslim countries‟ during these decades, Islamic terror attacks and activity

were marginal as radical leaders fled to foreign countries or worked solely underground.
Though, as time progressed and Suharto‟s power base waned, this secular authoritarian
influenced landscape began to change. It did not change because of a weakening hand, but
rather because Suharto began appointing politically conservative Muslims to high
governmental and military positions in exchange for support to maintain his own position.
Conservative parties often utilise extremist groups to promote their agendas. Consequently,
for Indonesia, this meant expanding the presence of radical Islam and terrorist activities
across the country from within its ruling political elite. With Suharto‟s generals commonly
giving tacit support to these extremist groups, the continuity of the system of authoritarian
government was eventually weakened, providing opportunities for radicals to breed more.
Conservative influence in the political system became entrenched and as such complicated,
during the country‟s transition to „democracy (albeit) with Asian characteristics‟. Despite
reforms and legislations, sectarian tensions and corruption have continued to plague
governmental affairs and remain a critical issue within the country. More so, such an
environment has and remains an advantageous environment for radical Islam to form,
incubate and flourish. Since 2000, local extremist groups have made significant strides in the
country. We have identified the most prominent of these local groups in the section that
follows. Moreover, we discuss how the diffuse nature of the groups and networks has been
both a weakness and the potential strength of the broader evolving interconnected networks
that are gradually meshing to the call of a commonality of purpose – the global jihad.
2. The consequences brought by globalisation of jihad to local
groups
Jihadism has experienced an evolution over the past four decades, not unlike many facets of
globalisation under the auspices of modernity. Specific waves of radicalisation can be
identified in this forty year period, dealt with later in this report. The terrorist campaigns
waged by what were historically „Islamist Separatist groups‟ and the now growing and
disruptive presence of „Pan-Islamism‟ extremism generally, has altered the fabric of radical
islamification over this period. The key strand of DNA connecting the evolution of global
jihadism is the evolving connectivity of the ideology. The indigenous terrorist groups of
Indonesia have both benefited and on occasion barely survived their collaborations with
global jihadist groups. If the Philippines represent the potential „operational hub‟ for radical
Islamic fundamentalism in Southeast Asia, then Indonesia represents the potential
„Ideological incubator‟ for the region. More importantly, like a strain of genetically modified
wheat that can cross fertilise and infect and alter neighbouring fields; an idea can also be

ingrained, become insidious and can be exploited. As such, the potential for Indonesia to
become the backbone of the regionalisation of radical Islam should not be underestimated.
Figure 1: Primary areas of radicalisation in Indonesia
a) Jemaah Islamiyah (JI)
Although it is not the most dangerous at present, Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) is undoubtedly the
most prominent extremist organization in Indonesia. This group remains responsible for the
majority of terrorist attacks that have occurred in the country over the past 15 years.
Following a crackdown by the Indonesian government against Darul Islam (DI) – an
indigenous terrorist organisation which aimed to establish the Islamic State of Indonesia -
serious disruptions to its activities led to its eventual collapse and effective dismantling. It
was at this juncture that JI splintered away to form its own entity. Underground networks of
radicals and extremists from the parent DI group remained across the country, providing a
rich vein of members to groups such as JI looking to grow and fill the void left by DI‟s
demise.
The JI organization grew steadily and significantly during the late 1990‟s to the mid 2000‟s
becoming not just a local-to-national militant terror group but a regional group of real
influence with proven operational capacity. Operating originally from Malaysia and then
returning to Indonesia following the fall of Suharto, the group ultimately became a regional

threat with enhanced relations and connectivity with other groups in Southeast Asia under
the stewardship of AQ cementing its position.
The group‟s founders, two Yemeni-born Indonesian clerics Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar
Ba‟asyir strategic decision to grow their group from Malaysia, was a direct result of them
having to flee to Malaysia in the 1980s so as to evade prosecution for ties to DI. Despite the
death of Sungkar shortly after returning to Indonesia, Abu Bakar Ba‟asyir without doubt
remains a key player in the regions jihadi efforts – a matter discussed further within this
report.
In line with DI‟s ultimate plans for Indonesia, the original intention of JI also was to establish
an Islamic State, yet their vision was of an Islamic State that would consist of not just
Indonesia, but also Malaysia, southern Thailand, Singapore, Brunei, and southern
Philippines. In spite of cells and partnerships across the region since its establishment and
return to Indonesia the group‟s current members have said that in recent years its focus had
returned solely to the creation of an Islamic state within Indonesia. It is safe to say that this
viewpoint and strategic ambition may well be changing again under new and improved
conditions for jihadists in the region!
After re-establishing headquarters in Indonesia, JI began carrying out a series of terror
attacks that ripped through the country throughout the 2000s. JI was responsible for
numerous large-scale attacks including the car bomb explosion beneath the Jakarta Stock
Exchange and Christmas Eve bombings of 2000, the Bali Bombings of 2002 and 2005, and
the JW Marriot / Ritz Carlton hotel bombings of 2009. During this period, JI focused heavily
on attacks against Christians and westerners often using VBIED‟s or suicide attacks.
Before the 2002 Bali Bombing, the Indonesian government refused to acknowledge the
existence of such extreme terror threats within its borders. In fact, Megawati [the then
President] ignored persistent and frequent warnings of the imminent threats faced by his
country from neighbouring countries and the United States. With nearly 200 people killed by
JI members in Bali, the government were finally forced to take notice and begin their crack
down on the organization. By 2003, the Indonesian security forces had identified and
captured JI‟s operational chief, Nurjaman Riduan Ismuddin. Over the next few years an
aggressive counter terrorism campaign by the government‟s police and security forces
resulted in hundreds of JI members and supporters arrested and jailed. In 2008, three out of
four of the main suspects behind the Bali bombing were executed.

b) Free Aceh Movement (GAM)
For the past forty years, Aceh [a region located on the northern end of the Indonesian island
Sumatra] has been plagued by separatist conflict. The Aceh region‟s campaign for
independence began in 1976 when a former DI member, Hasan di Tiro, established the
„Free Aceh Movement‟. The movement cycled through three stages. After almost being
wiped out by the close of the 1970s, GAM found enough funding and support to survive its
second stage from 1981-1991 and quietly regain its support base. The group caught
widespread support and attention and by 1999 fostered between 15,000 – 27,000 members,
commencing its third and final stage. The fight against Indonesian security forces, wreaked
utter havoc on the region, with an estimated 15,000 lives lost.
In 2005, after long negotiations with the Indonesian government, a peace agreement was
announced, putting an end to the nearly 30-year insurgency. Both sides agreed to de-
escalate, Indonesian government forces withdrew from the region, and the Aceh was
granted the right to organize Aceh-based political parties. Most importantly though, the
region was granted special autonomy.
Today, Aceh is a focal point of radicalism in Indonesia. In 2014, the provincial government
fully enforced Sharia Law, which criminalised extra-marital relations, drinking alcohol,
homosexuality, gambling, and adultery. It also required boys and girls to be taught
separately in school. It is the only region in the country that abides by this Islamic criminal
code. In the past two years, an estimated 8,000 Christians have been displaced as mobs of
hundreds of local Muslims have attacked churches, demanding their closures. Rather than
punishing such violence, local authorities acted themselves by demolishing more churches.
Sharia Law was supposed to only be applicable to Muslims in Aceh, but, in 2016, the first
non-Muslim [coincidentally a Christian] was publically caned 30 times for selling alcohol. The
region continues to become stricter and more abrasive in terms of enacting these stringent
Islamic codes.
Aceh is a recognised hotspot for Jihadi training camps for numerous extremist groups across
the Southeast Asian region. The existence of these camps proved especially crucial for JI,
as the group established training camps in the province since 2009. These camps have
lessened the necessity of sending fighters to the Middle East to be trained in Jihad – which
had partly been the operating procedure during the previous decades. An important dynamic
for the „combat readiness‟ of local jihadists.

c) Laskar Jihad (LJ)
In 2000, Jafar Umar Thalib established the Laskar Jihad terrorist group in response to
sectarian violence between Muslims and Christians on the Maluku provinces of Indonesia.
Although it disbanded within two years of commencing its campaign, the group was one of
the most brutal, ferociously loyal of all the Islamic extremist groups in the country. Its mission
was to defend local Muslims from Christians, and ultimately establish Sharia Law across the
Maluku archipelago and Indonesia.
The group claimed up to 13,000-15,000 members at its peak, but outside estimates believed
figures of 4,000-10,000 were more realistic. Regardless of these estimates within just
months of LJ‟s establishment, reports indicated that up to a thousand Christians had been
either forced to convert to Islam or had been killed across the Maluku provinces, with the
islands of Seram, Kesui, and Teor suffering most. Entire villages were pillaged and
destroyed and up to 9,000 people were killed and 400,000 displaced by late 2001. In
February 2002, the Manilo II Accord was signed, intending to settle the warring parties. The
violence in Maluku did not stop immediately, but slowly began to decrease. It was not until
after the Bali Bombings in October 2002 that the group alleged its disbandment.
In the period following its alleged disbandment however, the group established a base in
West Papua, where it committed attacks on local Papuans. These attacks, however, were to
no extent comparable to those committed previously on Seram for example, and eventually
the group dissolved. It is not seen as a current threat or material player in the current
extremist landscape in Indonesia.
The 5th wave: A new international influence
1. From al-Qaeda to Islamic State
Of course the groups listed above are but a sample of the groups that have been present in
the country, but they are the most notable and provide a clear demonstration of the terrorism
landscape faced by Indonesia at the turn of the century. The question is as we enter the
latter half of that second decade of the century, what does the future bring?
One key factor shared by these groups regardless of their ambitions being primarily
domestic or regional ambitions, was that they each had relations to the Middle East –
historically specifically to al-Qaeda and currently mostly to ISIS. This dynamic is the epitome
of the Indonesian jihadi system. Yet what is important to recognise here is that as connected
to global terror organisations as domestic groups may seem, the two are not entirely

connected on the ideological front.
They are both brutally and illogically aggressive but they are so for different means. Yes,
they both declare a near sadistic zealot allegiance for their interpretation of the teachings of
Allah and the fight for the religion of Islam but the fact they are not embracing jihad for the
same caliphate aspiration is a serious point of ideological divergence. This ideological
immiscibility withstanding does not place them necessarily as opposing forces at present,
but such entrenched divisions will without doubt come to a head at a later stage of the
indigenous and global group‟s „partnerships‟.
What role do Al-Qaeda‟s and ISIS respectively play in 2016 relative to jihadism in Indonesia?
Al-Qaeda used to be the organisation that connected Indonesia to the global terror network.
It was infrastructure, a platform, an attempt to tap into and capitalise on the undercurrent of
Muslim and Islamic resentment in an increasingly polarised world. As is discussed below,
AQ was heavily interlaced and influential in many domestic groups‟ activities, capitalising on
their need for growth, assistance and improvement, cross fertilisation. In the context of the
respective roles they have and are playing one could look at AQ as the IBM of terrorism,
creating the architecture, with ISIS as the Apple of terrorism, globalising the brand.
This global-to-local terror network dynamic is transforming in Asia at present, but more so
through the rise of regionalisation of terror networks. The early failure of AQ‟s attempted
globalisation of jihad was a salient lesson for many. It clearly was not lost on the inhabitants
of a US-run detention centre in southern Iraq called Camp Bucca in 2004. However, this

applied to the entire prison system in Iraq, created by the US after the invasion to absorb the
existing and emergent radicals and remnants of the Iraqi army and Baathist party members
deemed as a threat. If there was ever a true incubator of radicalism, this was it, unwittingly
and foolhardily created by the American military in the same knee jerk reaction to their
actions they have invoked for decades - only this time around the consequences are having
a genuine global ripple effect.
2. Camp Bucca
The 1st
wave, the foundations of an emergent globalised jihadism, was the establishment of
the mujahedeen during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, which successfully drew
fighters together from across the Islamic world. The 2nd
wave emanated from the rank and
file of the first wave after the occupation ended, when these fighters returned home or
charismatic leaders found new causes to get involved in, such as Chechnya. Arguably AQ
were essentially the 3rd
wave of globalising jihadism. The consequences of the invasion of
Iraq, the prison system in Iraq, or rather, internment system - call it what it was - was the 4th
wave, matching battle hardened, highly motivated extremists with Baathist party members,
unemployed and angry and disenfranchised Iraq Army Officers and soldiers. The 5th
and
current wave essentially emanated from this folly, giving both structure and an explosive rate
of growth to ISIS as a direct result of incarcerating these men together.
Currently the group providing the majority of access to the global network is Islamic State
(ISIS). An indigenous group‟s association with organisations like AQ and ISIS, as
commented on above do not necessarily indicate plans to reach an end goal together. To
further define this key point, the “problem” with the two‟s commonality of purpose regarding
Indonesia, is the fact that both want to hold the power, and they both want to run their own
caliphate. Consequently, the relationship is not entirely sustainable beyond a certain future
point. This, however, does not negate the highly dangerous nature of global networks
working internally in Indonesia. Gradual, incremental cross fertilisation and cooperation
allows resources and facilities to be maximised and funds to be more readily accessible to
domestic groups from these global networks.
If such differences exist and appear entrenched, why the collaboration and pledging of
allegiances by indigenous groups to these global groups? Simple, branding, promotion and
recruitment magnets. The draw to cooperate with ISIS or AQ is the prestige that comes with
being connected to and having attacks carried out in their name in countries across the
globe – and in regards to Indonesia, a prime archipelago with thousands of remote islands to
facilitate regional operations. These relationships are dangerous, but they do not mean that

the government and its security forces are up against one unified force. To illustrate this
further, detailed below are both AQ and ISIS‟ presence within Indonesia. Generally
speaking, rather than magnifying the power of individual terrorist organizations, this detailing
highlights the extent and topography of the undercurrents within the country‟s terrorist
landscape and the clear differences in orientation between so many groups.
3. Al-Qaeda in Indonesia
To date al-Qaeda‟s relationship with JI has proven one of the most successful terrorist
collaborations as well as one of the deadliest for Indonesians. It is AQ‟s influence that
inspired JI to embrace the “holy war” as the 2000s demonstrated. This most fundamental
aspect of AQ‟s concepts was originally so foreign to the group, that it actually split JI into two
factions: bombers and proselytisers. The bombers went on to execute coordinated attacks
with AQ which included the 2002 Bali Bombing.
Once investigations into the bombing revealed the depth of the connection between the local
group and the Middle Eastern global group, it became hard to dismiss AQ‟s influence in the
numerous sophisted attacks that followed. Investigations into the JW Marriot bombing the
next year further verified AQ‟s role and the extent of its penetration in Indonesia. During
investigations an Indonesian national known as Rusman Gunawan, was identified as the
main financer of the attack. Gunawan was later arrested with 5 other Indonesians (all
students) in Pakistan, where he was a member of the Al Ghurabaa cell. This cell was found

to be a joint effort by JI and AQ to train a new generation of terrorists. The potency of the
local and global network‟s connectivity and its ramifications were all too apparent by this
point to not only Indonesian authorities but to its regional neighbours also.
The connection between the two, however, cannot have come as a surprise. Many of the
original members of JI fought in the Afghanistan in the 1980s where they fostered links with
Osama Bin Laden (OBL). Abu Bakar Ba‟asyir, the surviving founder of JI denies personal
links with OBL, yet outwardly voiced support for him. Similarly, Riduan Isamuddin, better
known as Hambali, lived in the same compound in Afghanistan with JI‟s founders in the early
1990s, and later became JI‟s military leader.
In 1998, JI‟s founders Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba‟asyir accepted OBL‟s request to ally the
two groups to wage war against Christians and Jews. Later that year, Hambali met with
Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (KSM) to organize a deal for JI members to receive training in
Afghanistan at one of AQ‟s camps. From there, they formed an arrangement that for future
attacks, JI would do necessary reconnaissance activity and locate raw bomb materials and
AQ would provide bomb-making expertise and underwrite operations conducted by JI.
Hambali is thought to have been both the originator and central planner of the 2002 Bali
bombings and is also believed to have aided in the 9/11 attack on the Twin Towers in New
York City. The potency and long-term threat that have come from such connections is self-
explanatory in the face of such findings. Al-Qaeda in Indonesia at this time in the 2000s did

not stop there. The strong regional connectivity between groups meant that AQ‟s alignment
with JI also associated the global group with other Southeast Asian organizations. In short
through JI an influential and „leading‟ regional terrorist group with transnational operations
and numerous cells AQ gained ease of access to the region and notably increased the
lethality of attacks and complexity of operations local groups could conduct simultaneously.
In 2000 two of AQ‟s most senior leaders visited Indonesia. Intelligence reveals that Ayman
al-Zawahiri, OBL‟s right hand man, and Mohammed Atef, AQ‟s former military chief, made
the trip to assess the potential of moving AQ‟s entire base of operations to Southeast Asia.
Al-Qaeda at the same time also began sending members from around the world to training
camps in the region. (The parallels here to Afghanistan, Libya and the current day Iraq-Syria
theatre speak for themselves!). One of the two men who led this „global training operation‟
out of the AQ recruitment support centre in Madrid was an Indonesian man who was
historically a member of the Laskar Jihad terrorist group of the Maluku provinces.
Of high interest to AQ during this time was the strength of JI‟s connection to the Moro Islamic
Liberation Front (MILF) group based in the southern Philippines. JI abetted AQ-MILF
interaction, resulting in 400-600 Indonesians being trained between 1996-2001, in camps
located both in Indonesia and the southern Philippines province of Mindanao and Sulu. This
group became known as the IILF – Indonesian Islamic Liberation Front. One of the major
collaborative camps, revealed by Indonesian intelligence, was in Poso, Central Sulawesi.
The camp consisted of approximately 10 small, adjacent villages equipped with a firing
range, explosives, and weapons. Both local people and foreign jihadis attended this camp
that was run by Omar Bandon and Parlingdugan Siregar the latter being a member of AQ‟s
network in Spain and a known major recruiter.
Once the Indonesian government began counter terrorism operations after the 2002 Bali
Bombing, these extensive operations were finally challenged. In the years that followed,
hundreds of JI members were jailed or killed and numerous training locations were shut
down. These counterterrorism operations were (and continue to be) led by a police special
forces counter-terrorism group called Densus 88. At the same time, a coalition of forces, led
by the United States following 9/11, were focused on taking down al-Qaeda globally,
regionally and nationally. These concurrent campaigns degraded the leadership of AQ,
which eventually disrupted the organized nature of their extended relations. Today, AQ‟s
ambitions in the region have waned and, although still very much present, the links have
diminished. This has left an opportunity for other „global jihadists groups‟.

4. Abu Bakar Ba’asyir
Ba‟asyir personifies the changing dynamics of terrorism in the region, and how the entry of
ISIS has brought significant changes from both within and between indigenous radical
Islamic terror groups. As mentioned above, Ba‟asyir had personal ties to the Mujahedeen in
Afghanistan in the 1980s, he co-founded JI, and he fully endorsed AQ, calling on his
followers to support the group and look to OBL.
Ba‟asyir continues to be an extremely relevant figure in Indonesian jihad now for a number of
reasons however the foremost of these was unarguably his switching of loyalty to ISIS from
AQ. This shift of allegiance coupled with his continued preaching has been highly influential
in that it has fostered both resentment and inspiration within the terrorist group landscape in
Indonesia. Following the Bali bombings, increased anti-terror efforts forced JI leaders to
rethink the group‟s strategy. When the consensus appeared to be moving toward a non-
violent orientation, Ba‟asyir left and created his own organization in 2008 called Jamaah
Ansharut Tauhid (JAT).
Ba‟asyir was arrested in 2011 and given a prison sentence of 15 years for alleged financing
and support of a militant training camp in Aceh. Illustrating the loyalty of his followers and
personal capabilities Ba‟asyir was still able to function as a major regional influence. Lax
prison standards throughout much of his detainment in prison in Indonesia - where visitors

and smart phones come freely – were a major contributing factor this.
It is fair to say that the physical incarceration of JI‟s spiritual leader and current imprisonment
in a high security prison, one that is located on an island off Central Java, has achieved far
less than it should have in the fight against terrorism.
5. Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid, JAT
JAT or the Community of the Helpers of Monotheism was formed in Solo, Java, by Ba‟asyir
in 2008. He established bases across the country including chapters in the jihadi-hotbeds
Aceh and Sulawesi. At its peak in 2010, JAT boasted thousands of members across the
Indonesian archipelago. Initially, Ba‟asyir showed no indication of wavering support for AQ,
until in August 2014 when he pledged allegiance to ISIS from his high-security prison. Many
members of JAT including Ba‟asyir‟s sons, refused to attune to such affiliation and
consequently split to form Jamaah Ansharusy Syariah (JAS), in hopes of rivalling JAT.
Mohammad Achwan, former JAT emir, was one of the leaders that left the organization in
protest to the new allegiance away from AQ to ISIS. Now head of JAS‟ Sharia Council,
Achwan denounced ISIS claiming they have lost their way to establishing a caliphate –
especially criticizing the group‟s killing of fellow Muslims. Ba‟aysir‟s JAT consequently lost
nearly half of its members after pledging to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. Although now small in
size, JAT still facilitates recruitment to ISIS for its members and sympathisers and as such
remains a key consideration in the country‟s terrorist landscape.
Despite these serious losses in numbers to JAS in 2014 and Ba‟aysir‟s incarceration,
Ba‟aysir began utilizing the overly crowded Indonesian prison system as a platform to preach
his support for ISIS and „keep JAT‟ relevant. Without direct action taken against his prison
activities until February 2016, Ba‟aysir had free rein to preach his radical ideology to
prisoners. Currently 77 years of age with another 10 years to serve, Ba‟aysir‟s influence and
spiritual-ideological reign will likely end in prison. It is unlikely though that he will cease his
calls to jihad, and he will certainly remain spoken of as a figurehead and inspiration to many
budding and actual jihadists in Indonesia.
Outside of Ba‟asyir‟s importance and his impact on JI, JAT, JAS etc… the importance of his
extensive and long running ties to both local and international extremist networks is equally
crucial. Despite being a highly respected elder among extremists, the opposition he faced
when switching allegiance to ISIS from AQ indicates that leaders do not necessary go
unquestioned just because of their position in power. His decision to split from his own
group, JI, to form another group which eventually fractured into even more groups, is not an

uncommon occurrence amongst terrorist groups but its impact on the terrorist group
dynamics in the country remains clearly evident. For ISIS such changes and evolutions
between groups were surely viewed positively, for as the old saying goes „where there is
volatility, there is opportunity‟.
While many groups in Indonesia have aligned with ISIS to advance their notoriety and power
others such as JAS have not, stressing they remain committed to introducing Sharia law
themselves in Indonesia. In 2016 however arguments have emerged that given the high
focus that groups which are pro-ISIS have received from the country‟s security forces that
some groups are only publically anti-ISIS to avoid unwanted attention. JAS has been queried
by some observers on this very point.
When assessing the treatment and focus shown by the government to ISIS-pledged and
anti-ISIS groups this „perceived difference‟ despite particular intentions, is working. Local
sources within Indonesia state that the „two camps‟ appear to have engineered a situation
where non-ISIS aligned groups are seen as „acceptable guys‟ when contrasted to ISIS
affiliates in certain groups of the public‟s eyes.
6. Islamic State in Indonesia
ISIS clearly witnessed and studied AQ‟s activities in Southeast Asia, and came to the same
conclusion as AQ: great potential exists in Indonesia for their cause:
 Strategically the vast archipelago of islands found in Indonesia (and neighbouring
Philippines) is appealing for any extremist group, as it offers remote and potentially long
undisturbed grounds for training and operations.
 Indonesia is the largest Muslim majority country in the Asia continent. Indonesia is quite
rightly often hailed for its moderation of fundamental Islamic principles, yet the country
has a long history of radical Islamic groups that have resided on the fringes of its society.
 As detailed in the previous sections the churn and disruption to existing groups brought
by the entrance of ISIS, the perceived or actual thinning of the influence and connectivity
of AQ both regionally and nationally, and the successes of the security forces has led to
certain groups or factions within Indonesia fracturing, becoming dysfunctional and even
disbanding. Significant numbers of radicalized individuals across the country (ex-
affiliates of these disrupted groups) are seeking a new calling. A significant pool for
recruitment.
 There are numerous local groups that can be utilized by global groups as resources to

spread their own interests.
 Simultaneously to each of the above points Indonesian groups have long been
committed to a regional caliphate – a distinguishing feature, as it often makes them more
open to networking and collaborating with outside groups than groups in neighbouring
Malaysia for example.
Estimations range between 500 and 700 Indonesians currently in the Middle East serving
ISIS. This number may seem low for a country of over 250 million, but it does not indicate a
lack of interest from Indonesians. A great extent of the appeal ISIS offers to its Indonesian
affiliates is its expertise in bomb making and the execution of attacks. From 2010 until
January 2016, there were dozens of attempted bombings in Indonesia but not one of them
was successful. This is without doubt a major source of frustration for the leadership and
members of these groups. They have realised that the government and its security forces
have a highly effective counter-terrorism capability and as such their respective group‟s
abilities to execute attacks is severely impeded. They are simply being outplayed by security
forces, and would appear to have reached a ceiling in their „indigenous capacitates and
capabilities‟.
Certainly the fracturing of major groups has created a patchwork quilt of extremist groups,
but those groups often lack the discipline and training of those they stemmed from. They are
lacking the operational / training capabilities and access to weapons and explosives or
logistical support lines held by their former groups, and as such despite their political-
religious-ideological face redundancy in the domestic or regional terrorist playing field.
Commonplace is the neutering of operational capabilities of new splinter groups after a
number of attempts post-split to make their mark through failed terrorist attacks, or their
potency reduced to comparatively far smaller or less frequent attacks as when their
members were with JI for example.
The bottom-line here is clearly that with the emergence of ISIS this competency void can be
filled. The fact is that attacks in Indonesia have been increasing since the first ISIS affiliated
attack in January 2016 in Jakarta. ISIS is benefiting from the agendas of the domestic
groups and quickly serving its own interests vis-à-vis strengthening of connections and
extending its influence.
7. East Indonesian Mujahidin (MIT)
Mujahidin Indonesia Timur (aka East Indonesia Mujahideen, Santoso Group, East Indonesia
Holy Warriors, East Indonesian Jihad Fighters; MIT) was formed by a former JAT

commander, Santoso (alias Abu Wardah al-Syarqi) in 2011. MIT comprised an array of
jihadist cells in Central Sulawesi, West Nusa Tenggara (especially Bima) and East
Kalimantan. Uniquely Santoso was one of the first Indonesian jihadist leaders to declare
allegiance to ISIS, doing so in July 2014, yet MIT had already forged strong links into Syria
by late 2013, being frequently featured in the international jihadist media.
Despite having remained the most wanted terrorist in Indonesia until his death in July 2016,
Santoso proved to be an effective jihadist commander and although his group in Central
Sulawesi was estimated to number a platoon size unit of 30-40 it was their group‟s control of
a small tract of land at Biru Mountain near the city of Poso that earned him much respect in
Jihadist circles. The MIT‟s control of a territory and therein provision of a qaidah aminah
„safe haven‟ where Sharia law was upheld was viewed as hugely symbolic within the
extremist terrorist landscape in Indonesia and parts of Southeast Asia.
MIT further reaffirmed its position in January 2016 – they had executed the first major
terrorist attack in Indonesia in the past six years. On 14 January 2016, five MIT members
executed an attack at Sarinah shopping mall in central Jakarta. The attack was characteristic
of ISIS, but far from successful:
 The planting and specific positioning of explosives
 The use of gunman in addition to suicide bombers
 The selection of a soft, tourist target to inflict maximum fear upon citizens
Investigations revealed that the attack was the work of an organized cell supported by ISIS,
a cell that Densus 88 had been and is still aggressively pursuing since late 2015. The idea

for the attack was originated by, subsequently funded and driven by Bahrun Naim, an
Indonesian national living in Raqqa. Naim clearly was undertaking an operation so as to
assert himself as a major player in the formulation of a Southeast Asian caliphate. Naim is
the main liaison between MIT and ISIS in the Middle East, with his high profile messages
calling for Indonesians to travel to Syria clearly consolidating such a position. The group had
suffered serious loses in the months leading up to the January Jakarta attack and in all
likelihood foolishly responded by continuing the plan in spite of these loses. More recently
Naim was understood by Security forces to have been behind the July 5 suicide bombing
attack on a police station in Solo in Central Java.
MIT is „headquartered‟ in Poso, central Sulawesi a well-known terrorist hotspot in the region.
As an experienced former commander in the hard-line JAT, MIT became increasingly violent
under Santoso‟s lead. Following its creation in 2010, the group‟s activity focused mostly
around confrontation with authorities – often targeting police and army members by
shootings or bombs.
Traditionally a major portion of MIT‟s revenue / funding for the group coming from local
supporters, and as such the group intentionally avoided civilian causalities so as to ensure
donators were not deterred. This single fact makes the Jakarta attacks perpetrated by the
group both alarming, but also very insightful as to its direction and thinking in 2016. Taking
such a clear tangent away from its historical targeting criteria and modus operandi strongly
indicates the group believes it is no longer dependent upon local funding sources. By simple
deduction it would appear that the income and support now offered from ISIS seems to have
allowed them to completely transform their objectives and to some extent how they will go
about achieving them. MIT has been the most active extremist group in Indonesia in the past
few years. Now, with solid relations to the Islamic State, such activity has clearly escalated
and inhibitions have lowered. Consequently, MIT poses a grave threat to Indonesia and is a
group that must be minutely monitored.
Following the January 2016 attack in Jakarta Santoso and his men moved into hiding deep
in the mountains of central Sulawesi, their „home turf‟. Such was the government‟s
commitment to apprehending Santoso and MIT they committed approximately 2,500 security
personnel (over half of the elite Densus 88 unit). It was recognised by Densus 88 and the
Army that this was a highly dangerous operation and that throughout it food and water and
access to military resources was lacking at times. Sources similarly confirmed however that
Santoso was held by many in the Indonesian terrorist groups to be a figurehead and
therefore that his capture would be highly symbolic for the government. Come June 19 2016
the missions‟ primary objective was achieved with Santoso killed in a fire-fight with security

forces in Poso.
The death of Santoso led to a concern that „revenge attacks‟ would occur, and several
metropolitan police commands continue to monitor the threat from MIT in this regard. Quite
clearly the killing of MIT‟s leader will leave a significant gap in their command and control
structure, and the disruption brought to MIT following now nearly 12 months of pursuit. The
test for MIT is two-fold since June: the selection of a competent leader, and the maintenance
of their connectivity with Indonesians such as Naim in Syria, therein their overall relationship
with ISIS.
8. Smaller ISIS affiliates: collective potency
Alongside the principal groups discussed above there are also a number of smaller extremist
groups that receive comparatively less media attention which are linked to the ISIS. Although
the majority of them are insignificant on their own, they pose a greater threat once supplied
with the resources or inspiration of ISIS. It is individuals from these groups that account for a
large portion of Indonesian foreign fighters that have joined the Islamic State in the Iraq-
Syria theatre. Therefore although disparate in one sense, collectively they pose a risk in their
right, the likelihood of lone actor inspired attacks from these element will be higher.
Jamaah Ansharul Khilafah Islamiyah (Partisans of the Islamic Caliphate; JAKI) was
established in 2015, with its principal base located in East Java. Despite the group‟s
reported small size, it has a high profile nationwide following. Reports are that it was created
and is led by the extremist and pro-ISIS cleric, Aman Abdurrahman. The group is aligned
with the Syria-based Katibah Masyaariq (Forces of the East), an Indonesian unit led by Abu
Jandal as well as being aligned with the prominent Bahrun Naim. Katibah Masyaariq is a
splinter of the original bahasa speaking combat unit organised by ISIS command in Syria,
the Katibah Nusantara battalion which operates under the command of Bahrumsyah. It is
worth noting that the Jakarta attacks were not known to Bahrumsyah, and his reaction to the
attack was to order his network in Indonesia to perform a similar large scale attack. JAKI has
been associated with an increase in anti-Shi‟a attacks in areas where it operates.
Forum Aktivis Syariat Islam (Islamic Sharia Activists‟ Forum; FAKSI). Created by
Muhammad Fachry (real name Tuah Febriwansyah) and Bahrum Syam. FAKSI has become
a major source of Pro IS media in Indonesia. Through its main website al-Mustaqbal.com, it
promotes ISIS Ideology and shares teachings of Aman Abdurrahman the most well-known
extremist cleric in Indonesia.
Gerakan Mahasiswa Untuk Syariat Islam (Students‟ Movement for Islamic Law; Gema

Salam) has become the leading advocate for IS on campuses across Indonesia. Like FAKSI,
its Shoutussalam.org website, focuses on the teachings of Aman Abdurrahman. The site
also provides translations of ISIS‟s Dabiq journal for Indonesians.
Jamaah Tauhid wal Jihad (Community of Monotheism and Jihad; JTWJ) was established
in 2004 by Aman Abdurrahman (alias Oman Rochman) and is reported to hold a somewhat
loose structure with terrorist activities conducted through a number of cells. Reports are that
the JTWJ played a significant role in fundraising for the transporting of fighters to Syria from
ISIS supports in Australia. Intelligence reports from the Indonesian Police in 2014 and 2015
indicate the group has an important role in transporting jihadists to Syria as well as
facilitating these individuals crossing of the Turkish border into Syria.
Mujahidin Indonesia Barat (Western Indonesia Holy War Fighters; MIB), was established
in 2012 in West Java with its origins being that of a splinter group from DI. The splintering
faction was led by former DI senior member Abu Umar, and similarly with JTWJ, the MIB has
sent a number of its members to join ISIS in Syria.
A further 13 small groups across Indonesia were known to have pledged to ISIS1
.
9. Groups in opposition to Islamic State (ISIS)
Jemaah Islamiyah has taken a strong stance against IS. The two groups are ideologically
opposed and most certainly dynamics between certain local leaders have contributed to the
reinforcement of pro-ISIS and anti-ISIS camps, with JI firmly in the latter.
In the past 6 years, JI has taken a non-violent approach to its central goal namely
establishing a Southeast Asian based Daulah Islamiyah, a regional Islamic caliphate. Of
course, as mentioned above, this decision led to numerous splinter groups of members that
disagreed, but what is known as JI today is a well-populated movement. In fact, Jakarta
based security analysts believe that JI membership has climbed to 2,000, approximately the
same size as it was before the 2002 Bali Bombing.
Documents seized by authorities in 2013 suggest the group is strategically thinking long
term. It has curtailed its objectives from regional to local ambitions, turning its attention solely
1
Mujahidin Indonesia Barat (BIB), Ring Banten, Pendukung dan pembela daulah, Gerakan Reformasi
Islam, Asybal Tawhid Indonesia, Kongres Umat Islam Bekasi ,Umat Islam Nusantara, Ikhwan
Muwahid Indunisy, Jazirah al-Muluk (Ambon), Ansharul Kilafah Jawa Timur, Halawi Makmun Group,
Gerakan Tawhid Lamongan, Khilafatul Muslimin.

to Indonesia. The group has realized the importance of public support and has set its sights
on fostering backing for its ideology and eventual activity.
Earlier this year, a previously senior member of JI, Abu Tholut, following early release from
his 8-year prison sentence for terrorism related charges spoke out against ISIS. Tholut is
understood to still be highly connected to the JI leadership and as such his opinions
somewhat insightful. Tholut openly referred to Al-Baghdadi as a „new kid on the block‟, and
referred to the Jakarta attacks by ISIS (and its affiliates) as amateur and „bungled messes‟.
Tholut importantly mentioned that in his opinion the Indonesian authorities‟ inability to
suppress the power of ISIS at this stage of its entry into Indonesia or point of relative calm is
what makes the group highly dangerous. They are able to function without effective restraint.
Government counter-actions and responses
In parallel to the aforementioned „partnership‟ with JI, the Indonesian government is making
attempts to provide strong resistance against extremist ideology in the country. The fruits of
this are yet to be seen, however to date the results would indicate their actions are
insufficient.
1. Government use of anti-ISIS sentiment
Interestingly, JI‟s anti-ISIS rhetoric is being utilized by the Indonesian government. The
group has been given a platform to preach against the latter. The authorities have virtually
negotiated a deal with JI, agreeing that no action will be taken against the group if they
encourage their followers not to carry out attacks in the country. Both current and previous JI
senior members are given free rein to espouse their radical (yet non-violent) views on
listeners in local mosques.
Police are keeping a close eye on such activity but it would appear that the government are
prioritizing the threat from ISIS. Yes, JI is quiet right now and has not executed any acts, but
promoting such extremist rhetoric (despite not calling for attacks) is most certainly luring in
recruits and instilling the necessary mindsets within them for when there is a call to action.
Consequently, despite JI‟s recognized inactivity now, should the group re-adopt political
violence not only will the group be of greater numbers than ISIS in Indonesia but it will also
have retained military expertise and local logistical and operational capabilities that may well
surpass ISIS‟. In many ways the Indonesian government have taken a serious gamble with
this strategy of backing a non-violent JI.

2. Banning ISIS membership
In August 2014 the government banned support for ISIS, forbidding the propagation of ISIS
ideology. This law, however, does not make travelling to Syria to fight for the Islamic State or
training in general terrorist training camps abroad illegal. Compounding this situation is that
there currently exist no clear laws within Indonesia for the prosecution of nationals known to
have or are suspected of having conducted terrorist activities abroad. This means that the
police and security services are often aware of many individuals with terrorist links and who
are directly involved in terrorist actions and related supporting activities, but they do not have
the legal means to easily prosecute them and must attempt to do so with existing laws which
do not always offer a „close fit‟ to their needs.
3. Social media policing
In 2015, the government blocked 22 websites that promoted radical teachings and ideology.
The figure appears low given the size of population and number of Indonesians in Syria and
/ or known to be involved of sympathetic to radical Islam domestically. Communications
Minister Rudiantara, said authorities were working closely with the National Counterterrorism
Agency on how to best quash this radical content. Social media sites and personal
messaging systems that allow people to communicate privately, rather than websites are the
major initiator of mobilizing individuals to travel to Syria or execute local attacks.
4. De-radicalisation programs
De-radicalization programs have also been put in place to focus on the issue of countering
extremist preaching to inmates within the Indonesian prison system. Moderate Islamic
teachers have been brought in by the BNPT (National Agency for Countering Terrorism) to
attend group prisoner discussions and to „re-adjust‟ the religious-ideological thinking of
inmates through such counselling sessions. The prison system has in support of these
programs also begun the banning of mobile phones and laptops. It is safe to say that these
actions either singularly or collectively would require a very extensive effort by the prison
system and the national counterterrorism agency. For example the current de-radicalisation
program does not look to differentiate between different ideologies, nor does it have a long-
term program for prisoners on remand and / or continued support following their release.
Reports from observers are that the Program has not met with success to date, and this
reflects an effective planning and long-term perspective on rehabilitation and de-
radicalisation that stretches beyond the prison walls, or the period only immediately after
release.

Besides the focus on prison inmates, the programs for schools and religious organizations
(such as KOIIN Coalition of Indonesia Islamic Mass Organisation) as well as the general
public through media and social media platforms needs to be stepped up according to
sources within Indonesia. Several observers refer to a greater number of workshops on tools
to counter radical teachings and messages and the promotion of moderate Islam and social
tolerance all being needed. Through such actions the existent discords between violent and
non-violent indigenous groups such as MIT and JI can be monopolised upon by the
government and most certainly this same approach (rejection of ISIS by JI) when focusing
on ISIS‟ penetration and ongoing push to recruit in Indonesia.
5. Incubating terrorists – incarceration in the Indonesian prison
system
Through this report the influence of radical teachings within the Indonesian prison system
has been referred to. It is commonly held that prisons worldwide often foment increased
criminality, or can serve as a networking base for the criminal element; however, in
Indonesian prisons, radical Islamists have taken it to an entirely new level. Per Saud Usman
Nasution, Chief of Indonesia‟s National Counterterrorism Agency the BNPT, “for Indonesian
jihadists, a spell in prison, rather than being an intervention stage, is seen as a way station
to further glory. Many leave prison not only unreformed, but also Ademore influential in local
jihadi circles.” The former chief of the NCA went even further in a separate interview, stating
that prison officials asked for radicals not to be placed in their prisons, because guards
feared for their families‟ safety if they interfered with imprisoned militants.

Imprisoned Islamists in Indonesia are allowed to wear robes rather than prison uniforms, and
have regular access to outside personnel due to the fact that much of the prisoners‟ food is
supplied directly to the prisoners by sources outside the prison. Islamist doctrines are openly
preached throughout the prison system, and in at least one case an inmate even converted
a prison guard to radical Islam. Although the number of pro-ISIS prisoners is small within the
national prison population their ability to influence those around them and to recruit radicals
to their viewpoint is clearly significant to the BNPT.
Prison and reform, seems to be stopping at simply „prison‟, and even at this point the
freedom of communication open to these high-risk prisoners to pursue their extremist
agendas with the external world and within the prisons is alarming. Simply put, discussions
with Syria based jihadists, organisation of their couriers (frequently their equally committed
wives) and orchestration of recruitment, training and attacks should not be available to them.
For those looking for the evidence that these links between these radicalisation movements
within the country‟s prisons and terrorist operations exist, the 2016 Jakarta attack is a perfect
example. Singapore‟s Straits Times claimed that, after ISIS-supporter Aman Abdurrahman
was moved to high security Nusakambangan prison, all four of the Jakarta attackers visited
him on several occasions leading up to the day of the attack. Indonesian National Police
Chief Badrodin Haiti publically stated that at least five incarcerated militants had been in
touch with the Jakarta attackers at various times of the operational planning stage. One of
the attackers, Sunakim, or Afif, was one of two attackers previously incarcerated in
Indonesia for terrorism-related offenses. While an inmate in Jakarta‟s Cipinang prison,
Sunakim was a member of a score of militants that were well-known to be under the
influence of Abdurrahman during his years in that same prison facility.
An associate of Abdurrahman‟s, and as previously detailed JI‟s spiritual leader Abu Bakar
Ba‟asyir, has been in prison since 2011, but has had regular access to social media,
telephones, and couriers who have all served to carry his sermons across Indonesia. Both
Ba‟asyir and Abdurrahman freely communicated from prison until their transfers to
Indonesia‟s highest security institutions. Abdurrahman and Ba‟asyir both also pledged their
allegiance to ISIS from inside those same high security prisons, as did over 20 other
prisoners.
6. Maritime security
Indonesia is involved in dozens of border disputes across seven maritime regions and has at
least 12 largely uncoordinated agencies responsible for its maritime security; it is then little

wonder that President Widodo has identified the maritime domain as one of the most vital
aspects to his administration.
Indonesia has struggled to gain even marginal maritime domain awareness in many of its
territorial waters, an understandable difficulty in an archipelago consisting of upwards of
18,306 islands of which 922 are permanently inhabited. Maritime sovereignty issues
between Indonesia and neighbouring states Malaysia and Philippines further complicate the
maritime picture.
Of particular distinction is the Sulu – Sulawesi Sea, where both Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG)
and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) have carried out attacks against shipping
vessels to generate income through piracy and kidnapping. ASG‟s kidnapping of 14
Indonesian seamen in March of this year illustrates this ongoing threat in the maritime
domain. JI and other Indonesian militant groups commonly use that same water space to
transit between training camps and operational bases in Kalimantan, Sabah, and the Sulu -
Mindanao peninsula.
It must be acknowledged that Indonesia is making efforts to build domestic capabilities, as
well as forge international partnerships, to interdict terrorists using these waterways;
however, there is still a worrying lack of control, especially as distance from Jakarta
increases. Despite lack of present association between ISIS and these maritime issues, it is
almost inevitable that ISIS will begin to exploit this chronic weakness in its mission to expand
in Indonesia and Philippines.
SYRIA: Catalysts to the journey and the results of
the connectivity
The call to jihad in Iraq-Syria by both local Middle Eastern and global groups operating in-
theatre was heard by Indonesian radicals from 2012. By 2013 Indonesians were travelling
directly from Indonesia to the Iraq-Syria theatre, fighting and supporting a number of jihadists
groups such as al-Nusra Front (later Jabhat Fatah al-Sham), Katibat al-Muhajirin, Ahrar al-
Sham and as of course ISIL (ISIS).
By 2014 the arriving Indonesians were near exclusively joining with ISIS or Jabhat al-Nusra,
with the onset of pledges of allegiance to the former from indigenous groups spiking sharply
that same year. The choice of group joined in Syria reflected not only ideological grounds as
one might expect but also the availability of channels in Indonesia (with some controlled
strictly by certain local groups networks) a key determining factor also.

Aside from these dynamics of channel used, the key question here is „what were the
motivations for Indonesians for this journey‟? Most certainly direct comparisons to other
foreign fighters‟ motivations can be seen – a home and place in the caliphate, joining of the
jihad in the belief they are fulfilling a holy obligation, enforcing Sunni primacy over Shi‟a
Islam and the „End-of-Time‟ ethos (which proved very popular in 2013-14 in Indonesia
reportedly). Each and all of these have the highest relevance as motivations, but the
common denominator to them all is that interest in travelling to Syria a product these pull
factors as well local „Indonesian push factors‟ too. The works by ISIS centre to attract
Southeast Asians through virtual preaching and propaganda in social media in bahasa
matched by groups wishing to exert greater influence in Indonesia and be seen as the most
committed radical group to extremist Islamic terrorism can each be recognised as key
factors in this regard.
At present the exact number of Indonesians fighting or in support roles in Syria is frankly
unknown, but as mentioned above previously estimates are between 500 and 700. Densus-
88 the counter-terrorism elite police unit obtained confirmation of 166 Indonesians in Syria in
August 2015 however the Security Minister Luhut Panjaitan reported that the number was
approximately 800 in December 2015. The last two years the BIN (Indonesian National
Intelligence Organisation) has kept to an estimate of 500. If taking the BIN figure of 500 this
is a rather small number given the country‟s population, yet objectively speaking this
battalion size figure represents the largest portion of combat tested jihadists from Southeast
Asia now in Syria. The purpose for Indonesians travelling or „being sent‟ to Syria differs

when studied more closely, and as these insights are revealed the expectations of the
jihadist from their local group when returning is critical to understanding how the Syria
experience of these jihadists will come to impact Indonesia.
Channels to Syria
The three primary channels to Syria by 2015 were run by JI, ISIS and MMI (Majles
Mujahedin Indonesia), and the majority of Indonesians relied upon these channels for
travelling to Syria.
The JI and MMI channels were the reserve of the respective groups operating them, and as
such vetting was understood to be both strict and effective so that members were rightly sent
for military training and combat experience, or for humanitarian work. Estimates are that 20
to 40 Indonesians have worked with Jabhat al Nusra since 2014 having travelled through
these channels. Interestingly here (and in contrast to the ISIS channel) jihadists whether
sent for combat or humanitarian purposes, travelled without their families and it is known that
in suicide operations were strictly discouraged. This patently suggests that their travel to
Syria was to attain short term objectives, logically therein indicating that jihadists from JI and
MMI had a longer-term objective back in Southeast Asia, namely establishing an Islamic
state in Indonesia. What they saw achieved in Syria – be it military training, operational
know-how, ideological training / indoctrination, financing methods or construction of a state
they would repeat upon returning home.
For JI jihadists the comparisons that can be made to the first generation of JI using their
Afghan jihad to build military capacity in Indonesia are quiet clear. Interestingly with JI having
publically announced its priorities to achieving a caliphate being realised through education
as opposed to jihad, the threat from returning JI / MMI channel jihadists „returnees‟ to
Indonesia is primarily not one of „simply greater militancy‟.
The ISIS channel differs sharply from the JI and MMI channels, in that persons recruited
regardless of their „jihadist history / pedigree‟ but who have been radicalised whilst in prison,
through Islamic study sessions, or approached by recruiters within the ISIS network in
Indonesia are all welcomed.
The ISIS network in Indonesia is composed of many groups. It principally comprises of
Mujahedin Timur Indonesia (MIT), Tawhid wal-Jihad (TWJ), Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT),
Sharia Activists Forum (FAKSI), Mujahedin West Indonesia (MIB), Laskar Jundullah (LJ), the
Bima Group, Ring Banten, and Gema Salam, the Student Movement for Islamic Sharia.
From even this list it is clear that with several groups will come several „voices that wish to

be heard‟, and it is this friction and the fact that several of the groups have to some extent
still in 2016 their own distinct channels to ISIS in Syria (coupled with independent
recruitment drives) that the importance of „the main personalities involved‟ comes to the fore
when looking to understand the potency of this connectivity and its limits.
The preservation and existence of multiple channels and their organisers reflects respective
ambitions. Each group wishes to be seen as the „preferred choice in Indonesia‟ in the eyes
of ISIS command in Syria. This competition has simply fed fracture lines between the „pro-
ISIS groups collective‟. Since late 2015, these fracture lines have also been fed further by
the power struggle between the three senior Indonesian fighters based in Syria: Abu Jandal,
Bahrun Naim and Bahrumsyah.
ISIS have been well able to originate a wide variety of radicals from Indonesia, which has
been to its favour in terms of the penetration of their agenda and certainly pulling jihadists
from the traditional JI-AQ bundle (and JI seniors such as Abu Bakr Ba‟asyir and Abu Hunsa)
to them. They have instilled a Jihadi generation gap to some extent also too, and offered a
route for those not involved in the traditional JI-affiliated schools or religious groups. This has
come to some degree at the expense of unity as JI members by comparison were long-
trained and cohesion embedded. Further fracturing and an inability to elect a commonly
accepted leader may well indeed be an issue ISIS has to deal with for some time to come.
On balance to that issue however, ISIS have built a powerful image and in 2016 the vast
majority of jihadists travelling to Syria are joining ISIS. ISIS have cleverly orchestrated AQ
versus ISIS debates online on the divisive topics of killing Muslim militants that are anti-ISIS,
crafted and taken full advantage of existing anti-Shi‟a sentiment in parts of the country and
distributed effective propaganda relating to battlefield victories. Throughout this they have
also carefully promoted the belief through this virtual network that negative views (i.e.
realities!) of Islamic State‟s position in Syria are little more than western propaganda.
In Indonesia ISIS has had its share of prominent supports such as Santoso, Aman

Abdurrahman and former JI amir Ba‟syir, and has won over senior players from existing
opponents‟. However, the challenges to unity for pro-ISIS network brought by the competing
senior Indonesians in Syria and the competing voices and personalities back home, and the
high profile discord between JI and pro-ISIS groups, have created a structural flaw for ISIS‟
operations in Indonesia. For starters, there is no logical first choice for a common leader - no
organic choice such as Hapilon Isnilon, no welcomed transplant such as Tamim Chowdhury.
Three differing personalities who are standing at loggerheads increasingly in Syria, each
vying to build their own combat battalions at the expense of the battalion ISIS crafted so as
to bring bahasa-Southeast Asian jihadi unity can be nothing more but a headache for ISIS
command in Syria. It is in no way unique that local terrorist groups leaders reach out to ISIS
to improve their standing nationally, however the demise of Santoso and continue rise of
pro-ISIS factions will see frictions continue and leadership alternatives for ISIS thin.
The „wider security concern‟ for Indonesia here is that this lack of unity and inevitable race to
„earn the emirship of Indonesia‟ through one-upmanship will increase the risk of violence in
Indonesia. A competition between these rivals to appear the best choice and most
committed (militant!) could easily turn the current „low-casualty jihadism‟ in Indonesia into
„high frequency – higher casualty jihadism‟ as more and more radical acts are performed.
With the return of jihadists from Syria who first entered the combat theatre via the ISIS
channel, likely to return to Southeast Asia as the situation in Syria deteriorates this issue of
competition could quickly become a very serious one for the Indonesian security services

The Southeast Asian „Syria alumni‟ made up of bahasa speaking fighters, from Malaysia and
Indonesia along with their Philippine counterparts can move between each other‟s countries
virtually or otherwise when they return. The Mindanao and Sulu archipelago province in the
southern Philippines as discussed in ISS Risk‟s Philippines Special Report has every chance
of becoming an epicentre for ISIS in the region to this very end. A staging post for attacks
and a haven for training camps, only a few hundred nautical miles from Indonesia. Grave
causes for concern indeed should Indonesian returnees establish a set of strong footholds in
this neighbouring country.
Chronology of ISIS related events
2013
2013 / October
 Prior to the split between AQ and ISIS the major extremist groups in Ambon province
celebrated Idul Fitri together. Supporters of the different principle militias in Syria (i.e.
ISIS, al-Nusra Front, Ahrar al-Syam) celebrated together.
 Well known figure Aman Abdurrahman issued a declaration of support for ISIS on his
website with a pro-ISIS campaign in volatile Ambon commencing in earnest soon
afterwards.
2013 / November
 On November 25 an upload to Twitter by the Suquor al-Ezz Brigade (later part of al-
Nusra) announced the death of Abu Muhammad Al-Indunisi in East Ghouta in Syria. The
announcement confirmed that Indonesian jihadis were indeed not only in the Iraq-Syria
theatre but also in frontline combat roles. Typical of many of the early jihadists from
Indonesia Al-Indunisi studied at a JI school in Solo, Central Java – the same one
attended by six of the Bali bombers – and later leaving West Kalimantan in 2007 to study
in Yemen, and from Yemen ultimately travelling to Syria when the conflict started.
 The head of the Indonesian Foreign Ministry‟s directorate for the protection of citizens
abroad, Tatang Budie Razak Utama, informed the local Indonesian media at a press
conference that they had estimated approximately 50 Indonesians were fighting in Syria.
2014
2014 / January

 Bahru Naim, a prominent member of MIT and „rising star‟ in the Indonesian terrorism
community joins ISIS in Syria. By 2016 Naim would be tendering his position as a neutral
prominent Indonesian who would be the best choice to lead ISIS in Indonesia. Naim was
alleged by Police in Indonesia to be behind the January 2016 Jakarta Attacks, but was
subsequently found not to be so. Naim‟s computer and communications technical skills
are notable, and his contact with his network in Indonesia has been a focus of
Indonesia‟s intelligence services.
 Abu Husna then of JAT, and his close associate swear allegiance to ISIS after the
declaration of the caliphate in 2014 from within their Java based prison
2014 / March
 In celebration of the belief that a caliphate is to be created (Islamic State) in Iraq-Syria by
ISIS pro-ISIS rallies are held. One was organised at the Hotel Indonesia traffic circle in
central Jakarta, with another held at the al-Fatah mosque in Ambon. Reportedly several
hundred people attended from many organisations - including many formerly imprisoned
terrorists.
 Two further „rising stars‟ in the Indonesian terrorist landscape Bahrumsyah, a Bogor
native who went on the appear in several recruitment videos aimed at Bahasa speakers

from Southeast Asia and Salim Mubarok alias Abu Jandal, from Malang were understood
to have entered Syria. By 2016 these two leading Indonesians in ISIS Centre in Syria are
understood to command different competing factions. Abu Jandal is JAKI-linked and
understood to be one of the few cross-overs from salafi to salafi jihadi. He had studied
with a salafi leader Jafar Umar Thalib, and subsequently joined his group Laskar Jihad
when the very violent Maluku conflict began in Indonesia in 1999. He adopted salafi
jihadi ideology after discussions with Aman Abdurrahman, JAKI‟s ideological leader.
2014 / April
 Prominent Indonesian jihadist and spiritual leader Aman Abdurrahman swears an oath of
allegiance to ISIS and to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi (renewed on June 30, a day after ISIS
declared the caliphate). Abdurrahman and a number of fellow prison inmates followed as
did his network outside of the prison of his incarceration. Aman Abdurrahman‟s
supporters were reported as being highly militant and committed to ISIS.
2014 / June
 On June 29 the Islamic State of Iraq and Greater Syria (ISIS) changed its name to
Islamic State and declared Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi its leader to be the Caliph of all
Muslims the world over. The Islamic State also adopted the date „1 Ramadan‟.
 ISIS‟s Northern Iraq offensive began June 5, with the capturing of Mosul following shortly
afterwards. Units believed to be including Indonesians are involved in driving the Iraqi
Army out of the city.
2014 / July
 Ceremonies to pledge loyalty took place in jihadi communities on July 2 around
Indonesia to the newly announced Caliphate in Iraq-Syria – with several such pledges
performed in a number of prisons. These pledging ceremonies included a 24 prisoner
strong video recorded (and uploaded to YouTube) at a super-maximum security facility
on an island off the southern coast of Java, led by Ba‟asyir. Ba‟asyir held considerable
sway within JI senior command and by now was seen as the most prominent pro-ISIS
extremist cleric in Indonesia.
 JAT split over Ba‟asyir‟s oath to ISIS, with estimates of between 50% and 90% of the
organization broke away to establish a new group Jamaah Anshorul Syariah (JAS)
 On July 5, Mujahidin Indonesia Barat‟s leaders (MIB) in Kelpua Dua pledged to ISIS

 On July 14, Mujahidin Indonesian Timur (MIT) leader, Abu Warda Santoso („Santoso‟),
pledged allegiance to ISIS.
2014 / August
 President Yudhoyono‟s government announced on August 4 a ban on ISIS after the
appearance on YouTube of a video called “Joining the Ranks”, in which an Indonesian
calling himself “Abu Muhammad al Indunisi” urges others to follow his example and join
the jihad in Syria.
 The National Agency for Countering Terrorism (BNPT) Chairman Ansyaad Mbai
released a report that stated 34 Indonesian jihadists who joined ISIS in Iraq and Syria
have been identified as former terrorist prison inmates. The report detailed that they had
entered Syria and Iraq via Istanbul (Turkey) and Doha (Qatar). They then flew to Iraq
and Syria illegally. The BNPT stated that upon arrival ISIS had picked them up and
provided them with military training in-country.
 The BNPT announced it was dispatching a specialist team to Iraq and Syria to further
identify Indonesians joining ISIS. The BNPT stated that Indonesians who joined ISIS will
have their citizenship stripped and will be imprisoned.
 Dino Patti Djalal, Indonesia‟s Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister stated that Indonesia will
soon meet to discuss and share intelligence and information regarding ISIS with „some
friendly countries‟.
2014 / September
 The Syria-based Katibah Nusantara2
battalion (KNB) was formally launched on 26
September 2014, being headquartered in Al-Shaddadi, in the Syrian province
of Hasakah. Reports were that the KNB held a training ground located in
Poso, Indonesia for jihadists travelling to Syria. The members of the KNB had in early
April 2015, achieved its first major combat success by capturing five Kurd-held territories
in Syria, speculating that the unit's main area of operations was still in Syria, before the
2016 Jakarta attacks.
2014 / November
 Indonesia‟s most well-known extremist preacher Aman released online (despite his
2
Katibah Nusantara Lid Daulah Islamiyyah, Malay Archipelago unit for the Islamic State in Iraq and
Syria and Majmu'ah al Arkhabiliy.

imprisonment) a translation of an ISIS treatise on “Slavery According to the Teachings of
Islam.”
2014 / December
 The national counterterrorism agency BNPT provided an estimate that about 514
Indonesians were in Syria and Iraq fighting alongside ISIS
 Indonesian authorities released a report that stated they had detected some 5,000
individuals in Indonesia who were actively supporting ISIS
 Seven Indonesian nationals were arrested and subsequently deported from Malaysia to
Indonesia – the nationals were intercepted en route to Syria to join ISIS. The group were
accompanied by five children.
2015
2015 / January – February
 Reports received of the Indonesian authorities decided to attempt to circumvent
limitations in their counter terrorism legislation through using Article 139A of the Criminal
Code against individuals joining or trying to join ISIS.
2015 / January
 Elite Indonesian police commando unit the Detasemen khusus 88 („Detachment 88‟ /
„Densus 88‟ / „Delta 88‟) stated that a further 123 Indonesians had been identified as
having joined the fighting in Syria. Their statement was from prison service intelligence
reports and their own. Report detailed that prison networks provided a central source for
the arrangement of travel to Syria, and the important revelation that passage to Syria
and ISIS membership required a recommendation from a terrorist group in Indonesia.
 Approximately 43 Indonesians known to have died in Syria-Iraq theatre according to
Densus 88 reports, including at least five in known suicide attacks.
2015 / March
A video, entitled “The Light of Education in the Caliphate” (Cahaya Tarbiyah di Bumi
Khilafah) was posted on YouTube in which included Malaysian and Indonesian children in
Syria playing together and also receiving rudimentary military training from ISIS.

2015 / April
 Reported that Indonesian ISIS fighters suffered heavy casualties in Syria in the first
weeks of April
2015 / June
 Bahrun Naim of MIT, formed a small cell in Java via ISIS encrypted phone messaging
app Telegram. This app has been reported as being used by ISIS supporters in
Indonesia and worldwide. Naim delivered via this telecom platform, instructions on bomb
making techniques. The Central Java based unit planned attacks in August 2015 on a
police station, a Christian church and a Buddhist temple. The plans were intercepted and
the attacks prevented by security forces, with the police reportedly arresting all but one
member of the operational unit.
 Indonesia‟s Armed Forces (TNI) launched a new counter-terrorism squad named the TNI
Joint Special Operations Command (Koopsusgab) on 9 June 2015. The Chief of the TNI,
General Moeldoko said Koopsusgab was prepared to fight any act of terrorism that
threatened Indonesian sovereignty and would protect civilians. The new unit will be
stationed in Sentul, West Java, and will comprise 81 trained counter-terrorism personnel
from the Army, the Navy‟s special force (Denjaka) and the Air Force‟s Bravo 990 special
force unit. It has yet clear how Koopsusgab and Detachment 88, the police anti-terror
force, will work together to fight terrorism. Current law does not allow the military to
conduct anti-terror operations unless requested by police.
 The Minister for Social Affairs Khofifah Indar Parawansa reminded parents to guard their

children as ISIS targets teenagers for their recruitment. She expressed her concern that
ISIS could recruit Indonesian teenagers.
 A split between Bahrumsyah and Salim Mubarok (alias Abu Jandal) was noted as having
ongoing reverberations both in Indonesia and Syria. The first consequence was Abu
Jandal‟s decision to pull out of KNB the Bahasa speaking Indonesian-Malaysian fighting
unit commanded by Bahrumsyah, and to create a rival unit, the Katibah Masyaariq
battalion. Bahrumsyah responded by trying to strengthen his support base in Indonesia,
helped by his access to central ISIS funding.
2015 / August
 Abu Husna a former JI leader, who joined the more militant Jamaah Anshorul Tauhid
(JAT) in 2008, following his release from prison returned to Surakarta (Solo) and
immediately set up a new jihadi organisation called Katibul Iman. Abu Husna historically
held a very close relationship with JAT‟s founder.
2015 / October
 Police arrested field coordinators in the earlier stages of several planned terrorist
operations against Shi‟a leaders and institutions in Sumatra as well as an attack on
Iranian refugees (Shi‟a Muslims) in Pekanbaru accused of spreading Shi‟ism. The
arrested suspects were reported as being members of Katibul Iman led by Abu Husna.
 Police state that these arrests highlight the possibility of intra-Muslim sectarianism,
historically minimal in Indonesia might rise as a result of Salafi influence from ISIS. If it is
true that Salafi links might make salafi jihadi groups more prone to anti-Shi‟a targeting,
then the newest and largest pro-ISIS coalition, Jamaah Ansharul Khilafah Islamiyah
(JAKI) could begin targeting Shi‟s as well. The fact that JAKI‟s strongest base is located
in East Java, a region that has seen such a high level of anti-Shi‟a activity, might make
targeting Shi‟a an attractive recruiting device.
2015 / November
 Key ISIS meeting held in East Java, organised by prominent terrorist Aman
Abdurrahman, with the purpose of the meeting being the uniting of all ISIS supporters in
Indonesia under the banner of his newly formed group Jamaah Ansharul Khilafah
Islamiyah (Partisans of the Islamic Caliphate; JAKI). At the meeting the long-time
veteran terrorist Abu Gar was also appointed JAKI‟s head of military affairs and was
tasked with leading training courses for members. He was instructed to begin

preparations immediately for a sizeable attack, and set about selecting the participants
as well as organising logistics, training and finance arrangements that month. The attack
was the Jakarta attack, which was later decided to be conducted on January 14
unbeknown to him.
2015 / December
 Police arrested the sole escapee of Naim‟s Surakarta based unit, and several of his
associates. Intelligence from the arrest gleaned that the prominent terrorist based in
Syria, Naim, had instructed the man to target Jakarta‟s Christian governor in October
2015 and a Shi‟ite mosque in Bogor during an Ashura festival normally attended by 400
attendees.
 Indonesian forces began an operation in Sulawesi jungles to capture MIT leader
Santoso. Authorities reported they were concerned as to the reach of his network
domestically and his connectivity with ISIS in Syria.
 In Solo Police arrest an Indonesian Abu Musab in a police raid on December 23 together
with a Chinese ethnic Uighur named Ali. The police confirmed that the local terrorist cell
had been planning to mount a suicide bombing.
2016
2016 / January

 Jakarta Attacks, January 14: January 14 was the first major terrorist attack in Indonesia
since July 2009 (JW Marriott and Ritz Carlton hotel bombings). The terrorist attack team
was made up of at least five men who carried small firearms and crude IED SVEST and
other small explosives. The team was drawn from the pro-ISIS group Partisans of the
Islamic Caliphate (Jamaah Ansyarul Khilafah Islamiyah, JAKI), the group that carried out
the attacks.
 ISIS claims responsibility for the attack saying “Islamic State fighters carried out an
armed attack this morning targeting foreign nationals and the security forces charged
with protecting them in the Indonesian capital.” The statement was released on its official
Telegram Channel, an encrypted phone app according to Amaaq News Agency.
 A later statement released directly by ISIS‟ propaganda arm Amaaq News Agency stated
“A group of soldiers of the caliphate in Indonesia targeted a gathering from the crusader
alliance that fights the Islamic State in Jakarta”
 Indonesian security forces arrested twelve people linked with the 4 terrorists killed in the
attack, with the 12 arrested suspects accused of plotting further attacks against
Indonesian government, police and foreign targets. Abu Gar avoids arrest at this time.
2016 / February
 News report from ABC presents video footage by ABC cameraman of ISIS recruitment
meeting in mosque in Jakarta. Reporter states that five mosques in Jakarta were found
by him where such preaching occurs and where travelling to Syria is spoken of openly.
The meeting was recorded by the organisers and was later uploaded to YouTube for
recruitment – propaganda purposes.
2016 / March
 Two terrorists of the MIT group shot dead in Napu, Poso District, on March 15,
were identified as Nuretin alias Abdul and Magalasi Bahtusan alias Farok, were
reportedly of Uyghur ethnicity of China. The two had reportedly joined the group after
MIT‟s leader Santoso made his announcement on social media, calling all Indonesians
and Muslims to join him in the fight to help ISIS and to participate in training in Poso.
2016 / April
 Two further Uyghurs, a total of four out of six that had travelled to Indonesia to join MIT
were reported as killed in recent weeks in Central Sulawesi province, by police

authorities.
2016 / June
 Indonesia's most wanted terrorist Santoso, alias Abu Wardah, the leader of MIT was
killed by police during a fire-fight. Santoso's death was considered a success by the
country's counterterrorism efforts as police and military had focused heavily on his
capture since late 2015. Santoso‟s identity and death was fully confirmed by DNA testing
later revealed in late July.
 Police unit Densus 88 arrest four terrorists that are part of the pro-ISIS Sibghatullah
network in two arrests in the country‟s second largest city Surabaya. At the first arrest
several weapons, two IEDS and bomb detonating equipment with intelligence from the
arrest indicating they were planning to undertake an attack against government offices
and the public in Surabaya during Ramadan. One of the suspects was linked to Abu
Jandal in Syria another suspect was a former prison convict.
2016 / July
 ISIS video threatens nusantara archipelago (Malaysia and Indonesia focus, but this
region includes the Philippines) authorities, with the majority of video participants being
bahasa speaking children from Southeast Asian nations symbolically throwing their
passports into a fire saying they will return with military force.
 A suicide bomber riding a motorbike has attacked the largest police station in Solo

Central Java, killing himself and injuring a police officer. The bomber blew himself up at
the gate after he was prevented from entering the police station. The attack happened on
the last day of Ramadan. The city of Solo is the birthplace of Indonesian President
Widodo, and as such is seen as potentially symbolic that this city was chosen for the
attack. Preliminary reports from Police indicated that the bomber used low-grade
explosives in the homemade bomb, which like most improvised explosive devices
(IEDs), contained ball bearings and screws. Nur Rohman was a member of a local terror
cell led by an Indonesian militant named Arif Hidayatullah, alias Abu Musab. Musab
testified that Nur Rohman was one of two men who had escaped the raid with a
homemade bomb, adding that Rohman had received instructions on how to assemble an
IED from Bahrun via a smartphone messaging application.
2016 / August
 Police unit Densus 88 arrest six Indonesians (five prosecuted) including the leader of the
small group known on Batam island near Singapore, for allegedly plotting a rocket attack
on Singapore's “vital objects and busy areas.” Batam island has regular ferries services
to Singapore. The Marina Bay area was reportedly a target for the group. The militant
group is called GRD, named after their leader, Gigih Rahmat Dewa. Police stated that
the group had mostly recruited its members online and the leader was operating under
Bahrun Naim, the Syria based ISIS member.
 ISIS-inspired attempts suicide attack on Church congregation in Medan, Indonesia‟s third
largest city. The attacker slightly injured the priest during the service with an axe,
however his suicide bomb attempted failed when his IED „burst into flames‟ as opposed
to detonated. Police arrested the man.
 Two Indonesian sailors kidnapped in June by ISIS affiliate Abu Sayyaf Group escape
their captivity and are returned to Indonesia.
2016 / September
 The interim commander of MIT, Basri, Santoso‟s long-serving second in command was
arrested by Police in Poso. Police confirmed they are still seeking to apprehend the third
in command Alo Karora.

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