disclaimer - this is just an attempt to answer the question for tutorial/assignment, pls double check with ur own notes for confirmation

1. NON-FATAL OFFENCES
ASSAULT 1
The parties involve are A, as the accused and B, as the victim. Then, the issue here is
whether B can be held liable for assault as defined under Section 351 of the Penal Code and
punishable under Section 352 of the same code for pointed a water pistol to B.
LAW PRINCIPLE
Section 351 defines assault as gesture or preparation in conveying the threat of violence that
causes the apprehension that constitute the offence.
In determining whether A can be held liable for assault, we must see whether his act falls
within the meaning of assault. The 2 elements to an assault are physical gesture and the intention to
cause threat that the victim will apprehend. The physical gesture need not be an actual force and
requires no contact with the body. In the case of Sammy Pillay, the accused was charged for an
offence of assault in respect of his action in pointing a revolver at the complainant in a coffee shop.
In this situation, there is an issue to the effect of liability since A is a prankster.
If Section 351 is read literally, it states that an act amounts to assault as long as there is
gesture or preparation and no bodily contact. Then, in Jashanmal Jhamatmal, the court held that
when the accused put on his hand towards the woman in a menacing manner so as to cause her to
apprehend that he was about use criminal force, it was an assault. However, the court’s
interpretation was differs in the case of Dato Sri S Samy Vellu v S Nadarajah, the accused went on a
meeting and in that meeting he tried to hit the victim. The court stated that whether a certain act
amounts to an assault depends upon the reasonable apprehension which a person entertains about
criminal force being imminent. If there is no present ability to use criminal force, there cannot be
reasonable apprehension.
APPLICATION
In applying the law to the situation, there is a physical gesture directed by A to B when he
pointed the water pistol. If the literal interpretation is applied, A can be held liable even if there is no
intention to either use criminal force or make no bodily contact. However, in this case, the court’s
interpretation shall apply. A pointing a water pistol does not cause reasonable apprehension to B.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, A cannot be held liable for assault under Section 351.

2. ASSAULT 2
The parties involve are A, the accused and B, the victim. The issue here is whether A can be
held liable for assault as defined under Section 351 of the Penal Code for rolling up her sleeves and
uttered words of threat to B and punishable under Section 352 of the same code.
LAW PRINCIPLE
Section 351 defines assault as gesture or preparation in conveying the threat of violence that
causes the apprehension that constitute the offence.
In determining whether A can be held liable for assault, we must see whether his act falls
within the meaning of assault. The first element of assault is there must be a physical gesture. The
physical gesture need not be an actual force and requires no contact with the body . In Sammy Pillay,
the accused was charged for an offence of assault in respect of his action in pointing a revolver at
the complainant in a coffee shop.
Secondly, there must intention that the victim will apprehend. In this situation, there is an
issue whether words can amount to an assault. The general rule is that words cannot amount to
assault. However, words can colour gestures to indicate intention. In Read v Coker, the plaintiff was
fired by the defendant. Two days later, the plaintiff returned to the premises owned by the
defendant and refused to leave. The defendant gathered up some of his men and threatened him
that if he didn’t leave, they would break his neck. The plaintiff left fearing the men would strike him.
The court held that it was an assault. Gesture and intent locked the deal. In Illustration (c), A takes
up a stick saying to Z “I will give you a beating”. Here, though the words used by A could in no case
amount to an assault and though mere gesture is unaccompanied by any other circumstances might
not amount to an assault, the gesture explained by the words amounts may amount to an assault.
APPLICATION
In applying the law to the situation, A conducted a mere act of rolling up her sleeve
accompanied by words of assault. Thus, eventhough the threats uttered by A may not amounting to
assault as in general rule, but her threats was accompanied by her gesture by the act of rolling up
her sleeve.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, A can be held liable for assault under Section 351 and punishable under 352.

3. ASSAULT 3
The parties involve are A the accused and B the victim. The issue here is whether A can be
held liable for assault as defined under Section 351 of the Penal Code for pointing a sharpened
bamboo stick to B and punishable under Section 352 of the same code.
LAW PRINCIPLE
Section 351 defines assault as gesture or preparation in conveying the threat of violence that
causes the apprehension that constitute the offence.
In determining whether A can be held liable for assault, we must see whether his act falls
within the meaning of assault. The first element of assault is there must be a physical gesture. The
physical gesture need not be an actual force and requires no contact with the body . In Sammy Pillay,
the accused was charged for an offence of assault in respect of his action in pointing a revolver at
the complainant in a coffee shop.
Secondly, there must intention that the victim will apprehend. In this situation, there is an
issue whether words can amount to an assault. The general rule is that words cannot amount to
assault. However, words can colour gestures to indicate intention. In the case of Tuberville v Savage,
the accused had a sword in his hand and uttered “if it is not assize time, I would take such language
from you”. The court held that the words negative the intention and therefore no assault. Thus,
words can also negative an intention.
APPLICATION
In applying the law, eventhough A made physical gestures by pointing a sharpened bamboo
stick to B. But, he had uttered words that negative his intention to cause apprehension which
prevent him from doing the threat which he said that he will execute the threat if B is not his
brother.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, A cannot be held liable for assault under Section 351.

4. CRIMINAL INTIMIDATION
The parties involve are A, the accused and B, the victim. The issue is whether A can be held
liable for criminal intimidation as defined under Section 503 of the Penal Code and punishable under
section 506 of the same code for causing threat to B.
LAW PRINCIPLE
Section 503 defines criminal intimidation as a threat which intent to cause alarm to that
person as the means of avoiding the execution of threat.
In determining whether A can be held liable for criminal intimidation, we must see whether
his act falls within the meaning of the offence. There are two (2) elements that must be satisfied.
Firstly, there must be a threat to cause an injury to persons, reputation or property. Section
44 defines injury as any harm illegally caused to any person, body, mind, reputation, or property. In
the case of Sinnasamy v PP, the accused threatens to kill the victim with a parang, the court held
that there is sufficient evident to support a criminal intimidation because the parang is sufficient to
constitute a threat. However it is not essential to have a weapon as mere would suffice.
The second element is that there was an intention to cause alarm. The person have to be
alarmed by the threat and the accused must have the intention to cause alarm which is to cause a
person to do any act which he is not legally bound to do or to omit any act which that person is
legally bound to do so . In the case of Lee Yoke Choong v PP, the important requirement to
constitute criminal intimidation is the intention of the maker and the nature of threat, in which it
would be enough to conclude that the maker of the threats had the intention to cause alarm.
Then, in the case of PP v Aziz Bin Wee, the accused had picked up a dangerous weapon and
shouted ‘try if you want to get it’ as the staff of Ministry of Health was trying to remove the accused
good as he has no license to operate a food stall. The court decided that, anyone who had faced with
the accused while holding the knife near to him must have been gravely alarmed. Thus, the accused
was guilty of criminal intimidation.
APPLICATION
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, A may be held liable for criminal intimidation under section 504 of the Penal
Code and punishable under section 506 of the same code for causing threat to B.

5. CRIMINAL FORCE
The parties involve are A, the accused and B, the victim. The issue is whether A can be held
liable for criminal force as defined under Section 350 of the Penal Code and punishable under
section 352 of the same code for spittle on B.
LAW PRINCIPLE
Section 350 defines criminal force as if an accused caused motion, change of motion or
cessation of motion to any substance as to bring it into contact to body as to create feeling, by his
own bodily power, disposing substance or inducing animals to move.
Force is further defined in section 349 as a person is said to use force on another if he causes
motion, change of motion or cessation of motion.
In determining whether A can be held liable for criminal force, we must see whether his act
falls within the meaning of the offence. The first element which is the actus reus of this offence is
that the force must be intentionally inflicted, as it is not sufficiently to constitute an offence if force
was accidently or recklessly inflicted or that the offender knew his action was likely to cause force. In
Ng Eng Huat v PP, there was no direct force but the movement was affected when the appellant
intentionally reversed his car to collide with the other car. The court held that the appellant’s act
was an intentional and deliberate act and he had used criminal force.
The second element is that the force must be used on a person. The person must be the
ultimate object of the force. No offence of criminal force is committed when the lock of a house is
broken or where a ladder is removed leaving the victim stranded on the roof of a house. Its shows
that the purpose of doing such acts is to directly affect the person. In the case of Raja Izzuddin Shah
v PP, the accused was convicted with the offence under section 353 when he had slapped the
complainant who was a police officer, dragged him by shirt and pushed him against the wall.
Then, the third element of this offence is the force must be without the victim’s consent.
Where the victim consents to the use of force, there is no offence.
APPLICATION
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, A may be held liable for criminal force under section 350 of the Penal Code
and punishable under section 352 of the same code for causing threat to B.

6. CRIMINAL FORCE TO OUTRAGE MODESTY
The parties involve are A, the accused and B, the victim. The issue is whether A can be held
liable for criminal force to outrage modesty as defined under Section 354 of the Penal Code and
punishable under the same section for using force to outrage the modesty of B.
LAW PRINCIPLE
Section 354 of the Penal Code provides that whoever assaults or uses criminal force to any
person, intending to outrage or knowing it to be likely that he will thereby outrage the modesty of
that person.
Force is further defined in section 349 as a person is said to use force on another if he causes
motion, change of motion or cessation of motion.
In determining whether A can be held liable for criminal force, we must see whether his act
falls within the meaning of the offence. The first element which is the actus reus of this offence is
that the force must be intentionally inflicted, as it is not sufficiently to constitute an offence if force
was accidently or recklessly inflicted or that the offender knew his action was likely to cause force. In
Rajeevan v PP, the accused was convicted of this offence for slipping his left hand through the gap
between the bus’s window and the victim’s seat. He then pressed the victim’s blouse twice at the
left breast region.
The second element is that the force must be used on a person. The person must be the
ultimate object of the force. In the case of Tan Beng Chye v PP, the accused had taken the victim to
some bushes, removed his short and inner pants. He then made the victim take off her coat and
trousers leaving her in knickers, which she refused to take off. The accused then arrested, charged
and convicted for attempted rape. The appeal court held there was no sufficient evidence in the act
to constitute rape but his attempt to remove her knickers was evidence of use of force to outrage
her modesty.
Then, the third element of this offence is the force must be without the victim’s consent.
Where the victim consents to the use of force, there is no offence.
APPLICATION
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, A may be held liable for criminal force to outrage modesty under section 354
of the Penal Code and punishable under the same section for causing threat to B.

7. HURT
The parties involve are A, the accused and B, the victim. The issue here is whether A can be
held liable for hurt as defined under Section 321 of the Penal code for punching B and punishable
under Section 323 of the same code.
LAW PRINCIPLE
Section 321 defines voluntarily causing hurt as an act done with the intention of causing hurt
to another person or with knowledge that he is likely cause hurt the person and the hurt caused is
said to be voluntarily.
Section 319 further defines hurt as person who causes bodily pain, disease or infirmity to
another person. Then, infirmity was defined in the case of Anis Beg as inability of an organ to
perform its normal function which may be either temporary or permanent.
In determining whether B can be held liable for causing hurt, we must see whether his act
falls within the meaning of the offence. The actus reus of this offence is causing bodily pain, diseases
or infirmity to any person. Then, the mens rea is the intention or knowledge to cause hurt.
The first element needs to be proved is the act must be done voluntarily. Section 39 defines
voluntary act as when one causes it by means he intended to do it or at that time, knew and believe
to likely to cause it. Then, in the case of Jashanmal Jhamatmal v Brahmanand, it was said that there
was nothing in the provision to suggest that hurt should be caused by direct physical contact
between the accused and the victim.
Secondly, the act must be accompanied with knowledge and intention to cause and thereby
caused hurt. In PP v Mahfar bin Sairan, it was held that where an action lacked intention or
knowledge, it also lacks the essential element of voluntary. Then, in Manzoor Ahmad v State of
Allahabad, the accused, after an argument with a 15 year old boy, fed him with copper sulphate
which led to his collapse and subsequent admission to hospital for a stomach wash. The court held
that hurt can be either temporary or permanent. So long caused infirmity, it is sufficient.
APPLICATION
CONCLUSION
In the conclusion, A can be held liable for causing hurt towards B under Section 321 of the Penal
Code and punishable under section 323 of the same code.

8. GRIEVOUS HURT
The parties involve are A, the accused and B, the victim. The issue here is whether A can be
held liable for hurt as defined under Section 322 of the Penal code for punching B and punishable
under Section 325 of the same code.
LAW PRINCIPLE
Section 322 defines voluntarily causing grievous hurt as an act done with the intention of
causing grievous hurt to another person or with knowledge that he is likely to cause grievous hurt
the person and the grievous hurt caused is said to be voluntarily.
In determining whether B can be held liable for causing grievous hurt, we must see whether
his act falls within the meaning of the offence. In the case of PP v Sng Siew Ngoh, it was provided
that for an offence of voluntarily causing grievous hurt, it is necessary to show:
1. The hurt was caused voluntarily;
2. The accused intended or knew he was likely to cause grievous hurt; and
3. The hurt caused was grievous hurt.
For the first element, the offender must voluntarily commit the act. Secondly, the accused
must intended or knew he was likely to cause to cause grievous hurt. In the case of PP v Mahfar bin
Sairan, it was held that where an action lacked intention or knowledge, it also lacks the essential
element of voluntary.
Then, lastly hurt becomes grievous hurt when hurt takes one of the forms stated in section
320 of the Penal Code. [State any of the forms applicable according to the question].
APPLICATION
CONCLUSION
In the conclusion, A can be held liable for causing grievous hurt towards B under Section 322
of the Penal Code and punishable under section 325 of the same code.